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FOREWORD
The transition towards low carbon development 
and more broad based green growth are vital to 
addressing some of the most pressing challenges 
facing the global community, such as global warm-
ing and unsustainable use of natural resources. 
Confronting the end of the first Kyoto Commit-
ment period in 2012 with no agreed outcome for 
global cooperation on future emission reductions, 
there is an urgent need to look for new opportu-
nities for public and private cooperation to drive 
broad-based progress in living standards and keep 
projected future warming below the politically 
agreed 2 degrees Celsius. 
Responding jointly to these global challenges the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) 
and its UNEP Risø Centre (URC) have in coopera-
tion with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) 
prepared the Perspectives 2011. The publication 
focuses on the role of carbon markets in contribut-
ing to low carbon development and new mecha-
nisms for green growth, as one core area of action 
to address the challenges noted above. Under the 
title of ‘Progressing towards post-2012 carbon 
markets’ the publication explores, how carbon 
markets at national, regional and global levels can 
be developed and up-scaled to sustain the involve-
ment of the private sector in leveraging finance 
and innovative solutions to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
GGGI opened the first regional office in May 2011 
at the Technical University of Denmark, where the 
UNEP Risø Centre is located and this report repre-
sents a first collaborative effort. 
Richard Samans      John Christensen
Executive Director      Head
GGGI      UNEP Risø Centre
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EDITORIAL
The absence of agreement on a second commit-
ment period for the Kyoto Protocol or another le-
gally binding agreement is creating uncertainty for 
investors looking to invest in emissions reduction 
activities all over the world. This year’s Perspec-
tives from UNEP and its UNEP Risoe Centre focuses 
on the mushrooming of initiatives that are filling 
the global vacuum while waiting for a post-2012 
climate agreement. These may provide the building 
blocks and lead the way for carbon markets in the 
future. Local and regional initiatives have emerged 
in countries like India, South Korea, China, Japan, 
Australia, Brazil and others. Compared to the situ-
ation prior to negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, the 
international community may find that it no long-
er shapes the global carbon market, but will need 
to find ways of integrating the market fragments 
that have already established themselves. 
The current situation gives rise to a number of 
questions. Is a global carbon market possible that 
incorporates these diverse initiatives? If so, what 
would it look like? How can carbon markets reach 
their full potential and contribute to a significant 
scaling-up of climate finance by 2020? Can bot-
tom-up approaches and voluntary markets help 
us reduce greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently 
to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius? 
How will existing mechanisms evolve, and how 
will new instruments operate: independently, or as 
part of an integrated global carbon market? Do the 
new instruments constitute a threat or an oppor-
tunity for carbon markets?
Ten articles in Perspectives 2011 address these 
questions. Durando Ndongsok shares experiences 
from the CDM in Africa and takes a critical look 
at the perspectives for CDM and future mecha-
nisms in Africa, despite a preferential status in 
the EU ETS post-2012. Christian Egenhofer con-
tends that the future European carbon market is 
unlikely to induce noticeable demand while it still 
remains the backbone of global carbon markets. 
The carbon credit overhang may seek towards the 
voluntary markets that are experiencing a new dy-
namism, as described by Dinesh Babu, or it may 
wait for a scaled-up cost-efficiency mechanism 
like the sectoral crediting approach, as suggested 
by Wolfgang Sterk. Meanwhile the USA and Canada 
are lagging behind on carbon trading, as both Rob-
ert Stavins and David Sawyer describe, while at the 
same time experiencing a significant fragmenta-
tion of the emissions-related markets within their 
borders. Axel Michaelowa argues that fragmen-
tation comes at a cost and maintains that a top-
down regime remains the preferential outcome 
of the negotiations. But fragmentation is already 
becoming a reality in China, a rapidly rising new-
comer in the exclusive group of countries that, as 
described by Wei Lin,  Hongbo Chen and Jia Liang 
Editors: Søren Lütken (snlu@risoe.dtu.dk) 
and Karen Holm Olsen (kaol@risoe.dtu.dk)
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is seeking to establish its own national carbon-
trading markets. Therefore, as Kishan Kumarsingh 
describes, the role of the UN is fast becoming that 
of the ‘coordinating entity’ of a global programme 
of activities, the diversity of which is threatening 
the liquidity of the global carbon market unless a 
regulator assumes the task of ensuring compat-
ibility. Finally, there is still the chance that Durban 
will provide the breakthrough and deliver a suite 
of new GHG market instruments, as Andrei Marcu 
suggests, that will ultimately go beyond off-setting 
and mean the beginning of up-scaled carbon mar-
kets, with additional benefits for the atmosphere. 
Perspectives 2011 is organized into three inter-
related sections covering policy, existing instru-
ments and new instruments. The first section is a 
collection of articles presenting the range of policy 
responses from a number of essential players – the 
EU, China, the USA and Canada, and not least the 
UN in a potentially coordinating role. The second 
section discusses perspectives for existing mar-
kets and mechanisms, in which the CDM and its 
recent adjustments and additions may inspire the 
structuring of future instruments, while the volun-
tary market, free from top-down regulation, may 
also explore other less compliance-related cor-
ners of emissions-reduction markets and indeed 
inspire the development of new approaches. Such 
new approaches are the focus of the third section, 
in which sectoral crediting and new market mecha-
nisms are the main concepts being promoted in 
the negotiations.   
Paradoxically, while many seem to be on the look-
out for something new to follow the Kyoto flexible 
mechanisms, the CDM is thriving. Never has the 
number of new projects entering into validation 
on a monthly count been higher than now, reach-
ing over 200. Of course, part of this is an End of 
Business syndrome, but a more positive interpre-
tation is that it provides evidence for an invest-
ment momentum that is unlikely to come to a halt 
overnight. Thus, what the current market has done 
above anything else is to ensure that there is a 
common understanding of the issue and a global 
drive to find ways to keep rewarding the pursuit of 
emission reductions.
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Section 1
Policy
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Fragmentation of international 
climate policy – doom or boon 
for carbon markets?
Abstract
After Copenhagen and Cancun, fragmentation of 
carbon markets is in full swing, with the EU and 
Japan actively dismantling the role of the CDM 
as “gold standard” currency of the global carbon 
market  While some political scientists argue that 
fragmentation could be advantageous for the 
climate negotiations, economists see it nega-
tively, as it drives mitigation costs upwards and 
leads to a hodgepodge of rules with high transac-
tion costs  The voluntary market as a laboratory 
for fragmentation has shown that high-quality 
credits are restricted to a tiny share, prices vary 
by several orders of magnitude and registries as 
well as verification standards have proliferated  
Thus fragmentation should be resisted as far as 
possible 
 
The rise and fall of centralized  
international climate policy
Anthropogenic global climate change is one of the 
biggest challenges for mankind entering the 21st 
century due to its particularly “nasty” policy char-
acteristics. Mitigation of greenhouse gases has the 
character of a global public good whose benefits ac-
crue to everybody while costs have to be borne by 
the entity financing the mitigation activity. In con-
trast to other public goods such as public security, 
benefits from climate change mitigation do not ac-
crue immediately, but only in the future, and the 
level of benefits is contested. For some actors, e.g. 
people living in high latitudes where climate change 
increases agricultural productivity (see Yang et al. 
2007), mitigation of climate change might actually 
not be desirable. Moreover, given the uncertainty 
surrounding climate change impacts, people might 
prefer to “wait and see”, and eventually call for gov-
ernment help if impacts actually occur. 
Axel Michaelowa 
University of Zurich
Perspectives
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After two decades of increasing visibility and sali-
ence, international climate policy is at a crossroads. 
Hitherto, climate policy had followed a path of in-
creasing centralization and coordination, climbing 
up a ladder of increasingly detailed international 
agreements. Climate negotiators had the general 
impression to follow in the footsteps of ozone di-
plomacy, where a generic framework treaty was 
strengthened over time by specific treaties, ratchet-
ing up emissions commitments as well as resource 
transfers from industrialized to developing coun-
tries to fund emissions mitigation. With the UN 
Framework Convention of Climate Change agreed 
in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 and 
the Bali Plan of Action agreed in 2007 on the prin-
ciples of a post-2012 climate regime, the Montreal 
Protocol precedent seemed to be a perfect fit.
Of course, game theorists (Barrett 1998) and po-
litical science realists (Victor 2001) had long stated 
that the free riding induced by the global public 
good characteristics of climate policy would lead 
to a failure of a centralized international approach. 
They had seemed to triumph already in 2001 when 
US president Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol. 
But then the rest of the world rallied to defend 
the Kyoto approach, and the Protocol entered into 
force in 2005. 2007 brought the consecration of 
climate policy as an issue of highest global impor-
tance with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Al 
Gore. Everything seemed on track to culminate in a 
glorious event that would lead international climate 
policy in its third decade and set up a really global 
climate regime – the Copenhagen climate summit 
of late 2009. 
But fate intervened by unravelling the real estate 
bubble in the US. By mid-2009 policymakers in 
countries previously proud of their role as climate 
policy pioneers were struggling to keep their econo-
mies afloat. Hopes of the US playing the role of a 
climate policy frontrunner evaporated after Con-
gress failed to pass a comprehensive emissions 
trading bill. Those advanced developing countries 
that had weathered the storm well were not really 
eager to take up the role of greenhouse gas miti-
gation pioneers. Instead, they discovered climate 
policy as a field where they could assert their newly 
won economic power and defy industrialized coun-
tries through a new negotiation group called BASIC. 
This explosive cocktail derailed the Copenhagen 
negotiations, with things made worse by the host 
country’s inept handling of the summit. What was 
hoped to be the herald of a new era of global co-
operation on climate change mitigation dissolved 
into a glimpse into the abyss of a fragmented cli-
mate policy with each country just doing what it 
felt to be appropriate, without any comparabil-
ity or transparency of mitigation efforts. While 
through last minute attempts the abyss was pa-
pered over by the “Copenhagen Accord”, it became 
quickly visible that Copenhagen heralded a sea 
change in climate policy. Ever since then, interna-
tional climate policy faces the inconvenient truth 
of fragmentation, even if hidden behind many 
smokescreens of UNFCCC language and “success-
es” in negotiations such as Cancun in 2010. 
Why fragmentation of climate policy  
is a bad idea
Biermann et al. (2007, p. 8ff) discuss pros and 
cons of fragmentation from a political science 
view. In their view, fragmentation could lead to 
faster agreements among frontrunners and avoid 
watering down of commitments. Moreover, it 
would allow side payments and allow to involve 
non-state actors as well as solutions tailored to 
specific circumstances. Competition between dif-
ferent approaches could lead to innovation. Os-
trom (2010) argues that bottom-up “polycentric 
efforts” could lead to a situation that is better than 
an ineffective centralized regime. However, many 
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of the arguments do not fully fit to the current 
regime, as it allows for differentiation of commit-
ments, side payments through climate finance and 
voluntary non-state action. According to Biermann 
et al. (2007) the disadvantages of a fragmented ap-
proach include less potential for package deals, 
lack of fairness, incentives to engage in a race to 
the bottom and lack of transparency.
From an economist’s viewpoint, the disadvantag-
es dominate. Due to the characteristics of green-
house gas mitigation as a global public good, it is 
economically ideal to agree on emissions targets 
globally and to harness the cheapest mitigation op-
tions through market mechanisms. While simple 
marginal abatement cost curves as reported by Mc 
Kinsey need to be treated with caution (see Ekins 
et al. (2011), and the dynamic effects of mitigation 
policies need to be considered when comparing 
measures, experience from the Clean Development 
Mechanism has shown that it was able to mobilize a 
significant volume of low-cost reductions, but also 
higher cost ones (Castro 2011). The effect of frag-
mentation will be that overall emissions mitigation 
effort will be lower than required by the 2°C target 
acknowledged both in the Copenhagen and Cancun 
agreements (Kartha and Erickson 2011 summarize 
all relevant studies and conclude that the tempera-
ture rise would be in the interval 2.5°C to 5°C) . This 
is even acknowledged by realists, Carraro and Mas-
setti (2010) propose wryly to use 50 billion $ to buy 
mitigation in developing countries in order to close 
the effort gap. They do not realize that under a 
fragmented approach, there is no incentive for any 
country to spend huge sums on mitigation abroad. 
A comparison of modelling studies show that any 
fragmentation of mitigation action will unequivo-
cally lead to mitigation cost increases (Hof et al., 
2009). This is the case in any configuration of mar-
ginal costs. In a fragmented world, carbon prices 
will differ and even if there is “linking” of different 
jurisdictions (Flachsland et al. 2009), transaction 
costs will occur. Further negative effects are car-
bon leakage, i.e. the increase of emissions outside 
a group of countries that mitigates emissions due 
to the reduction of fossil fuel prices caused by the 
mitigation action (Sinn 2008). Fragmentation of 
market mechanisms will deter financial institu-
tions which need a minimum turnover and stabil-
ity to enter a market. In a fragmented market, sell-
ers of credits will be at the mercy of each single, 
unique buyer for specific types of credit while cur-
rently, international competition protects sellers 
against overly greedy buyers.  While some buyers 
would look for high-quality credits, as done by the 
EU today, there would probably be a “race to the 
bottom” in order to minimize costs of complying 
with the pledge.
How does a fragmented climate policy 
world look like?
The key characteristics of the centralized world 
of the Kyoto Protocol regime and their counter-
parts under a fragmented regime are shown in 
Box 1.
Often, a fragmented system is seen as equal to a 
“pledge and review” system, which was first pro-
posed by Japan in the early 1990s and has resurfaced 
from time to time. However, the review element still 
needs to be based on some common ground, which 
would lack in a fully fragmented system.
A full fragmentation would mean that all countries 
define their climate policy unilaterally. While even 
in the bleakest scenario, the UNFCCC would persist, 
it would uniquely provide rules for reporting of na-
tional greenhouse gas inventories. So some degree 
Fragmentation of mitigation action will 
unequivocally lead to mitigation cost 
increases.
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of ex post evaluation of actual climate policy suc-
cesses would be possible, at least for the Annex I 
countries. However, for developing countries, this 
evaluation would become difficult as the frequen-
cy of reports is not specified in the UNFCCC. 
The actual post-2012 future may settle on a “mid-
dle ground” between a centralized and a fully 
fragmented system (Prag et al. 2011, p. 8). While 
it retains some features of centralization that are 
commonly seen as useful – Prag et al. (2011) would 
include common accounting rules, tracking of in-
ternational transactions and common principles 
for new market mechanisms - other elements are 
fragmented. This would entail the risk that in a 
fragmented system one mitigation activity could 
be counted in several systems. A reduction might 
be acknowledged as an offset and at the same time 
credited towards a national pledge. This would 
become particularly relevant if some mechanisms 
credit policies whereas in the same jurisdiction 
project-based mechanisms continue to exist. It is 
clear that transaction costs of checking for double 
counting might be substantial.
Even with the UNFCCC negotiations formally still 
aiming at a relatively centralized system, de facto 
fragmentation is in full swing. The EU, which has 
hitherto formed the backbone of the global carbon 
market with its domestic emission trading scheme 
(EU ETS) accepting credits from the project-based 
Kyoto Mechanisms without serious constraints, is 
no longer willing to play this role. Already in the 
legislation agreed in 2009, the import limits for 
Kyoto credits have been reduced massively for the 
third EU ETS phase 2013-2020. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of an international agreement, Certified Emis-
sion Reductions (CERs) from Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects can only be imported 
if they come from projects located in Least Devel-
oped Countries or from projects that have already 
been registered before 2013. The latest restriction, 
announced in November 2010, was the prohibition 
of CER imports from CDM projects reducing the 
industrial gases HFC-23, and N2O from production 
of adipic acid, which will enter into force in April 
2013. CERs from such projects currently make up 
the lion’s share of all CDM credits. The EU has made 
it very clear that it sees the Kyoto Mechanisms as 
Box 1: Key differences between a centralized and a fragmented climate policy regime
Centralized world
-  legally binding commitments (absolute) 
-  common emissions units (same global warming 
potentials) 
-  common inventory guidelines (based on IPCC 
Good Practice) 
-  a UNFCCC-administered registry linking national 
registries
-  centrally defined market mechanisms 
-  central regulatory oversight 
- transparency 
Fragmented world
-  unilateral pledges (absolute or intensity-based, 
partially qualitative)
-  unilaterally defined emissions units (different 
global warming potentials)
-  unilateral inventory guidelines (national ap-
proach)
-  national registries 
- bilateral mechanisms 
- unilateral rules
- opaqueness
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a bargaining tool in the climate negotiations. It has 
been actively pushing for sectoral mechanisms to 
replace the CDM. Moreover, the EU’s import regula-
tions for the EU ETS allow multi-country agreements 
negotiated as per the EU’s interests. 
The US, which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
and thus have been the vanguard of fragmentation 
proactively undermined the idea of a global carbon 
market. While the bills that failed to pass Congress 
in 2009 embraced the principle of international 
offsets, it remained always clear that these offsets 
would have to obey domestically defined regula-
tions. This was due to a deep mistrust of the CDM 
(see e.g. US Government Accountability Office 2008) 
fostered by an awkward coalition of supporters 
of environmental integrity and opponents of any 
monetary transfers abroad generated by climate 
policy. Offset mechanisms are also seen as a way to 
subsidize competitors of US industry in advanced 
developing countries; thus avoided deforestation 
initiatives were preferred compared to industrial 
projects.
Even within the US, fragmentation is rampant, with 
two regional emission trading schemes (the Region-
al Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, in the Northeast 
and the Western Climate Initiative essentially trig-
gered by the Californian emissions trading proposal 
under the bill “AB 32”). Each of these schemes has 
different rules for project-based offsets. California 
has set an offset limit of 8%; offsets may only come 
from projects in the US, Canada and Mexico under 
rules approved by the Air Resources Board. So far, 
only a limited number of project types has been ac-
cepted. Moreover, sectoral credits might be allowed.
In 2010, Japan introduced the idea of a bilateral 
mechanism and quickly embarked in filling it with 
life. A budget of 77.5 million $ was allocated to 
promote the concept in 2010 and 2011. Both the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Environment are lavishly funding fea-
sibility studies for pilot projects, of which 59 have 
been started to date. Most of the studies are done in 
South East Asia and relate to technologies either not 
eligible under the CDM (e.g. a nuclear power plant in 
Vietnam) or suffering from additionality problems. 
Japanese industry strongly supports the bilateral 
approach as it was put off by the high regulatory in-
tensity of the CDM process and now hopes for easily 
accessible export subsidies for Japanese technolo-
gies. Access to feasibility study subsidies is limited 
to Japanese firms. Agreements with several govern-
ments to award and recognize bilateral credits are 
under negotiation. The credits are to be counted to-
wards the Japanese Copenhagen pledge. To date, no 
baseline, monitoring and verification methodologies 
have been published. The pilot projects shall how-
ever assess such methodologies.
The current status of fragmentation of carbon mar-
kets for the time after 2012 is shown in Figure 1 
below, showing the wide range of emissions trading 
systems and project-based offset mechanisms. 
Below, I discuss which parameters of project-based 
mechanisms and emissions trading systems can be 
influenced by fragmentation.
Differentiation of project-based  
mechanisms
The different parameters of project-based market 
mechanisms that can be influenced by fragmenta-
tion are as follows:
a) Baseline and additionality determination
b) Project types and sector coverage
Even with the UNFCCC negotiations for-
mally still aiming at a relatively centralized 
system, de facto fragmentation is in full 
swing.
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c) Duration of crediting period
d)  Validation process, monitoring, reporting and 
verification
e) Sustainability criteria
Positions of different countries and regional 
groups influencing their acceptance of offset cred-
its in a fragmented world will be discussed below.
Baseline and additionality
Both baseline and additionality determination of 
mitigation projects are crucial elements of any off-
set mechanism and thus have been severely con-
tested between business and environmental lobby 
groups. Normally, rules to set baselines are not 
identical with additionality determination rules 
but for many project types they are based on simi-
lar principles. The definition of the baseline is usu-
ally done by applying methodologies which have 
been accepted by the regulatory authorities.
Additionality is seen as important by key players 
in international negotiations. For example the EU 
has consistently emphasized strict additionality 
determination based on investment tests or tough 
technology benchmarks. Due to the strong domes-
tic opposition against offset mechanisms men-
tioned above the US is arguing on the one hand for 
a robust additionality test to avoid the impression 
that US money flows abroad for the purchase of 
hot air. On the other hand US industry has always 
been interested in simple access to cheap credits 
and thus is not really interested in a limitation due 
to a strict additionality rule. In developing coun-
tries, views diverge. On the one hand Least Devel-
oped Countries and the AOSIS group which do not 
have a large potential of non-additional emission 
reductions due to the absence of industry are in 
favour of strong additionality to achieve real miti-
gation of greenhouse gases. On the other hand 
heavily industrialized CDM players like China and 
India see additionality as an obstacle to maximize 
emission credit generation and exports and thus 
support a lenient interpretation of additionality. 
Regarding baseline determination similar chal-
lenges appear. A stringent baseline enhances envi-
EU ETS 
WCI 
(2013) RGGI
PRChina
(2013?)
NSW
NZ ETS 
National ETS
Sub-national ETS
Tokyo
Korea
(2015?)
CDM projects
CDM projects 
accepted in the EU
Taiwan
(200x?)
Projects under Japanese 
bilateral mechanism
Figure 1: Ongoing carbon market fragmentation – current status for post-2012
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ronmental integrity by leading to higher emission 
reductions while lowering the profitability of pro-
jects and increasing the costs of the investor coun-
try to reach its pledges. Thus the investor country 
might try to keep the baseline as loose and flexible 
as possible in a fragmented world. 
Countries interested in environmental integrity will 
ask for accurate and complete datasets for base-
line determination, while host countries and less 
quality-oriented buyers will go for simple default 
parameters. The pressure to reduce costs of base-
line setting will be high; eventually the supporters 
of environmental integrity might settle for highly 
conservative default factors. 
Project type and sector coverage
Investor countries will define eligible technologies 
in such a way that interests of its industries are sat-
isfied. Thus technologies that are applied by com-
petitors located in developing countries will not 
be eligible (see the US position discussed above), 
whereas technology exports not leading to direct 
competition will be favoured (see the Japanese ap-
proach to the bilateral mechanism).
Duration of crediting periods
In terms of environmental integrity, overall global 
emission reductions and project profitability, the 
characteristics of the crediting period within an off-
set system are a decisive factor as they directly af-
fect the number of credits which can be generated 
under the scheme. The start of the crediting period 
can be determined in very different ways. While the 
CDM is very conservative inasmuch the registration 
date determines the start date, other mechanisms 
may apply the starting date of the project or the 
date of third party validation, both of which would 
lead to an earlier inflow of credits.
The duration of the crediting period has major im-
pacts on the overall delivery volume of offsets. The 
CDM allows a maximum of 21 years for credit gen-
eration, split up in three periods of 7 years, whereas 
forestry projects can receive credits for 60 years. If 
one imagines that the whole lifetime of large power 
generation units like nuclear power plants or ultra-
super critical coal power plants would be eligible 
for crediting, the overall amount of offsets would 
be increased tremendously compared to the CDM. 
Longer crediting periods also increase the unwill-
ingness to change policy regime characteristics and 
thus tend to “fossilize” policies. The Japanese bilat-
eral mechanism, which has not defined any credit-
ing period, might be the first step into this direction.
Rules for updates and renewals of crediting periods 
can have important repercussions on credit vol-
umes. Stringent approaches require recalculation 
of the baseline and re-validation of additionality 
whereas lenient ones would just require continued 
existence of the project.
While the EU has shown a tendency to prevent re-
newal of crediting periods of project types that gen-
erate exceedingly high profits such as HFC-23, in-
ternationally lenient approaches to crediting period 
duration and renewal have not really spread to date. 
Validation process, monitoring, reporting and ver-
ification
A validation process requires an independent audi-
tor. A project could be admitted to a market mecha-
nism by simple production of a validation report of 
a certification company accredited under domestic 
law. The CDM goes beyond that inasmuch regula-
tors scrutinize validation reports and frequently 
ask for revisions. Moreover, regulators accredit vali-
The pressure to reduce costs of baseline 
setting will be high; eventually the support-
ers of environmental integrity might settle 
for highly conservative default factors.
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dators on the basis of a careful process of checking 
organizational competence. Significant cost savings 
could be achieved by doing away with validation 
and just rubber-stamping project documentation.  
Furthermore it has to be defined whether it is com-
pulsory to publish project documentation ex ante. 
The CDM even requires to collect the opinion of 
the potentially affected local population, e.g. by 
conducting a stakeholder meeting. Publication of 
documents and stakeholder consultation is costly, 
but usually seen as critical for credibility of pro-
jects. The same applies to monitoring, reporting 
and verification. Reporting frequencies, contents of 
monitoring reports, verification requirements and 
responsibilities need to be clarified. Should the veri-
fication body be independent or is verification done 
by the mechanism administrator? 
International acceptance of a “light” approach is not 
guaranteed, but experience is mixed. Some parties 
do not require independent validation for domestic 
offset systems (e.g. Canada ). Advanced developing 
countries have been extremely reluctant to allow 
independent verification. On the other hand trans-
parency of reporting monitoring results is generally 
supported, especially by the US. 
Sustainability criteria
In the CDM the host country’s DNA has the exclu-
sive right to define a set of sustainability criteria 
that projects have to fulfil. In case of a negative out-
come of the sustainability assessment projects can 
be rejected. This possibility reflects states’ sover-
eignty, but is applied rarely. Under fragmented mar-
kets, both countries involved in a transaction would 
have first to see a need for assessing sustainability 
benefits and then agree who defines and evaluates 
the criteria. Either it will be the responsibility of the 
host country as in the current CDM, or the investor 
claims that right for itself. A third approach would 
be the joint definition of criteria and a joint evalua-
tion body. 
Differentiation of emissions trading 
systems
For emissions trading systems, the key parameters 
are 
a) Characteristics of targets
b) Coverage
c) Allocation processes
d) Openness
Characteristics of targets
Under the Kyoto Protocol, targets are legally bind-
ing and thus generate demand for trading units. 
Targets can be set on different jurisdictional levels 
and “cascade” downwards from the international 
to the national and subnational level – the Kyoto 
target triggered the introduction of the EU ETS. In 
a fragmented climate policy world, the incentive to 
set legally binding targets will be lower than in the 
Kyoto world. Types of targets would also be differ-
entiated. The currently prevalent absolute targets 
would most likely be substituted by much less “bit-
ing” intensity targets, especially in advanced devel-
oping countries.
Coverage
The degree of coverage is akin to project type eligi-
bility for project-based mechanisms. An upstream 
system where allowances are surrendered by fossil 
fuel producers and importers can cover the entire 
economy. In a downstream system, coverage is usu-
ally limited to large sources in order to keep trans-
action cost at a manageable level. In a fragmented 
world, the latter system is more likely as it allows 
to exempt critical sectors. For example, in Australia 
and New Zealand key sectors prevented coverage 
In a fragmented climate policy world, the 
incentive to set legally binding targets will 
be lower than in the Kyoto world.
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in proposed emission trading systems arguing that 
their competitors were not covered by any climate 
policy instrument. Likewise, industries in the EU 
were able to prevent a replacement of free alloca-
tion by auctioning in the phase 2013-2020 by ar-
guing that a critical loss of competitiveness would 
ensue. Fragmentation will also lead to attempts to 
reduce transaction costs of the systems.
Allocation processes
Allocation can range from pure grandfathering to 
full auctioning of allowances. Fragmentation will 
make a grandfathering approach attractive as auc-
tioning is seen to provide a competitive disadvan-
tage. The EU implementation of the rules to prevent 
competitive distortions would certainly have led to 
less exemptions if Copenhagen had brought a cen-
tralized regime for post-2012.
Openness
In a centralized climate policy world, openness is 
favourable as it allows access to UNFCCC regulated 
credits and thus cost reduction with only a limited 
reduction in credibility. The fragmented world will 
reward exclusive relations between symbiotic part-
ners and discount openness. Openness reduces the 
degree of control over prices and quantities. Price 
caps and floors are a huge obstacle to openness as 
they might lead to “contamination” of other trading 
schemes in case the caps are reached. 
The voluntary carbon market  
– laboratory of fragmentation
We already have a fragmented world in an impor-
tant segment of the carbon markets – the voluntary 
market. In the decade of its existence, several key 
lessons have been learned. None of these is particu-
larly encouraging.
Lack of transparency
The voluntary market is highly non-transparent. 
Only specialists have a good overview of the details 
of rule differences. While some institutions provide 
an evaluation of the market segments (the best is 
the annual report on the state of voluntary mar-
kets, for the most recent edition see Peters-Stanley 
et al. 2011), there is no institution providing real-
time information. This is a massive contrast to the 
mandatory market systems where high liquidity and 
standardized contracts lead to real-time publication 
of prices free of charge. 
Wild swings in demand
Right from its inception, the voluntary market has 
been a buyer’s market. Turnover of the voluntary 
market is dependent on the whims of the demand 
side and credit suppliers have to discover “what 
turns the markets on or off” (Peters-Stanley et al. 
2011, p. iii). Whole market segments are turned off 
if the political appetite for greenhouse gas reduc-
tions slackens as seen in the US in 2009-10. This 
shows that a large share of the demand for volun-
tary credits was actually due to the hope to acquire 
an offset that could eventually be used for compli-
ance purposes at rock-bottom prices. Many players 
in the voluntary markets have also tried to market 
those segments that were ineligible in the compli-
ance market, such as forest protection. Generally, 
marketing plays a much larger role than in the com-
pliance market, leading to waste of resources and 
a tendency to focus on simple messages. Despite a 
decade of efforts, overall, annual turnover of the en-
tire voluntary market has remained below ¾ billion 
$, i.e. less than 1% of the compliance markets. Even 
if one only counts primary transactions of offsets 
from the Kyoto Mechanisms, the voluntary market 
never reached more than a quarter of the volume of 
the compliance market. 
Proliferation of institutions with similar tasks
Registry and verification systems compete with 
each other, increasing transaction costs. 15 reg-
istries are competing, most of which are located 
in the US. Divergence of standards is likely as 
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standard providers try to find stable niches. For 
example, the Gold Standard with a highly elabo-
rate stakeholder consultation procedure caters for 
the buyers who value development benefits highly, 
whereas the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) caters 
for those who want to get a “no-frills” credit. Pe-
ters-Stanley et al. (2011, p. vi) list 21 verification 
standards, twelve of which have a market share of 
1% or less. Some offset providers combine several 
standards, particularly in the forestry sector.
Wide divergence of credit prices reduces efficiency
Prices per emissions credit have a range of sev-
eral orders of magnitude depending on the ap-
peal of the credit. The difference is large both 
between project types as well as between differ-
ent projects of the same type. This clearly does 
not lead to an efficient mitigation outcome, as 
should be achieved by a market mechanism. With 
the exception of forest protection, there is an in-
verse relationship between the typical size of a 
project and its chance to achieve a high price.
Figure 2: Price lottery on the voluntary market ($)
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Doubtful environmental integrity 
Environmental integrity of voluntary offsets is 
very variable. While there is a distinct “high end” 
of the market catered for by the Gold Standard, 
many voluntary projects have a distinctively lax 
approach to additionality. Unsurprisingly, fre-
quently projects rejected under the CDM are ac-
cessing the voluntary market.
Possible futures of market mechanisms 
in a fragmented climate policy world
An apt analogy of the current situation in global 
climate policy is the eve of the great depression in 
the 1930s. Then, the gold standard currency sys-
tem was still working, albeit with challenges cre-
ated by protectionist tendencies of countries in 
the post-war period. Nobody did envisage how the 
currency world would look like just five years later 
– impoverished and fragmented, with countries in-
dulging in “beggar my neighbour “ policies. If we 
do not engage in a last minute attempt to save a 
global climate policy approach, we will similarly 
look back in a nostalgic fashion to the “good old 
days” of an integrated carbon market with a single 
currency, the CER.
Fragmented carbon market mechanisms will lead 
to a coexistence of project-based mechanisms, 
sectoral crediting and crediting of policies. Within 
the universe of project-based mechanisms, there 
will be different eligible project types, different 
baseline methodologies, different monitoring 
procedures and different degrees of verification, 
all leading to different degrees of environmental 
integrity. We will se a patchwork of partially over-
lapping approaches. Buyers will try to minimize 
costs of credits whose environmental integrity is 
sufficiently high to dispel doubts in the general 
population, as well as in the eyes of the interna-
tional community whereas sellers will want to 
maximize revenues. Given that the demand will 
be rather weak, a buyer’s market can be expected. 
As the voluntary market shows, there 
might be a small share of very high 
quality mechanisms, whereas bulk 
transactions would be done in a “no 
frills” way.
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One key criterion that is consistent among buy-
ers and sellers is low transaction cost. The avail-
ability of cheap credits from hitherto ineligible 
project types is also supported by both sellers 
and buyers, unless the environmental integrity of 
those credits is perceived to be low. Furthermore, 
both sellers and buyers are interested in diffusion 
of advanced technology, unless transfer of this 
technology leads to an increase of competitive 
pressure on industries from the investor country. 
As the voluntary market shows, there might be 
a small share of very high quality mechanisms, 
whereas bulk transactions would be done in a “no 
frills” way.
Of course, fragmentation of carbon markets will 
generate some winners – politicians unwilling to 
underwrite expenses for serious national mitiga-
tion strategies, industry lobbyists, sovereignty 
enthusiasts, contract lawyers, highly specialized 
consultants like my firm Perspectives, speculators 
and arbitrageurs. The great loser will be the global 
climate.
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Abstract
The EU emissions trading system (ETS) strictly 
speaking is a regional carbon market  Neverthe-
less, it has developed into the backbone of the 
global carbon market, generating demand for 
international carbon credits  The recession in 
the EU with a resulting reduction of demand for 
carbon credits has brought home the tension that 
the EU faces between domestic objectives such as 
‘ensuring’ an adequate EU price signal to drive the 
decarbonisation of the economy and its ‘responsi-
bility’ for the global carbon market by maintaining 
or increasing the trade of carbon credits  With the 
EU currently not being able politically agree on a 
tighter ETS cap to increase scarcity, for some time 
the EU ETS will not be able to generate significant 
demand for carbon credits  In the meantime, the 
EU is currently discussing reform of existing and 
design of new flexible mechanisms to be ready 
for the moment that EU or international demand 
for credits picks up 
Introduction 
The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is argu-
ably the most important part of the global carbon 
market. By covering currently some 2 billion of 
GHG emissions in the EU and so-called countries 
of the European Economic Area1, comprising of 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the EU ETS by 
most estimates makes up some 80% of the global 
carbon market. Strictly speaking a regional carbon 
market, its size however means that prices for EU 
allowances (EUAs) under the ETS are price setters 
for the global carbon market. With demand from 
those countries that have ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol fast decreasing, the EU ETS will become – at 
least temporarily – even a more important compo-
nent of the global carbon market. 
This is why the ETS, despite being a regional mar-
ket, remains the backbone of the global carbon 
market. While it is the prerogative of the EU to 
restrict or allow certain credits from the Kyoto 
Protocol mechanisms, decisions have implications 
1  Countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) are closely associated to 
the EU’s internal market and as a result take over most of the EU’s eco-
nomic regulation
Christian Egenhofer
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beyond the EU, because in the absence of other 
comparably sized carbon markets, there are little 
alternative outlets for credits. Restrictions typi-
cally trigger market participants’ harsh criticism 
of the EU’s lack of responsibility for the carbon 
market, which arguable is the EU’s domestic and 
global flagship policy. 
Seen from within the EU’s political economy, the 
EU’s carbon market is first of all meant to serve EU 
interests, i.e. to “promote greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions in a cost-effective and economically ef-
ficient manner”2, and if one wants to believe policy 
makers, to drive EU decarbonisation. Only second-
ary are EU concerns of developing a global carbon 
market, once forcefully advocated, now somewhat 
more tempered after the US has de facto aban-
doned attempts to develop a US carbon market. 
It becomes increasingly clear that the EU ETS alone 
cannot generate the demand for the big volumes 
of credits that are or at least that could be gener-
ated globally. The EU ETS therefore faces the ten-
sion between pursuing domestic policy objectives 
such as cost-effectiveness, decarbonisation of its 
economy, investment and after all ensuring com-
petitiveness of its industries and developing the 
global carbon market. This tension will continue to 
define the perspectives of the EU ETS as a regional 
carbon market in the absence of even the prom-
ise of an integrated global market. EU experiences 
in this respect will not remain unique but become 
generally applicable to other regional emissions 
trading systems as they appear. 
From the very beginning the EU ETS has been de-
signed as a domestic, i.e. EU ‘policy and measure’ 
in Kyoto Protocol speak, somewhat ‘protected’ 
from carbon markets emanating from the Kyoto 
Protocol such as CDM and JI or International Emis-
2  See Art  1 of the EU Emissions Trading System Directive (European Union 
2003)
sion Trading. The principal reason has been con-
cerns over compliance under the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Marrakech Accords although scepticism 
over the possibility for a global effort may also 
have played a role. For an efficient trading system 
to work, there has to be guarantee that a ‘tonne 
is a tonne’ and that compliance is ensured with a 
possibility of recourse to a court in case of litiga-
tion. This, so the rightful reason of the EU can only 
be guaranteed within a national or regional juris-
diction and not within a more loosely UN frame-
work. With this in mind, the following article will 
highlight perspectives of the EU carbon market. 
Past EU ETS experiences 
The EU ETS had a bumpy start, especially in its 
first (pilot) phase (2005-07) as well as the on-go-
ing phase 2 (2008-12), suffering from a number of 
‘teething problems’ and design flaws, extensively 
covered by the literature – see also below. Most 
have been addressed by now notably by a review, 
adopted in 2009, coming into force, however only 
in the beginning of 2013. 
Initial problems were partly the result of the rapid 
speed with which the ETS was adopted, motivated 
by the EU’s desire to show a strong determination 
to tackle climate change.3 This should, however, 
not hide the fact that the ETS suffered from some 
serious design flaws (e.g. Egenhofer 2007; Swedish 
Energy Agency 2007), which were largely the result 
of two political choices: a high level of decentrali-
sation and free allocation based on grandfathering, 
i.e. historical emissions. Initial allocation of allow-
ances by member states on the basis of National 
Allocation Plans led to a ‘race to the bottom’, i.e. 
member states were under pressure by industries 
not to hand out fewer allowances than their EU 
competitors received (e.g. Kettner et al. 2007, El-
lerman et al 2007). This led to over-allocation, and 
3  For a full overview of this period, see Delbeke 2006 and Skjærseth and 
Wettestad 2008 
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ultimately to a price collapse. During the period 
when the EU allowance price was high, free alloca-
tion also generated ‘windfall profits’, mainly but 
not only in the power sector (e.g. Keats and Neu-
hoff 2005). Some of these issues were addressed 
in phase 2 (2008-12) as a result of member state 
cooperation and the European Commission being 
able to reduce member states’ allocation propos-
als (e.g. Ellerman et al 2010). Still, throughout both 
phases, by and large, the ETS has managed to de-
liver a carbon price. One result has been that car-
bon price has now officially entered board room 
discussions (Ellerman and Joskow 2008).
In the absence of a global agreement, leading to 
‘uneven’ carbon constraints, concerns over com-
petitiveness and carbon leakage have been high 
on the agenda. The essential answer by the ETS 
was free allocation. Free allocation constitutes a 
compensation or a subsidy, potentially creating an 
incentive to continue producing in Europe. At the 
same time, historical grandfathering in the first 
two phases has led to significant windfall profits. 
The ex-post analyses on economic rents and wind-
fall profits are relatively clear, while also more or 
less consistent with ex-ante studies that assessed 
the potential windfall profits for the ETS sectors at 
the time. Ellermann et al (2010), the most authori-
tative ex-post study conducted so far, conclude 
that in total the rents were substantial, even at a 
relatively modest carbon price of €12, and amount 
to more than €19 billion in windfall profits, plus 
more than €10 billion of ‘informational’4 rents, al-
though with the caveat of surrounding uncertain-
ties in the calculations. Other ex-post studies (e.g. 
Delarue et al 2010) and own calculations (Egen-
4  ‘Informational’ rents describe the fact that during the first period of 
general over-allocation, which should have produced a zero price, the EU 
allowance price remained at around €12  Companies that have received al-
lowances for free – both industry and the power sector – could make large 
trading profits by selling their allowances  This appears to be a one-off 
rent  
hofer et al 2011) do not significantly disagree with 
this finding5. During phase 1, all technologies and 
all participants included in the ETS – power and 
industry alike – benefited from ETS-related rents. 
Those rents for the power sector that accrued 
as a result of free allocation will disappear with 
the auctioning in the ETS phase 3 (see below for 
details). This is not the case, however, for those 
rents in the power sector of low carbon power-
generation technologies, such as hydro or nuclear, 
which will enjoy additional revenues as a result 
of higher power prices due to the ETS but do not 
face additional costs. The benchmark-based allo-
cation – in place as of 2013 – will reduce potential 
rents, sometimes significantly. Still, different stud-
ies come to diverse conclusions (e.g. De Bruyn et 
al 2010, CE Delft 2010). This is partly so because 
windfall profits depend on the ability to pass 
through product price increases due to the ETS al-
lowance price, an issue that remains controversial. 
Overhaul in two steps 
Experiences from phase 1 and 2 have greatly 
helped the European Commission to propose and 
adopt radical changes to the EU ETS, which were 
not even thinkable before its initial adoption in 
20036. The principal element of the new ETS is a 
single EU-wide cap which will decrease annually in 
a linear way by 1.74% starting in 2013. This linear 
reduction continues beyond 2020 as there is no 
sunset clause.
5  For a detailed overview, see Egenhofer et al 2011: 8-14
6  See e g  Ellerman et al 2010, Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010 and Egenhofer 
et al 2011 for a full overview 
It becomes increasingly clear that the EU 
ETS alone cannot generate the demand for 
the big volumes of credits that are or at 
least that could be generated globally.
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The revised ETS Directive also foresees EU-wide 
harmonised allocation rules. Starting from 2013, 
power companies will have to buy all their emis-
sions allowances at an auction with some tempo-
rary exceptions for ‘coal-based’ poorer member 
states. For the industrial sectors under the ETS, 
the EU agreed that the auctioning rate will be set 
at 20% in 2013, increasing to 70% in 2020, with 
a view to reaching 100% in 2027. The remaining 
free allowances will be distributed on the basis of 
EU-wide harmonised benchmarks, set on the ba-
sis of the average performance of the 10% most 
GHG-efficient installations. Industries exposed 
to significant non-EU competition and thereby 
potentially subject to carbon leakage, however, 
will receive 100% of allowances free of charge 
up to 2020, based on Community-wide product 
benchmarks set on the basis of the average per-
formance of the 10% most GHG-efficient installa-
tions. 
Other changes include a partial redistribution of 
auction rights between member states, restrictions 
of the total volume of CDM/JI credits, the use of 
300 million EU allowances to finance the demon-
stration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and 
innovative renewable technologies and a general 
– non-legally binding – commitment from EU mem-
ber states to spend at least half of the revenues 
from auctioning to tackle climate change both in 
the EU and in developing countries, including for 
measures to avoid deforestation and increase af-
forestation and reforestation in developing coun-
tries. 
 • Furthermore, 12% of the overall auctioning 
rights will be re-distributed to member states 
with a lower GDP per capita (10%) and those that 
have undertaken early action (2%). 
 • The system will be extended to aviation, the 
chemicals and aluminium sectors and to other 
GHGs, e.g. nitrous oxide from fertilisers and per-
fluorocarbons from aluminium. 
 • Member states can financially compensate elec-
tro-intensive industries for higher power prices. 
The European Commission is drawing up EU 
guidelines as to this end. 
As already in the previous periods, access to pro-
ject credits under the Kyoto Protocol from outside 
the EU will be limited. The revised ETS will restrict 
access to no more than 50% of the reductions re-
quired in the EU ETS to ensure that emissions re-
ductions will happen in the EU. Left-over CDM/JI 
credits from 2008-12 can be used until 2020. Exact 
figures are subject to discussion. 
Possible further changes 
Changes for phase 3 are not the end point of ETS 
reform. 
First, several implementation provisions, e.g. on al-
location or monitoring and reporting of emissions, 
have not been finally adopted or implemented. 
New gases and sectors will require amendment of 
the Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines (MRGs). 
Similarly, the auctioning regulation is still pending 
implementation. 
Second, the ETS Directive has also developed a 
framework for possible changes without amend-
ing the Directive. This includes for example the 
possibility for member states to opt-in new gases 
and activities under certain conditions, a clause 
that has already been applied in the past. A second 
possibility constitutes a kind of domestic offset 
schemes, the so-called Community-level projects 
under article 24a, where member states can issue 
credits for reductions projects outside ETS cover-
age. Another clause (Art. 27) allows for the exclu-
sion of small installations from the ETS. Finally, the 
ETS features an enabling clause for linking the ETS 
with other regional, national or sub-nation emis-
sions trading programmes through mutual rec-
ognition of allowances (Art. 25). Another – poten-
29 
Access to project credits under  
the Kyoto Protocol from outside the EU 
will be limited.
tially contentious – issue will be the compensation 
of electro-intensive industries by member states. 
Although the European Commission is drawing up 
guidelines, there is a risk of a new round of distor-
tions to competition between member states. 
Third, the revised ETS Directive explicitly foresees 
the possibility for a revision in the case of an inter-
national climate change agreement. Depending on 
the nature of the agreement, this could mean the 
lowering of the cap, for example if the EU decided 
to move to a unilateral EU reduction commitment 
of 30%. This move would trigger a whole number 
of implementation rules including notably an in-
crease of the linear annual reduction factor of cur-
rently 1.74%7 allocation rules, the role of flexible 
mechanisms, the inclusion of forestry credits and 
land use changes. 
In 2011, the European Commission has formally 
adopted a ban on the use of HFC-23 and N2O in-
dustrial gases credits in the EU Emissions Trading 
System, coming into effect in May 2013. According 
to Commission analysis, CDM credits have encour-
aged more production of HCFC-22 to access cred-
its for HFC-23 abatement, while for N2O, the high 
rents have shifted production from the EU to de-
veloping countries, leading to carbon leakage, due 
to the high rents from CDM. The European Com-
mission has also declared that no future restric-
tions are currently considered. 
Carbon prices remain low: what now? 
At the time of the hard won compromise of the 
ETS review for post-2012, there was a general con-
viction that the new ETS will be ‘future-proof’, i.e. 
being able to cope with the lack of a global climate 
change agreement, address competitiveness, yet 
7  Simple calculations reveal that in order to almost entirely decarbonise the 
power sector by 2050 – a precondition to meet the officially agreed 80%-
95% reductions of GHg emissions by 2050, the ETS linear annual reduction 
factor would need be in the order of 2 5% rather than the current 1 74%  
able to drive de-carbonisation of the EU econo-
my. The 2008/9 economic crisis however has de-
stroyed that confidence by a seemingly permanent 
dramatic lowering of EUA prices due to rapid and 
dramatic decline in economic output. Ever since 
EUA prices have been lingering around €10-15 per 
tonne of CO2 and few expect EUA prices to climb 
much higher than €20 at best throughout the pe-
riod of up to 2020 (Egenhofer 2010), largely be-
cause of the possibility to bank unused allowances 
between the second and third phase.
Alarmed by this, the European Commission has 
launched the idea of a set-aside, whereby a certain 
number of EUAs would be taken out of the market 
either temporarily or permanently. Some also ar-
gue that the European Commission has been iden-
tifying other ways to support EUA prices, for exam-
ple by delaying or restricting EUA supply such as 
delay of the initial auctioning of EUAs and restric-
tions on the use of CDM credits stemming from 
industrial gases. However this remains subject to 
debate. Member states are equally concerned with 
low EUA prices and have also started to design 
policies such as for example the UK carbon price 
support mechanisms, in essence a price floor by a 
carbon tax for the UK only. The efficiency meas-
ures under a newly proposed directive on energy 
efficiency that foresees efficiency standards also 
for the ETS sector could lead to a further drop of 
EUA prices because some, cover areas that are al-
ready ‘regulated’ under the EU ETS. The market in 
the meantime seems to have drawn its own con-
clusions. EUA prices had further fallen to around 
€12 per tonne of CO2 with a tendency to decrease 
further for the time being.
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As a result, the list of those voices to call for some 
sort of market oversight and price stabilisation 
mechanisms has increased. Many agree that both 
price stability and a strong carbon price signal are 
beneficial if not essential. More controversial is 
the question on the nature of such a mechanism, 
its organisation and after all, how ad hoc or per-
manent this should be. The following ideas have 
been raised (e.g. Egenhofer et al 2011): 
 • Price floors & ceilings: Among the most promi-
nent proposals have been various ideas for price 
floors and ceilings including the announcement 
of a minimum price for future auctioning for ex-
ample in 2030. 
 • Back to a carbon tax: Others have suggested to 
adjust ETS prices upwards from time to time to 
ensure a steadily increasing carbon constraint, 
essentially transforming the ETS into a hybrid 
tax-ETS system. 
 • Technology accelerators: This new mechanism 
would support early investors in top performing 
low-carbon technologies by rewarding them with 
additional free allowances.
 • Complementary member states measures: Mem-
ber states are free to adopt additional measures 
also for the ETS sector, for example to address 
market failure or provide technology push for 
certain technologies. 
 • Ex-post adjustment: some have argued that ex-
post adjustment are a suitable tool to deal with 
carbon price fluctuations stemming from rapid 
and frequent changes in economic activity.
 • The most far-reaching idea is the establishment 
of an independent European Carbon Bank to in-
crease long-term predictability and notably en-
sure a carbon price signal that drives low-carbon 
investment. This would include a mechanism to 
cope with EUA demand fluctuations by adjust-
ing the supply. 
Although not doing away with the need for a price 
stabilisation mechanism, the obvious answer 
would be upping the unilateral EU target to -30%. 
The current ETS Directive foresees the possibility 
to increase the EU’s unilateral 20% reduction tar-
get. Politically, the likelihood for this to happen in 
the short term, i.e. within the next 2 years or so is 
very slim. While it still might happen beyond that 
period, it would also mean an opening and re-ne-
gotiation of the current Directive, which many EU 
governments might wish to avoid. 
Difficult discussions on off-sets from 
the outset 
From the outset, the EU ETS has experienced a dif-
ficult relationship with CDM and JI credits. While 
there are many issues around CDM/JI, the most 
important within the EU has been how the trade-
off between ‘cost-effectiveness’ and ‘incentives 
for EU/EEA industry’ to reduce emissions, there-
by avoiding EU/EEA lock-in in high-carbon growth 
patterns. Thus, from the beginning of the EU ETS, 
policy makers, industry and NGOs have debated 
hotly how much of the abatement should be done 
domestically – i.e. is there a need for quantitative 
restrictions? – and on project type and quality – 
i.e. is there a need for qualitative restrictions? At 
the same time, the EU and EEA tied themselves 
to the UN-based crediting mechanisms, not only 
to show support for the UN system but also to 
work towards one integrated system of offset 
mechanisms. However, the perceived ‘failure’ to 
act on ‘controversial’ emissions on the part of the 
UN eventually has started to undermine the cred-
ibility of offsetting mechanisms and therefore 
the ETS. This is why qualitative restrictions, on 
for example industrial gases projects, have been 
adopted. 
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The supply/demand interface 
Linking JI and CDM to the EU ETS has been meant 
to increase cost–effectiveness, an objective of the 
ETS.8 Given current and expected future EUA pric-
es, this concern is only of limited importance for 
the time being, however. But clearly perceived ad-
vantages of the JI, CDM or other mechanisms that 
they give investors an incentive to engage in car-
bon reduction projects and promotes technology 
transfer and investments will unlikely be able to 
tip the balance for unlocking new supply options 
in the near future. 
For the global carbon market, the EU message is 
clear: the last thing that the EU and the ETS re-
quires at this stage is additional supply. Already 
now, prices are ‘too’ low and the EU is struggling 
to find a suitable solution to raise them. And even 
if a move to a unilateral target of -30% by 2020 
compared to 1990 were to be made within a re-
alistic timeframe, changes would come into force 
by 2014 at best, a bare six years before the target 
date. 
As a result, EU demand for credits remains lim-
ited. For the period up to 2012 buyers will be able 
to meet their demand easily through carbon cred-
its generated under existing flexible mechanisms 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU for both the ETS 
and non-ETS sectors is expected to require some-
what more than 300 MtCO2e through 2012 (Lina-
cre et al. 2011, table 12). For the period until 20209 
estimates range between 1.750 to 2.100 MtCO2e 
for the EU’s unilateral 20% reduction target and 
between 2.550 and 3.800 for a possible 30% reduc-
tion target. In the “Roadmap 2050”, the European 
Commission (2011) estimates that a 25% reduction 
by 2020 can be achieved by full and effective im-
8  Recital 19 sees the mechanisms as “important to achieve the goals of 
both reducing global greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the cost-
effective functioning of the     scheme” (European Union 2009) 
9  Based on Point Carbon 2011 and Linacre et al 2011 
plementation of the Energy Efficiency Plans and 
the legally-binding renewables targets while only 
a 30% reduction target would generate additional 
demand for post-2012 credits or offsets from non-
Annex 1 countries.10 
However, this is not to say that the EU has no inter-
est in new carbon mechanisms. The EU alongside 
other Parties within the UN has an interest in pro-
gress towards improving existing or creating new 
mechanisms. Only for the time being, the interest 
is mainly in the structure of the mechanisms and 
less so in volumes of credit. 
This seemingly paradox situation can be explained 
in the EU’s strive to arrive at a single legal frame-
work for developed and developing countries 
alike as successor to the Kyoto Protocol. As such 
a single framework is likely to take time, there is 
value in designing the necessary elements of the 
architecture including mechanisms. Thus, the pe-
riod before a global deal on mitigation targets and 
measures can be reached – if ever – should be used 
to get the rules and mechanisms in place to reach 
the globally agreed targets.
What future mechanisms?  
Therefore, following the Cancún Agreements, Par-
ties to the UNFCCC including the EU currently 
elaborate new market-based mechanism options, 
highlighting their views over their potential roles 
in a comprehensive international agreement, the 
10  Note that all indicators point out that the EU is likely to meet its 2020 
renewables targets while underachieving on energy efficiency  New legisla-
tion has been proposed to address energy efficiency  
The European Commission has launched 
the idea of a set-aside, whereby a certain 
number of EUAs would be taken out of the 
market either temporarily or permanently.
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institutional set-up, and their relations to the ex-
isting mechanisms. Within the EU, overall objec-
tive continues to be that new or revised flexible 
mechanisms continue to aim at advancing climate 
objectives, i.e. achieving real global emissions re-
ductions and possibly other specific objectives 
such as sustainable development, technology 
transfer and financing. A number of options are 
discussed.11 
Clean Development Mechanism
Programmes of Activities (PoAs) are a program-
matic version of the CDM, registering a set of ac-
tivities of the same type under a single umbrella. 
Sectoral benchmarking in the CDM credits emis-
sions reductions below the baseline based on a 
pre-determined benchmark for a sector or a sub-
sector. Expansion of the scope to sectoral and 
programmatic activities could help to strengthen 
the CDM and address more mitigation opportuni-
ties. On the other hand, an increase in the number 
of CDM projects will require improvements in ef-
ficiency of administration and an increase in the 
transparency of governance.
Joint Implementation
JI has faced administrative and organisational 
shortcoming pertaining to the Joint Implementa-
tion Supervisory Committee (JISC) as well as more 
technical issues such as baseline setting and meth-
odology choices. Existing problems with double-
11  For more details see Fujiwara 2009, Egenhofer et al 2011 and Fujiwara 
forthcoming 
counting have become controversial (see Sandbag 
2010). 
Sectoral Crediting Mechanism
For the EU, most potential to reach EU/EEA objec-
tives is related to sectoral crediting. A sectoral 
crediting mechanism (SCM) credits emissions re-
ductions from a covered sector against a thresh-
old possibly below the business as usual (BAU) 
scenario. The main difference from the CDM is to 
expand the coverage moving beyond offsetting. A 
SCM could enhance the environmental integrity 
of the system. An SCM based on no-lose targets 
means that the host country will be rewarded 
for its over-performance in the sector above the 
threshold but will not be penalised for its under-
performance, hence ‘no-lose’. There are a variety 
of design options. The baseline can be negotiated 
as part of an international agreement between par-
ties or domestically set on the basis of a sectoral 
benchmark. The baseline could be expressed in 
absolute emission levels, the carbon intensity or 
technology penetration rates. A technical merit of 
sectoral crediting is to circumvent the additional-
ity test on a project basis.
By introducing a carbon price signal, an SCM is 
considered to be a stepping stone in an evolution 
path of a market mechanism from the CDM or JI 
via Programme of Activities (PoAs) to a sectoral 
trading scheme, then to a cap-and-trade scheme. 
Sectoral trading
Sectoral trading is a cap-and-trade scheme (or al-
ternatively, a baseline and credit programme) ap-
plied to a whole sector or a sub-sector within a 
country (e.g. Fujiwara 2009:44). Such a move can 
be done by gradually tightening the negotiated 
baselines and converting them into absolute caps. 
Sectoral trading aims at addressing countries that 
are not yet ready to take on binding economy-wide 
targets but are prepared to accept them in key 
For the global carbon market, the EU 
message is clear: the last thing that the 
EU and the ETS requires at this stage is 
additional supply.
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sectors, such as power and industry. Emissions al-
lowances would be allocated to the host country’s 
government, reflecting binding sectoral targets. 
Governments would be responsible for reducing 
emissions in particular sectors to a pre-deter-
mined level, based on national rules such as on al-
location or on compliance. Theoretically, sectoral 
trading if based on absolute caps would be simpler 
with lower transaction costs that sectoral credit-
ing. Some countries, such as China for example 
might prefer this model over sectoral crediting or 
a scaled up CDM. As sectoral trading is generally 
seen as stepping stone to a cap-and-trade system 
as the ETS, one should expect some sort of ‘pref-
erential’ treatment of credits emanating before it. 
This would be possible for example by a bi-lateral 
agreement between the EU and China, something 
that has been rumoured for some time.
REDD plus market
There is a consensus of the importance of provid-
ing a value to environmental services such as the 
ones of avoided deforestation. The importance of 
avoided deforestation has been discussed in de-
tail during the review of the ETS and recognised in 
Article 10 (3).12 From an EU perspective, sovereign 
participation of EU member states in international 
REDD plus market generally appears preferable to 
linking to the ETS and international carbon mar-
kets irrespective of whether a CDM style (inter-
national issuance of credits) or JI style (national 
issuance of credits) is chosen. Full linking to inter-
national carbon markets would first require more 
clarity of the design of REDD plus markets, nota-
bly addressing questions of permanence, MRV and 
more generally, compliance as well a solution to 
12  Article 10 (3) c stipulates that at least 50 % of the revenues generated from 
the auctioning of allowances should be used for climate-related activities 
enumerated in a list including “measures to avoid deforestation and 
increase afforestation and reforestation in developing countries that have 
ratified the international agreement on climate change” (European Union 
2009) 
the tricky question on how to absorb the expected 
volumes of credits (e.g. O’Sullivan et al 2010). 
To date, the link to the EU ETS is the auctioning 
of EUAs, which will supply EU governments with 
the necessary funds for sovereign participation. 
However, current and expected EUA price levels 
are insufficient with EU finance commitments (e.g. 
Egenhofer 2010: 169). 
NAMA crediting
Crediting of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Ac-
tions (NAMAs), which is being discussed within 
the UN negotiations has attracted less attention 
within the EU. Besides the familiar point of lack 
of demand within the EU, NAMA crediting is seen 
as even more complex than for sectoral crediting, 
the EU’s preferred mechanism. Unless there is a 
significant breakthrough on NAMA crediting in the 
UN negotiation, EU interest will most likely remain 
limited. This does however not rule out EU and 
member states support for NAMAs through sover-
eign climate finance.
Conclusions 
The EU is promoting the creation of a global car-
bon market, which is seen as the most efficient 
and effective tool to reach domestic and global 
climate change objectives. To this end, it has es-
tablished its domestic carbon market, the EU Emis-
sions Trading System. Consistent with the Kyoto 
Protocol and the objective of a coherent, if not 
single legal framework under the UN, the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, CDM and JI cred-
its have become fungible – in principle yet condi-
tionally - with EU allowances that are issued under 
the EU ETS. While being a sign of support for the 
UN system, this has made the EU ETS – at least 
as regards CDM and JI – dependent on UN rules, 
thereby ‘importing’ actual or perceived shortcom-
ings, notably as to transaction costs, the integrity 
of the CDM, excessive rents and the value of pure 
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off-setting. Indeed, the practice of off-setting de-
veloped countries emissions against developing 
countries’ reductions – even if assumed that they 
are real – will not be consistent for much longer 
with the objective of halving global GHG emissions 
by 2050.
As a result, the EU is exploring new mechanisms 
that address the identified shortcomings. While 
the CDM is considered to continue to be useful for 
least developed countries with limited institution-
al capacity, sectoral crediting or sectoral trading is 
promoted as more suitable instrument for emerg-
ing economies, partly but not only because of their 
potential for deeper reductions and broader sector 
coverage. To date, discussions on these mecha-
nisms continue in international negotiations and 
bilaterally without much tangible progress.
The major challenge for the EU ETS however is the 
low allowance price which currently standing at 
around €10 per tonne of CO2 and with little pros-
pects that it will recover any time soon, unless 
policy intervenes. Absence of intervention – highly 
uncertain at this moment – demand for credits will 
remain very weak. A possible recession in the EU, 
which many expect is possible if not likely, could 
drive down the price even further. From a global 
carbon market perspective, the good news is that 
further EU restrictions on supply, i.e. credits would 
not be a solution and hence are unlikely, unless for 
integrity reasons. The bad news however is that 
there is no immediate prospect for much stronger 
demand in the ETS. Such demand can only be re-
established by economic growth or far-reaching 
changes in the way the ETS works. Either way, both 
would take their time.
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The major challenge for the EU ETS however 
is the low allowance price which currently 
standing at around €10 per tonne of CO2 
and with little prospects that it will recover 
any time soon, unless policy intervenes.
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Abstract
This article provides an overview and analysis of 
the situation in China regarding the emerging car-
bon market  The policies and targets introduced 
by the central government and the actions and 
pilot activities undertaken at the provincial and 
industrial levels will be illustrated to demonstrate 
the formation and development of the Chinese 
carbon regime and show how a market approach 
will be applied in this process  
 
Policy-makers in China have given clear signals 
that the establishment of a trading scheme for 
carbon credits will be realized and regulations on 
the carbon market issued in the near future. The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan on National Economic and 
Social Development states clearly that ‘China will 
set up a sound system for the measurement, re-
porting and verification of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and gradually establish a trading market for 
carbon credits.’(NDRC 2011)
Apart from the policies being developed by the 
central government, a series of initiatives promot-
ing the low-carbon economy have been undertaken 
by regional (provincial) and industrial entities as 
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well. For instance, a domestic Voluntary Emis-
sion Reduction Mechanism is being established to 
regulate and promote the transaction of voluntary 
emission reductions; low-carbon pilot locations in 
five provinces and eight cities have been selected 
as a way of exploring and accumulating experi-
ence in addressing the nation’s carbon issues; the 
China Green Carbon Foundation has been set up, 
dedicated to combating climate change by increas-
ing carbon sink projects in China; carbon-neutral 
activities have been conducted by some Chinese 
companies; and several climate exchanges have 
been established, those in Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai being the most active.
Policy Prospect of Carbon Market and 
Trading in China
Mandatory requirements and administrative ap-
proaches have been used excessively in China to 
tackle the issue of climate change. However, the 
limitations of these methods have emerged gradu-
ally. During the period of the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan (2005-2010), China has used climate change 
mitigation as an important opportunity to promote 
the transformation of economic development pat-
terns and economic structures. Meanwhile, energy 
conservation and emissions reductions and the 
development of a green and low-carbon sector 
have also been recognized as the internal require-
ment for the country’s sustainable development. 
Remarkable results were obtained through a se-
ries of policies and actions. For instance, energy 
consumption per unit of GDP decreased by 19.1 
percent during the period, with 630 million tons 
of standard coal being saved and carbon dioxide 
emissions being reduced by 1.5 billion tons. Nev-
ertheless, these achievements were dependent on 
mandatory requirements and administrative ap-
proaches such as the elimination of outmoded 
forms of production, the compulsory shut-down 
of inefficient power plants, steel factories and ce-
ment plants, and provision of significant finan-
cial subsidies. Yet these mandatory requirements 
and administrative approaches have caused high 
economic and social costs, and sustainability was 
gradually exposed as a problem. For example, in 
2010, in pursuit of achieving the energy-saving 
goal of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, some local 
governments imposed power cuts for consump-
tion that seriously impacted on the production 
of enterprises and people’s day to day activities, 
and was widely criticized. Hence, the central gov-
ernment started considering how to use market 
mechanisms to promote energy conservation and 
tackle climate change. 
The Chinese Government formally included the 
issue of carbon trading in its most important of-
ficial documents. In November, 2009, the central 
government explicitly announced targets to deal 
with climate change by 2020, namely that carbon 
dioxide emissions per unit of GDP should be re-
duced by 40-45 percent compared to the level 
in 2005, and the share of non-fossil fuels in pri-
mary energy consumption should reach 15 per-
cent. In March 2011, the ‘12th Five-Year (2011 
to 2015) Plan on National Economic and Social 
Development’ was approved by the National Peo-
ple’s Congress of China. A series of intermediate 
binding goals were also put forward, such as (by 
2015, compared with the level in 2010): energy 
consumption per unit of GDP to be reduced by 
16 percent; carbon dioxide emissions per unit 
of GDP to be reduced by 17 percent; the share of 
non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption 
to reach 11.4 percent; and binding targets to be 
set for forest carbon sink. To meet the targets 
mentioned above, the plan also announced that a 
sound system for the measurement, reporting and 
verification of greenhouse gas emissions will be 
set up, and a trading market for carbon credits 
will be established step by step. This is the first 
time that the central government has formally 
made the plan to set up a domestic carbon trading 
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China has used climate change mitigation 
as an important opportunity to promote the 
transformation of economic development 
patterns and economic structures.
market in China, indicating that this concept has 
entered the stage of governmental working proce-
dures. As a result, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, along with other ministries 
and committees, have started designing the car-
bon trading scheme and other related fundamen-
tal work.
The construction of a domestic carbon market in 
China will be a stepwise process. From the official 
speeches and documents released so far, the es-
tablishment of a domestic carbon market will be 
progressively promoted, changing from voluntary 
to compulsory, and from regional pilots to an uni-
fied national carbon market.
The first task is to standardize and promote the 
construction of a voluntary trading market. The 
National Development and Reform Commission 
has devoted itself to the formulation of ‘Admin-
istrative Measures on Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reductions Voluntary Trading Activities (Interim)’ 
(hereafter referred to as the Administrative Meas-
ures), which have been completed and are cur-
rently in the stage of consultation and approval. 
The Administrative Measures aim to standardize 
the market for voluntary greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions trading, create an open, fair and 
transparent market, and encourage enterprises to 
take part in activities mitigating climate change. 
Through application of the Administrative Meas-
ures, the central government intends to set up the 
basic registration system for a voluntary market, 
define trading products and sites and to clarify 
how to apply the new methodologies and accredi-
tation procedures for validation and verification 
entities (the DOEs), so that the whole process of 
the validation of emission reductions, registration 
and issuance, etc. can be realized under the su-
pervision of the government. Meanwhile, another 
intention of the government in setting up the vol-
untary market is that the compulsory market can 
learn from the lessons drawn from the operation 
of the voluntary market, and experiences regard-
ing government supervision will also be accumu-
lated. 
The second task is to facilitate the construction of 
regional pilot projects on carbon policies. In 2010, 
five provinces, namely Guangdong, Hubei, Liaon-
ing, Shaanxi and Yunnan, as well as eight cities, 
namely Tianjin, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Xiamen, 
Shenzhen, Guiyang, Nanchang and Baoding, have 
been selected as the first group of regions for low-
carbon policy pilots. The National Development 
and Reform Commission required the pilot re-
gions to study and formulate relevant low-carbon 
development plans, actively explore a low-carbon 
development pattern with distinctive local char-
acteristics, set up and implement the target of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, transform 
and upgrade traditional industries through the 
application of low-carbon technologies, construct 
low-carbon buildings, promote low-carbon forms 
of transport, strengthen the statistical work of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and actively advocate 
low-carbon and green lifestyle and consumption 
behaviour. Carbon trading was also added to the 
tasks this year, thus encouraging and supporting 
the pilot regions to launch regional pilot cap-and-
trade initiatives. In recent months, the National 
Development and Reform Commission has held 
a number of workshops on setting up carbon 
trading markets in pilot regions to deploy and 
promote the regional carbon trading pilot estab-
lishment. The purpose of these activities is to 
generate experience in establishing a nationwide 
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There are still some restrictions and 
deficiencies connected with the process 
of establishing a carbon market in China, 
such as a lack of infrastructural facilities 
for carbon market operation.
unified carbon market. In addition, these pilots 
may provide a platform for exploring how to de-
velop a diversified financial mechanism that can 
actively lead to foreign investment into China's 
low-carbon research and industrial development. 
Consequently, China’s carbon market will be es-
tablished step by step.
There are still some restrictions and deficiencies 
connected with the process of establishing a car-
bon market in China, such as a lack of infrastruc-
tural facilities for carbon market operation. To ad-
dress these problems, the National Development 
and Reform Commission and concerned depart-
ments are committed to studying, compiling and 
developing policies to establish and improve in-
frastructural facilities for a national carbon mar-
ket, including climate change legislation and set-
ting up a system for the measurement, reporting 
and verification of carbon emissions. The pace at 
which these elements will be completed is uncer-
tain. Some government officials have stated that 
China is expected to implement its regional car-
bon trading pilots by 2013 and to go nationwide 
in 2015. But other officials reported that there 
is no clear timetable for the establishment of a 
national carbon market. Regardless of rumours, 
it seems certain that significant progress will be 
achieved in setting up a carbon market in China 
during the period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan.
China is now at a crucial point in building a pros-
perous society, and at an important stage of in-
dustrialization and urbanization. It has difficult 
tasks to perform to develop the economy and im-
prove people’s living standards, and it faces more 
severe climate change challenges than developed 
countries do. Therefore, China is likely to contin-
ue to stick to the principle of sustainable develop-
ment, adopting more powerful policies and meas-
ures to strengthen her ability to deal with climate 
change in an all-round way.
Specific Actions on the Regional and 
Industrial Levels 
Global climate change has become one of the big-
gest threats to humanity, and concerns are grow-
ing globally. On 12 December 2009, at COP15, the 
Copenhagen Accords fell far short of the declared 
purpose of confirming the timetable for interna-
tional negotiations and defining the emission re-
duction responsibilities of relevant parties. Also, 
the Cancun Conference held in 2010 has not ac-
complished the task of negotiations set in the ‘Bali 
Road Map’, which means that negotiations for the 
Durban Conference will be arduous, and it is as 
yet unclear whether the negotiations for a second 
Commitment Period for the Kyoto Protocol can be 
achieved. Nevertheless, the low-carbon economic 
system supported by low-carbon industry, low-
carbon technology and low-carbon finance will 
not be hampered. On the contrary, this indicates 
that international cooperation on climate change 
has a long way to go and that countries all over 
the world must urgently speed up the construc-
tion of low-carbon economies. 
China’s government attaches great importance to 
climate change, having adopted a series of poli-
cies and measures and actively implemented cli-
mate change programs to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and strengthen its capacity to address 
climate change. Meanwhile, regional governments 
and industries have undertaken a series of actions 
representing bottom-up initiatives to combat cli-
mate change. 
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The establishment of China’s voluntary emis-
sion reductions mechanism
As a responsible developing country with a large 
population, China has been fully aware of the 
importance and urgency of addressing climate 
change, following the requirements of China’s 
guiding theory of development, namely a Scientif-
ic Outlook on Development,1 taking into consider-
ation both economic development and ecological 
construction, and bearing in mind both domestic 
and international issues, as well as both present 
and future generations, China has kept to the 
principle of common but differentiate responsibil-
ity in its pursuit of low-carbon development.
As already mentioned, China is working to build a 
voluntary emission reductions system of its own. 
China’s first domestic voluntary carbon standard, 
the Panda Standard, was launched at COP 15 in 
December 2009. The China Beijing Environment 
Exchange (CBEEX) and BlueNext jointly developed 
this standard, which is designed to provide trans-
parency and credibility in the nascent Chinese 
carbon market and to fulfil the Chinese govern-
ment’s poverty alleviation objective by encourag-
ing investments in China’s rural economy. The 
Panda Standard will support the commitment of 
the Chinese government to reduce the level of 
greenhouse gas emissions in its economy, help 
develop national capacity in domestic voluntary 
carbon trading, and promote Agriculture, Forestry 
and Other Land Use (AFOLU) greenhouse gas off-
set projects with significant poverty alleviation 
benefits. This standard is intended to establish a 
match with China’s national conditions and to be 
compatible with international rules of voluntary 
emissions reduction in terms of certification and 
registration standards.
1  The Scientific Outlook on Development was put forward at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 16th Communist Party of China National Congress 
in 2003, which is necessary in order to achieve the objective of building a 
prosperous society in an all round way 
Apart from the establishment of the voluntary 
carbon standard, China’s voluntary emissions re-
duction market is being rapidly constructed with 
the development of a voluntary carbon trading 
platform led by the China Beijing Environmental 
Exchange, the Shanghai Environment and Energy 
Exchange and the Tianjin Climate Exchange estab-
lished in 2008. For instance, CBEEX has launched 
the first China Low Carbon Index.2 The Tianjin 
Climate Exchange has completed China’s first vol-
untary emission reductions-based carbon neutral 
transaction (see below). The Shanghai Environ-
ment and Energy Exchange set up a carbon offset 
platform in 2010 to support the green World Expo 
and has helped transact over 70 projects involv-
ing carbon emissions reduction technologies and 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
internet-based trading platform for carbon credit 
offsets was founded by Shanghai Environment 
and Energy Exchange on 27 April 2010. The vol-
ume in the first month reached 526 transactions. 
The platform has established technical systems, 
including remote transaction, immediate quota-
tion, online delivery and a database of all relat-
ed Environmental Protection Standards,3 as well 
as a registration and accounting system. Along 
with further improvements to the trading system 
and mechanism, the platform will be equipped 
with the same carbon trading technical capacity 
as those from international institutions like EU-
ETS (i.e. reflecting the relationship between sup-
ply and demand, and providing the reference for 
investment). Apart from these three well-estab-
lished trading platforms, founding environmental 
and climate exchanges has proved very popular in 
China since 2009. Exchanges have also been es-
tablished in Wuhan, Hangzhou, Kunming, Dalian, 
2  The China Low Carbon Index reflects the development of China’s low car-
bon industry and degree of securitization, which is the first RMB-denomi-
nated low carbon index  The index covers nine energy technologies: solar, 
wind, nuclear, hydro, clean coal, smart grid, battery, energy efficiency, 
water and refuse treatment 
3  http://www cneeex com/datacenter/huanjingbaohu html (in Chinese)  
42 
Anhui Province, Guizhou Province, Hebei Province 
and Shanxi Province, etc. in succession.   
The growing number of exchanges is being estab-
lished in the wake of the Chinese government hav-
ing drawn up rules to implement a domestic carbon-
trading market and in expectation of a series of 
practical policies, laws, regulations and systems 
that will promote technological innovation and a 
sustainable economy in China, combined with high 
efficiency and low emissions. The Chinese gov-
ernment will definitely play a leading role in this, 
though the exchanges ensure that companies and 
the public will also make contributions. Conse-
quently, the ‘Administrative Measures on Green-
house Gas Emission Reductions Voluntary Trading 
Activities (Interim)’ will be issued this year. The 
Administrative Measures will regulate the trading 
regime by first of all instituting accreditation for 
emission reduction verification and formulating 
a unified verification standard. In addition, it will 
help identify and guide market demand, as well as 
enhance the capability and knowledge of Chinese 
companies in the carbon-trading field. 
Low-carbon pilot locations in China
On 8 July 2010, the National Development and Re-
form Commission (NDRC) of China issued a Notice 
on Initiating Low-carbon Pilot Projects in Provinces 
and Cities. It states that five provinces as well as 
eight cities have been selected as the first group of 
regions for low-carbon policy pilots.
Each region is required to draft its own plan to re-
duce carbon emissions and develop a green econo-
my for the nation’s 12th Five Year Plan. The plans 
should put forward a target and list the main tasks 
and concrete measures for controlling local green-
house gas emissions. The city’s or province’s carbon 
emission intensity must be reduced and low-carbon 
development options explored.
The central authority also requires that correspond-
ing policies supporting low-carbon development 
should be made. A target and task management sys-
tem to control greenhouse gas emissions should be 
employed based on the setting up of a greenhouse 
gas emissions data, statistics and management sys-
tem. This should accelerate the establishment of an 
industry system characterized by low-carbon emis-
sions, while simultaneously the low-carbon and 
green lifestyle and consumption should be advocat-
ed actively.
In accordance with the state’s policy, the pilot work 
in Guangdong Province has developed rapidly. This 
province is at the forefront of opening up and re-
form in China and possesses the location advantag-
es in facilitating cooperation with Hong Kong (HK) 
and constructing the SZ (Shen Zhen City)-HK conur-
bation, as well as establishing an Asian carbon cred-
its exchange. To provide a good external environ-
ment, in the process of constructing a carbon credits 
trading system, the local government of Guangdong 
Province provided a ‘green’ trading channel for the 
pilot project, widened the channels for international 
communication and exchange, and widely dissemi-
nated information, awareness raising and public in-
volvement.
Xiamen City, which was also listed as one of the pilot 
cities for low-carbon policy development, will initi-
ate a pilot program on low-carbon city development 
and a project on carbon emissions trading. Xiamen 
has introduced two measures to cut building ener-
gy consumption. The first method is to ensure the 
energy efficiency of the buildings by upgrading the 
standards on design and raw material usage for new 
Apart from the establishment of the voluntary 
carbon standard, China’s voluntary emissions 
reduction market is being rapidly constructed 
with the development of a voluntary carbon 
trading platform.
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buildings, as well as strengthening new buildings re-
views and approval procedures. The second method 
is to take a market-oriented approach to gradually 
completing the energy-conservation renovations of 
existing buildings. Till now, Xiamen has collected 
energy consumption statistics from 264 large public 
and governmental office buildings and has released 
energy-conservation renovation plans for the first 
group of 67 high-energy consumption public and 
governmental office buildings.
In 2011, the Urban Environment Institution of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with 
the National Development and Reform Commission, 
is creating a low-carbon city assessment indicator 
system with more than a hundred indicators. The 
program is expected to be finished at the end of the 
year. If the research findings of the assessment indi-
cators submitted by each institution are accredited 
by the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion, the assessment indicators of low-carbon cit-
ies may be changed from voluntary into authorized 
ones, which will then eventually be introduced and 
applied to the whole country.
China has been demonstrating its credentials as an 
active and responsible country in dealing with cli-
mate change issues. The pilot projects are the central 
government’s response to the international commu-
nity and its pressure on China’s huge and increasing 
carbon emissions, which shows the government’s 
commitment to developing a low-carbon and green 
economy. The pilot work conducted in low-carbon 
provinces and cities will be helpful to inspire initia-
tives from all stakeholders and accumulate experi-
ence in guiding different areas and different indus-
tries, which is the basis for policy-making in respect 
of the nationwide carbon trading mechanism and is 
an important breakthrough in controlling of green-
house gas emissions. In reducing carbon emissions, 
the pilot regions, voluntary carbon standards and as-
sessment system are essential lessons to be drawn 
by China, as well as other developing countries, in 
drawing up national rules and regulations.
China Green Carbon Foundation
In an effort to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
while encouraging the development of carbon 
credit trading and bio-fuel technology, on 30 July 
2010 the State Forestry Administration officially 
launched the China Green Carbon Foundation, the 
first nation-wide publicly funded foundation dedi-
cated to combating climate change by increasing 
carbon sink in China. The mission of the China 
Green Carbon Foundation is to promote activi-
ties combating climate change in fields including 
afforestation, forest management, decreasing de-
forestation and other activities associated with 
increasing carbon sink and reducing emissions. 
Its aim is to spread relevant knowledge so as to 
strengthen public capacity in combating climate 
change and to support and perfect the Forest Ef-
fect Compensation Mechanism of China.4 A brand 
new operational model was used in which enter-
prises or individuals donated to the China Green 
Carbon Foundation for the activities of affores-
tation, forest management, etc., and the CO2 ab-
sorbed by trees from the forest funded by these 
enterprises will be credited to their own accounts 
and published on the internet. Farmers can obtain 
more job opportunities, and their income will be 
increased and living standards improved through 
participation in afforestation activities and forest 
management, reflecting the principle that ‘indus-
try supports agriculture, and the city supports ru-
ral areas’.
Since its establishment, the China Green Carbon 
Foundation has collected an endowment of RMB 
4  The examination of a Forest Effect Compensation Mechanism of China 
started at the beginning of 1980s  This mechanism was established to 
compensate for ecological damage, provide ecological protection, solve the 
problems of eco-conservation in the fields of key national eco-protection 
zones, river basins and development of mineral resources, and improve 
eco-environmental protection in China 
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The construction of a low-carbon  
industry and system can provide a 
transaction platform for carbon  
trading, as well as a basis for policy- 
making and the establishment of rules.
9.68 million and established five specialized 
funds in Beijing, Shanxi Province, Zhejiang Prov-
ince, Daxing region and Weizhou county respec-
tively. It has created afforestation pilots in nine 
provinces or cities through partnerships with for-
estry administrations, and the afforested area has 
reached eight thousand hectares. Meanwhile, the 
first group of fifteen bases of individual donors 
for afforestation have been established in Yan’an 
City, Shanxi Province, Jinggangshan City, Jiangxi 
Province, Duolun County, Inner Mongolia Auton-
omous Region, Tengchong County, Yunnan Prov-
ince, etc., thus creating the conditions for public 
participation in carbon offsetting.
The foundation has built a quadruple beneficial 
platform between the enterprises and the pub-
lic for ‘storing carbon credits, practising social 
responsibility by enterprises, raising farmers’ 
incomes and improving the ecological environ-
ment’  (China Green Carbon Foundation, 2010) by 
the way of a forest carbon sink. The China Green 
Carbon Foundation guarantees that every ton 
of carbon in the carbon sink account will corre-
spond to a forest plot, which will not only absorb 
the carbon but also provide employment oppor-
tunities and increase incomes for farmers work-
ing in afforestation and forest management. The 
amount of carbon sink is to be made open and 
transparent by means of online publication. The 
activities of increasing carbon sinks can create 
positive social benefits, and it is straightforward 
and easy so that everyone can participate. 
Carbon neutral actions
On 17 November 2009, as China’s first carbon-
neutral action, Shanghai Pacific Millennium Pack-
aging & Paper Industries Co. conducted China’s 
first voluntary emission reduction-based carbon 
neutral transaction at the Tianjin Climate Ex-
change, offsetting 6,266 tons of carbon emis-
sions from 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2009. All 
the packaging businesses under Pacific Millen-
nium Holdings Corporation (the parent company 
of Shanghai Pacific Millennium) will gradually in-
troduce carbon management and carbon neutral 
measures. 
In January 2010, the China Carbon Neutral Alli-
ance was officially launched by CBEEX in Beijing. 
In accordance with the aims of Green Earth, Sus-
tainable and Harmonious Development through 
Carbon Neutral, the Alliance aims to provide all-
round carbon-neutral services for enterprises, in-
stitutions and organizations, and to take the lead 
in carrying out corporate social responsibility ac-
tivities and supporting the national strategy on 
sustainable development. 
Also launched by CBEEX in association with a 
large number of professional institutions, the 
Chinese Enterprises Voluntary Emission Reduc-
tions Billboard was issued on 6 June 2011, with 
41 institutions in total. The institutions include 
Chinese and foreign listing enterprises such as 
Baidu, Air China, China Everbright Bank, China 
Merchant Bank and SocGen. These entities pur-
chased voluntary emission reductions to off-
set greenhouse gas emissions generated during 
their operations or activities, with a reduction of 
210,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions in to-
tal. 
Among the listed enterprises, China Everbright 
Bank has made good efforts in environmental 
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improvement and corporate social responsibility 
through various channels in recent years. In 2010, 
the company purchased voluntary emission re-
ductions to offset the CO2 emissions generated in 
2009 from the operations of its headquarters and 
33 branches. Hence, China Everbright Bank is Chi-
na’s first carbon-neutral bank. The Bank also ac-
tively promoted carbon finance business by means 
of a green credit mechanism, the promotion of 
modular financing and the creation of carbon fi-
nancing products. The Zero-Carbon credit card is 
one of the financial products launched by China 
Everbright Bank in cooperation with the Beijing En-
vironment Exchange. This card has six functions, 
including a recyclable chip, carbon trace calcula-
tor, scheduled carbon purchases, and environmen-
tally-friendly billing to support the Chinese gov-
ernment’s emission reduction initiative. By June 
2011, China Everbright Bank had issued 100,000 
Zero-Carbon credit cards.
Besides China Everbright Bank, Air China came up 
with the first green flight in China, SocGen issued 
the first low-carbon credit card — the China Low-
Carbon credit card. Similarly, Baidu became the 
first internet company to try and offset carbon 
emissions by purchasing carbon credits. China 
Vanke Co Ltd, a leading real-estate developer, has 
bought emission reduction quotas on the Shang-
hai Environment and Energy Exchange in order 
to make its pavilion at the Shanghai Expo carbon-
neutral.
At the present stage, Chinese companies have 
established preliminary carbon neutral services, 
including carbon footprint counting and veri-
fication, as well as carbon assets management 
and consulting. China encourages large emitters, 
such as the power and petrochemical industries, 
to adopt low-carbon technologies and implement 
carbon-neutral strategies.
China has attached great importance to the con-
struction of low-carbon industries and systems 
at a national strategic level and has taken many 
measures and actions ultimately to construct a 
domestic carbon trading market. The construction 
of a low-carbon industry and system can provide 
a transaction platform for carbon trading, as well 
as a basis for policy-making and the establishment 
of rules. Solving environment-related problems 
by using the market mechanism will help create 
an open and fair environment for all players, thus 
reducing social costs and attracting more busi-
nesses. Meanwhile, the development of China’s 
domestic carbon market will be an effective way 
to strengthen the capability and knowledge of Chi-
nese companies in the carbon-trading field. It will 
help reduce transaction costs for both buyers and 
sellers and inject improved liquidity into the glob-
al carbon market. The efforts that China is making 
at present in the field of low-carbon development 
can provide practical experience for policy-making 
in respect of the nationwide carbon market and is 
a critical step in the development of the future car-
bon trading mechanism.
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Abstract
Why should anyone be interested in the national 
context of a state policy? In the case of Califor-
nia’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), the 
answer flows directly from the very nature of the 
problem – global climate change, the ultimate 
global commons problem  Greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) uniformly mix in the atmosphere  There-
fore, any jurisdiction taking action – whether a 
nation, a state, or a city – will incur the costs of 
its actions, but the benefits of its actions (reduced 
risk of climate-change damages) will be distrib-
uted globally  Hence, for virtually any jurisdic-
tion, the benefits it reaps from its climate-policy 
actions will be less than the cost it incurs  This is 
despite the fact that the global benefits of action 
may well be greater – possibly much greater – 
than global costs  
This presents a classic free-rider problem, in 
which it is in the interest of each jurisdiction to 
wait for others to take action and benefit from 
their actions (that is, free-ride)  This is the funda-
mental reason why the highest levels of effective 
government should be involved, that is, sovereign 
states (nations)  And this is why international, if 
not global, cooperation is essential  
Despite this fundamental reality, there can 
still be a valuable role for subnational climate 
policies  Indeed, my purpose in this essay is to 
explore the potential for such state and re-
gional policies – both in the presence of federal 
climate policy and in the absence of such policy  
I begin by describing the national climate policy 
context and then turn to subnational policies, 
such as California’s AB 32 and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the North-
east  My focus is on how these subnational poli-
cies will interact with a federal climate policy  
It turns out that some of the interactions will 
be problematic, others will be benign, and still 
others could be positive  I also examine the role 
that could be played by subnational policies 
in the absence of a meaningful federal policy, 
with the conclusion that – like it or not –  we 
may find that Sacramento, California comes to 
take the place of Washington as the center of 
national climate policy  
Robert Stavins
Albert Pratt Professor of 
Business and Government, 
Harvard Kennedy School
The National Context  
of U.S. State Policies for a  
Global Commons Problem
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The (Long-Term) National Context:  
Carbon Pricing
Virtually all economists and most other policy 
analysts favor a national carbon-pricing policy 
(whether carbon tax or cap-and-trade) as the core 
of any meaningful climate-policy action in the 
United States. Why is this approach so overwhelm-
ingly favored by the analytical community?
First, no other feasible approach can provide truly 
meaningful emissions reductions (such as an 80 
percent cut in national CO2 emissions by mid-
century). Second, it is the least costly approach in 
the short term, because abatement costs are ex-
ceptionally heterogeneous across sources. Only 
carbon pricing provides strong incentives that 
push all sources to control at the same marginal 
abatement cost, thereby achieving a given aggre-
gate target at the lowest possible cost. Third, it is 
the least costly approach in the long term, because 
it provides incentives for carbon-friendly techno-
logical change, which brings down costs over time. 
Fourth, although carbon pricing is not sufficient 
on its own (because of other market failures that 
reduce the impact of price signals – more about 
this below), it is a necessary component of a sensi-
ble climate policy, because of factors one through 
three, above.
But carbon pricing is a hot-button political issue. 
This is primarily because it makes the costs of the 
policy transparent, unlike conventional policy in-
struments, such as performance and technology 
standards, which tend to hide costs. Carbon pric-
ing is easily associated with the dreaded T-word. 
Indeed, in Washington, cap-and-trade has been 
successfully demonized as “cap-and-tax.” As a re-
sult, the political reality now appears to be that 
a national, economy-wide carbon-pricing policy 
is unlikely to be enacted before 2013. Does this 
mean that there will be no federal climate policy in 
the meantime? No, not at all.
The (Short-Term) National Context:  
Federal Regulations on the Way or  
Already in Place
Regulations of various kinds may soon be forth-
coming – and in some cases, will definitely be 
forthcoming – as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (April 2007) and 
the Obama Administration’s subsequent endan-
germent finding (December 2009) that emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases en-
danger public health and welfare. This triggered 
mobile source standards in mid-2010, the promul-
gation of which identified carbon dioxide as a pol-
lutant under the Clean Air Act, thereby initiating a 
process of using the Clean Air Act for stationary 
sources as well.
Initial stationary-source standards took effect on 
January 2, 2011. The EPA plans to issue additional 
new source performance standards and possibly 
other stationary-source regulations later in 2011 
and in 2012. 
The merits that were originally suggested of such 
regulatory action are that it would be effective in 
some sectors and that the threat of such regula-
tion will spur Congress to take action with a more 
sensible approach – namely, an economy-wide cap-
and-trade system. However, regulatory action on 
carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act will accom-
plish relatively little and do so at relatively high 
cost, compared with carbon pricing. Also, Con-
gress has now rejected cap-and-trade and will not 
reconsider it in the near future. It is reasonable to 
ask, though, whether regulatory action was ever a 
credible threat; the implementation of inflexible, 
high-cost regulatory approaches may lend ammu-
nition to the staunchest opponents of any climate 
policy.
Air pollution policies for non-greenhouse gas pol-
lutants, the emissions of some of which are highly 
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correlated with CO2 emissions, may also play an 
important role. Most importantly, without any new 
legislation, a set of rules now making their way 
through the regulatory process – affecting ambient 
ozone, SO2 /NO2, particulates, ash, hazardous air 
pollutants (mercury), and effluent water – could 
significantly reduce the portion of electricity gen-
erated by coal-fired power plants.
Finally, there is the possibility of new energy poli-
cies (not targeted exclusively at climate change) 
having significant impacts on CO2 emissions. The 
possible components of such an approach that 
would be relevant in the context of climate change 
include: a national renewable electricity stand-
ard; federal financing for clean energy projects; 
energy efficiency measures (building, appliance, 
and industrial efficiency standards; home retrofit 
subsidies; smart grid standards, subsidies, and dy-
namic pricing policies); and a new federal electrici-
ty-transmission siting authority.
Even without action by the Congress or by the Ad-
ministration, legal action on climate policy is likely 
to take place within the judicial realm. Public nui-
sance litigation will no doubt continue, with a di-
verse set of lawsuits being filed across the country 
in pursuit of injunctive relief and/or damages. Due 
to recent court decisions, the pace, the promise, 
and the problems of this approach remain uncer-
tain.
Beyond the well-defined area of public nuisance 
litigation, other interventions which are intended 
to block permits for new fossil energy invest-
ments, including both power plants and transmis-
sion lines, will continue. Some of these interven-
tions will be of the conventional NIMBY character, 
but others will no doubt be more strategic.
But with political stalemate in Washington on car-
bon pricing or national climate policy, attention is 
inevitably turning to regional, state, and even local 
policies intended to address climate change.
Subnational Climate Policies
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in 
the Northeast (Figure 1) has created a cap-and-
trade system among electricity generators. More 
striking, California’s Global Warming Solutions 
Act (Assembly Bill 32, or AB 32) will likely lead to 
the creation of a very ambitious set of climate ini-
tiatives, including a statewide cap-and-trade sys-
tem. The California system is likely to be linked 
with systems in other states and Canadian prov-
inces under the Western Climate Initiative (Figure 
2) (see later on linking). Currently, more than half 
of the 50 states are contemplating, developing, or 
implementing climate policies.
In the presence of a federal policy, will such state 
efforts achieve their objectives? Will the efforts 
be cost-effective? The answer is that the interac-
tions of state policies with federal policy can be 
problematic, benign, or positive, depending upon 
their relative scope and stringency, and depend-
ing upon the specific policy instruments used (for 
elaboration see Goulder and Stavins, 2010). 
Problematic Interactions
Let’s start with the case of a federal policy which 
limits emission quantities (as with cap-and-trade) 
or uses nationwide averaging of performance (as 
with some proposals for a national renewable 
portfolio standard). In this case, emission reduc-
Virtually all economists and most other 
policy analysts favor a national carbon-
pricing policy (whether carbon tax or cap-
and-trade) as the core of any meaningful 
climate-policy action in the United States.
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tions accomplished by a “green state” with a more 
stringent policy than the federal policy – for ex-
ample, AB 32 combined with Waxman-Markey/H.R. 
2454 – will reduce pressure on other states, there-
by freeing, indeed encouraging (through lower al-
lowance prices) emission increases in the other 
states. The result would be 100 percent leakage, 
no gain in environmental protection from the 
green state’s added activity, and a national loss of 
cost-effectiveness.
Potential examples of this – depending upon the 
details of the regulations – include: first, AB 32 
cap-and-trade combined with some U.S. Clean Air 
Act performance standards (neither H.R. 2454 
nor anything like it are any longer on the table); 
second, state limits on GHGs/mile combined with 
federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards; and third, state renewable fuels stand-
ards (RFS) combined with a federal renewable fuels 
standard or state renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS) combined with a federal RPS. A partial solu-
tion would be for these federal programs to allow 
states to opt out of the federal policy if they had an 
equally or more stringent state policy. Such a par-
tial solution would not, however, be cost-effective.
Benign Interactions
One example of benign interactions of state and 
federal climate policy is the case of the RGGI in the 
Northeast. In this case, the state policies are less 
stringent than an assumed federal policy (such as 
H.R. 2454). The result is that the state policies be-
come nonbinding and hence largely irrelevant.
A second example – that warms the hearts of econo-
mists, but appears to be politically irrelevant for 
the time being – is the case of a federal policy that 
sets price, not quantity, i.e., a carbon tax or a bind-
ing safety valve or a price collar in a cap-and-trade 
system. In this case, more stringent actions in green 
states do not lead to offsetting emissions in other 
states induced by a changing carbon price. It should 
be noted, however, that there will be different mar-
ginal abatement costs across states, and so aggregate 
reductions would not be achieved cost-effectively.
Positive Interactions
Three scenarios suggest the possibility of positive 
interactions of state and federal climate policies. 
First, states can – in principle – address market 
failures not addressed by a federal carbon-pricing 
policy (should there ever be one). A prime exam-
Figure 1. Map of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI)
RGGI is the first mandatory U.S. cap-and-trade 
program for carbon dioxide. It was established in 
December 2005 by the governors of seven North-
eastern and Mid-Atlantic states; three additional 
states joined in 2007, and Pennsylvania remains 
an observer.
Source: The Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2011
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ple is the principal agent problem of insufficient 
energy-efficiency investments in renter-occupied 
properties, even in the face of high energy prices. 
This is a problem that is best addressed at the 
state or even local level, such as through building 
codes and zoning.
Figure 2.  Map of Western Climate Initiative
The WCI is a collaboration of independent jurisdictions who work together to iden¬tify, evaluate, 
and implement policies to tackle climate change at a regional level. Other U.S. states, Canadian 
provinces, Mexican states, and tribes are encouraged to participate in the WCI as either partners 
or observers.
Source: Western Climate Initiative 2011
Observer
Partner
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Second, state and regional authorities frequently 
argue that states can serve as valuable “laborato-
ries” for policy design and thereby provide use-
ful information for the development of federal 
policy. However, it is reasonable to ask whether 
state authorities will allow their “laboratory” to 
be closed after the experiment has been com-
pleted, the information delivered, and a federal 
policy put in place. Pronouncements from some 
state leaders should cause concern in this re-
gard.
Third, states can create pressure for more strin-
gent federal policies. A timely example is provided 
by California’s Pavley I motor vehicle fuel-efficien-
cy standards and the subsequent change in federal 
CAFE requirements. There is historical validation 
of this effect, with California repeatedly having 
increased the stringency of its local air pollution 
standards, followed by parallel federal action un-
der the Clean Air Act. This linkage is desirable if 
the previous federal policy is insufficiently strin-
gent, but whether that is the case is an empirical 
question.
Thus, in the presence of federal climate policy, in-
teractions with subnational policies can be prob-
lematic, benign, or positive, depending upon the 
relative scope and stringency of the subnational 
and national policies, as well as the particular 
policy instruments employed at both levels. (For 
a more rigorous derivation of the findings above, 
see Goulder and Stavins, 2010). 
International perspectives  
– The Linking of Trading Systems
At the international level, tradable permit systems 
are emerging as a preferred instrument for reduc-
ing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Two of the 
most significant institutions for reducing GHG 
emissions implemented to date – the European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – are trad-
able permit systems. Australia, Canada, Japan, and 
New Zealand, , among other countries, are consider-
ing or have put in place tradable permit systems for 
reducing GHG emissions. As these systems grow in 
prominence and number, attention has increasingly 
focused on whether and how to link them.
Linking occurs when a tradable permit system’s 
regulatory authority allows regulated entities to 
use emission allowances or emission reduction 
credits from another system in order to meet com-
pliance obligations. Linking thereby allows these 
entities to take advantage of the cost savings from 
international trade in allowances or credits.
As mentioned the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative provides for several types of one-way links. 
Covered sources may use emission reduction 
credits from qualified domestic offset projects, 
subject to quantitative limits that depend on the 
prevailing RGGI allowance price. When the RGGI al-
lowance price exceeds a specific threshold, which 
increases over time, sources have the additional 
option to use CERs and allowances from other 
countries’ cap-and-trade systems, such as the EU 
ETS, in meeting their compliance obligations.
Linking tradable permit systems leads to diverse 
effects that need to be considered in assessing 
both the merits of particular linkages, be it among 
state-based systems or internationally, and the 
merits of linkage as a major design element of a 
post2012 international policy architecture.
The interactions of state policies with 
federal policy can be problematic, benign, 
or positive, depending upon their relative 
scope and stringency, and depending upon 
the specific policy instruments used.
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The degree of control that a (State) government can 
retain over its system depends in part on whether 
linkage is oneway or twoway. For example, twoway 
linkages can increase or decrease domestic allow-
ance prices. Twoway linkages lead to complete 
propagation of cost-containment measures across 
the linked systems. In contrast, oneway linkages 
can only decrease the price of allowances in the 
system that establishes the link. Oneway linkages 
therefore will only lead to propagation of cost-con-
tainment measures in one direction – from the sys-
tem with which a link is established to the system 
that establishes the link.
The effects of a linkage also depend on whether 
it connects two cap-and-trade systems or a cap-
and-trade system and an emission-reduction-cred-
it system. For example, linkage that involves an 
emission-reduction-credit system raises the issue 
of additionality. On the other hand, in a link be-
tween two cap-and-trade systems, the increase in 
allowance prices in one may have more far-reach-
ing economic consequences – such as increasing 
domestic energy prices – than would the increase 
in credit prices resulting from a link between a cap-
and-trade system and a credit system. In a credit 
system, entities are not required to meet any emis-
sions targets and thus can only benefit from the 
opportunity to sell credits for higher prices.
Linkage as a Bottom-Up International 
Policy Architecture
Bilateral linkages are likely to continue to evolve 
among national and regional capandtrade systems 
and the CDM (or its successor). Could such a set of 
linkages, established without central coordination, 
function as an effective, standalone, bottomup inter-
national policy architecture? – And if so would this in 
effect entail a significant de facto U.S. participation?
Although such an architecture would need to in-
clude other design elements, including emission 
reduction commitments and participation incen-
tives, its distinguishing feature would be that it 
would grow organically from direct and indirect 
linkages. The degree to which a system of bot-
tomup linkages could achieve meaningful en-
vironmental performance depends on whether 
participants set sufficient environmental targets, 
a sufficient number of key countries participate, 
and participants comply.
With regard to whether participants will set mean-
ingful environmental targets, commitments to re-
duce emissions in an architecture of bottom-up 
linkages would result from unilateral decisions by 
individual nations, or from negotiations among 
small groups of nations. In developed countries, 
internal political support would probably be the 
driving force behind adoption of more stringent 
emission caps, whereas adoption of emissions 
caps by developing nations may depend upon in-
centives provided by committed developed coun-
tries. To address the possibility that linking may 
create incentives for some countries to adopt less 
stringent future caps, countries could negotiate 
cap trajectories as a condition for linking. On the 
other hand, a system of linkages may actually al-
low some countries to adopt more aggressive tar-
gets than they otherwise would.
Links among cap-and-trade systems create gains 
from trade for the participating countries. There-
fore, such an architecture has the potential to be 
costeffective if the bottom-up system includes a 
sufficient set of direct twoway links, or if the sys-
States can – in principle – address mar-
ket failures not addressed by a federal 
carbon-pricing policy (should there ever 
be one).
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tem relies primarily on indirect links through a 
common credit system (a sort of clearing house) 
that has an adequate supply of low-cost credits to 
bring about allowance price convergence.
A bottom-up system of linkage is already evolv-
ing for example in the U.S., and could function 
well in the nearterm in the absence of a top-down 
post-2012 international policy architecture. How-
ever, for a bottomup system to achieve meaningful 
long-term environmental performance and a high 
degree of participation, it would require the major 
emitters – the United States, the European Union, 
Russia, Japan, China, India, and other key coun-
tries – to reach an implicit agreement regarding 
emissions targets and incentives for participation. 
Whether this would be possible without central-
ized negotiations is an open question.
Subnational Climate Policies in the Ab-
sence of Federal Action
Cap-and-trade systems are emerging as a preferred 
domestic instrument for reducing GHG emissions 
in many parts of the world, the CDM having devel-
oped a substantial constituency despite some con-
cerns about its performance. Because of the con-
siderable political and economic pressure to link 
these systems, linkage may be expected to play a 
de facto, if not de jure, role in any future interna-
tional climate policy architecture.
In the U.S., comprehensive federal carbon-pricing 
policy appears to be delayed until 2013, at the 
earliest. And it is possible that pending federal 
regulatory action under the Clean Air Act will be 
curtailed or significantly delayed either by the 
new Congress or by litigation. Therefore, it is im-
portant to consider the role of state and regional 
climate policies in the absence of federal action. 
State policies and the linking of state policies is 
an obvious first step in the absence of any federal 
policy. 
In brief, in the absence of meaningful federal ac-
tion, subnational climate policies could well be-
come the core of national action with potential 
links also to the international level. Problems will 
no doubt arise, including legal obstacles such as 
possible federal preemption or litigation asso-
ciated with the so-called “Dormant” Commerce 
Clause.
Also, even a large portfolio of state and regional 
policies will not be comprehensive of the entire 
nation, that is, not truly national in scope (for a 
quick approximation of likely coverage, check out 
a recent map of blue states and red states).
And even if the state and regional policies were na-
tionally comprehensive, there would likely be dif-
ferent policies of different stringency in different 
parts of the country. As a result, carbon shadow–
prices would not be equivalent, and overall policy 
objectives would be achieved at excessive social 
cost.
Is there a solution (if only a partial one)? Yes. If 
the primary policy instrument employed in the 
state and regional policies is cap-and-trade, then 
the respective carbon markets can be linked. Such 
linkage occurs through bilateral recognition of al-
lowances, which results in reduced costs, reduced 
price volatility, reduced leakage, and reduced mar-
ket power. Good news all around.
Such bottom-up linkage of state and regional cap-
and-trade systems could be an important part, or 
In the absence of meaningful federal ac-
tion, subnational climate policies could well 
become the core of national action with po-
tential links also to the inter national level.
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perhaps even the core, of future of U.S. climate 
policy, at least until there is meaningful action 
at the federal level. In the meantime, it is at least 
conceivable – and perhaps likely – that linkage of 
state-level cap-and-trade systems will become the 
(interim) de facto national climate policy architec-
ture.
In this way, Sacramento would take the place of 
Washington as the center of national climate pol-
icy deliberations and action. No doubt, this possi-
bility will please some and frighten others.
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Mind the Gap: The State-of-Play 
of Canadian Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation 
Abstract
At the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) talks in Bonn in 
June 2011,1 Canada released its climate change 
mitigation plan  Canada will harmonize mitigation 
with the U S  “where appropriate” and develop 
performance-based standards for large industrial 
emitters, transportation and buildings (Govern-
ment of Canada 2011a)  However, a focus on 
recent federal approaches ignores long-standing 
efforts by provinces to mitigate greenhouse gases 
(GHGs)   Original modelling completed for this 
paper indicates current and planned provincial 
and federal mitigation could reduce 103 million 
tonnes (Mt) of GHGs in 2020, or about 46 percent 
of Canada’s targets of -17 percent below 2005  
More importantly, Canada is not seized with miti-
gation inaction; many emitters face carbon costs 
consistent with emitters in the European Union  
Still, more needs to be done but now, at least, 
Canada is moving in the right direction  
1  The 34th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
Federal Carbon Policy Developments 
and Carbon Reductions 
Canada’s announcement in the UNFCCC interces-
sional climate meetings in Bonn confirmed what 
the federal government had been signalling for 
some time: the Government of Canada will regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) using emission 
standards that specify industry performance and 
will not implement carbon pricing. Carbon pricing 
is most certainly dead for now due to the politici-
zation of instrument choice, where the choice of 
carbon taxes, cap and trade or performance based 
regulations formed competing political platforms 
in the 2008 and 2011 national elections. In the po-
litical arena the ruling political party rejected the 
carbon pricing platforms of the other parties. The 
result of this politicization of instrument choice, 
at least at the federal level, is a preference by the 
Government of Canada for narrowly targeted sec-
tor-based performance standards. 
Two Government of Canada regulatory initiatives 
provide a blueprint of the type of performance-
based regulations that will come: new light duty ve-
hicles sold after 2012 need to achieve an emission 
standard based on grams of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
per kilometer travelled (Government of Canada 
David Sawyer 
Director of Climate Change and 
Energy, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD)
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2010); and thermal electricity generating units at 
age 45 years must attain a natural gas performance 
standard of 375 tonnes of GHG per gigawatt hour 
of electricity produced (Government of Canada 
2011b). Yet is this preference for performance reg-
ulations necessarily bad for carbon pricing? 
To achieve the aspiration targets adopted by the 
federal government,2 carbon pricing held the only 
cost-effective path forward. Regulations were too 
hard to design given information asymmetries be-
tween the regulator and industry, too inflexible to 
enable cost-effective decision making by firms and 
households and simply too costly relative to more 
efficient carbon pricing. Yet the focus on the depth 
of the quantity GHG targets was the problem and 
not necessarily which management instrument 
could deliver the reductions. The sticker shock of 
compliance for the deep targets was so great that 
Canada became locked into inaction, even under 
efficient carbon pricing proposals. Since the late 
1990s, when the federal government initiated the 
National Climate Change Process, successive stud-
ies modelled Canada-alone carbon pricing sce-
narios with aversion to international flexibility 
(i.e. Russian hot air) and deep targets (-6% below 
1990).3 These scenarios produce big compliance 
costs, in the order of CAD$200 per tonne reduced, 
while wreaking havoc on indicators of competi-
tiveness due to the Canada mitigates “alone” focus 
(NRTEE 2007). Add to this a “petro-state” view that 
GHG mitigation would slow regional economic de-
velopment from oil and gas in Alberta, but also 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia. In this light, it is not surprising 
that successive governments, taking signals from 
the public where climate change has not catalyzed 
2  -17 per cent below 2005 levels in 2020 (Government of Canada 2011c)
3  “Canada-alone” usually did not include action by the United States, 
Canada’s major trading partner  This then exacerbated competitiveness 
impacts given the importance of Canada-US trade  About 80 per cent of 
Canada’s exports are to the United States, with daily cross-border flows 
well over CAD$2 billion  
as an issue, have been slow to reduce GHG emis-
sions given competiveness concerns. Mitigation 
actions aligned with deep GHG reduction targets 
were not on the table regardless of whether the 
instrument was efficient carbon pricing or less ef-
ficient regulations. 
 
Nonetheless, Canada’s GHG reduction targets re-
main, and the ability of performance regulations 
to deliver cost-effective reductions consistent 
with the targets is questionable. Canada has har-
monized its reduction targets with the U.S. at mi-
nus 17 per cent below 2005 levels in 2020, which 
for Canada represents 607 Mt. With the economy 
growing at about 1.25 times current levels to 2020, 
including a rapidly expanding oil and gas sector, 
Canada’s GHG emissions could grow to 830 Mt in 
2020, leaving a gap of 223 Mt to the 607 Mt target.4 
Uniquely, Canada is a federation where provinces 
and the federal government have strong jurisdic-
tion over energy and emissions decision making. 
All provinces, for example, have set aspirational 
carbon reductions targets of varying stringency and 
have implemented some form of GHG mitigation 
policy. As such, a forward-looking climate policy 
for Canada necessarily includes a mix of provin-
cial and federal mitigation actions. But the risk of 
continued fragmentation has much to do with the 
rejection of carbon pricing by ruling federal govern-
ment due to its politicization in the last two federal 
elections, concern over Canada-US competiveness 
and slowing growth in the oil and gas sector. 
But a forward-looking policy also needs to unify 
the emerging patchwork of federal and provin-
cial actions if cost-effective mitigation is to be 
4  To estimate the baseline and the emissions reductions below, we use the 
CIMS energy and emission model  CIMS is calibrated to historic Canadian 
energy demand and technology deployment and uses a forecast of future 
economic demand and energy prices for emission forecasting and policy 
scenario outcomes  It is maintained by researchers at Simon Fraser Univer-
sity  
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achieved. Due to the significant differences in ju-
risdictional mitigation costs between sectors and 
regions, policy fragmentation with no sector or re-
gional flexibility to smooth compliance costs will 
necessarily be inefficient. For example, analysis by 
Canada’s National Roundtable on the Environment 
and Economy estimated that fragmented jurisdic-
tional GHG policy could lead to compliance costs 
that were 25 per cent higher for a given mitigation 
target relative to a unified carbon pricing policy 
(NRTEE 2009). 
Understanding where Canada needs to go with 
respect to developing cost-effective mitigation 
policy first requires understanding the current 
patchwork of federal and provincial mitigation 
policies. Below we present the current state of play 
with respect to provincial and federal mitigation 
actions and then discuss additional mitigation op-
portunities.
Provincial GHG Mitigation Action 
Provincial and territorial governments in Canada 
hold many levers for action on climate change. 
They have established their own climate change 
emissions reductions targets and are implement-
ing GHG reduction strategies that reflect their 
individual circumstances. The main actions are 
primarily carbon pricing, with a mix of regulatory 
actions such as a phase-out of coal thermal power 
in Ontario. Below we present new modelling com-
pleted for this paper to estimate current emissions 
reductions from existing provincial actions. 
The modelling uses CIMS, an integrated set of eco-
nomic and energy modules for Canada designed 
to provide information on the likely response of 
firms and households to policies and changes in 
prices that influence their technology acquisition 
and use decisions.5 The CIMS model is based on 
current and forecast energy flows through Cana-
5  See NRTEE 2009 for an overview of CIMS 
da’s economic system and tracks the flow of ener-
gy, beginning with production processes through 
to eventual end-use by individual technologies. 
In the model, historical emissions, energy and 
economic baselines are coupled with economic, 
demographic and energy price forecasts to deter-
mine both a reference case and a change case with 
new mitigation policies. The model has been used 
extensively by the federal and provincial govern-
ments of Canada to forecast GHG emissions and 
energy supply and demand. 
With a forecast of emissions to 2020 that reflects 
baseline increases in energy efficiency and fuel 
choices given forecasts of energy prices, we then 
add in each provincial policy incrementally. This 
serves to both highlight the emissions impact of 
each policy and avoid double counting the mitiga-
tion impact of each policy. In effect, each policy 
reduces the stock of mitigation potential remain-
ing as policies influence technology deployment 
and behavioral choices, making these unavailable 
to subsequent policies. 
 
Based on our assessment of the incremental impact 
of current provincial mitigation policies, about 31 
Mt of reductions are likely to be achieved annually 
by 2020, representing attainment of about 14 per 
cent of Canada’s 2020 mitigation target:
 • British Columbia’s carbon tax was initiated in 
2008 at a rate of CAD$106 per tonne and will 
6  In September 2011, the Canadian and American dollars were about at par-
ity  
The risk of continued fragmentation has 
much to do with the rejection of carbon 
pricing by ruling federal government due 
to its politicization in the last two federal 
elections, concern over Canada-US compe-
tiveness and slowing growth in the oil and 
gas sector.
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climb to CAD$30 per tonne by 2012, or just over 
7.25 cents per litre of gasoline. The tax covers liq-
uid fuels and large industrial emitters, or about 
75 per cent of the GHG inventory. Covered are 
both liquid fuels and solid fuels used in industry 
transportation and buildings, while process, fu-
gitive, agriculture (soils and livestock) and waste 
emissions are omitted. Assuming the sched-
uled CAD$30 price in 2012 remains unchanged 
to 2020, the policy could deliver about 3 Mt in 
2020. In all likelihood this underestimates reduc-
tions as the carbon tax rate will inevitably climb. 
 • Alberta’s Specified Gas Emitter Regulations 
(2007) (Government of Alberta 2003) is a base-
line and credit hybrid of cap-and-trade and car-
bon tax with a binding intensity standard of 12 
per cent improvement per year on large industri-
al emitters including oil and gas facilities.7 Cov-
erage includes 100 facilities that represent 50 
per cent of Alberta’s overall emissions or 70 per 
cent of industrial emissions. The carbon price 
for a facility only binds on the compliance obli-
gation (intensity improvement) and not all emis-
sions, thereby reducing the marginal incentive 
to reduce emissions. Compliance can be attained 
through buying or selling emission performance 
credits (EPCs), compliance payments capped at 
CAD$15 to a technology investment fund, or 
with domestic offsets. In 2010, about CAD$70 
million was contributed to the technology fund, 
3.7 Mt in offsets and another 1.9 Mt in EPCs gen-
erated by facilities that exceeded their compli-
ance target (Government of Alberta 2010). Our 
7  Any facility in the province that emits more than 100,000 metric tons of 
CO2e of GHGs per year  (Government of Alberta 2007)  
modelling suggests this policy will likely deliver 
reductions of about 9 Mt in 2020.
 • Quebec’s Carbon Levy, implemented in 2007, 
is a charge on liquid fuels applied at the refin-
ery gate on gasoline and diesel fuel. The rate 
is 0.8 cents for each litre of gasoline distrib-
uted in Quebec and 0.938 cents for each litre 
of diesel fuel, which is equal to a carbon tax 
of CAD$32.50 per tonne. While the charge was 
designed primarily as a revenue raising tool for 
financing mitigation, the effect is nevertheless 
to reduce gasoline consumption and hence emis-
sions. Revenues from the tax are on the order of 
CAD$200 million annually with modelling sug-
gesting this policy could deliver 1 Mt in 2020.
 • Ontario is phasing out coal for thermal electricity 
by 2015. Ontario currently has 6,315 Mw of coal-
fired capacity provided by 15 units that operate 
at four plants across Ontario (Government of 
Ontario 2009). Phasing this coal out and replac-
ing it with a mix of non-emitting fossil electricity 
and lower emitting natural gas will likely result 
in a net reduction of about 8 Mt in 2020. 
 • A series of energy efficiency and renewable elec-
tricity incentives across Canada, such as the fed-
eral government’s ecoEnergy initiatives, Ontar-
io’s Feed-in Tariff and Nova Scotia’s renewable 
portfolio standard could deliver another 10 Mt 
reduction. 
Federal Government GHG  
Mitigation Action
The Canadian federal government has been spend-
ing billions on climate change programs for a num-
ber of decades. Unfortunately, these expenditures 
have been used not so much for emissions reduc-
tions but rather for government programs that 
have had limited success in reducing emissions 
(NRTEE 2011). The primary programs, now de-
Without action in the United States and 
carbon costs on U.S. industry, Canadian 
governments will continue to be hesitant to 
risk the flow of cross-border trade. 
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funct, included subsidies to wind power (primar-
ily) and for building retrofits. Other investments 
include carbon capture and storage demonstration 
projects. 
That said, a number of federal regulations will de-
liver emissions reductions in the short-term and 
increase in time to reduce emissions on the order 
of 39 Mt by 2020. These regulations include:
 • Federal Passenger Automobile Regulations and 
Ethanol Contents Standards. Newly promulgated 
vehicle regulations require all new vehicles pur-
chased after 2011 to achieve an emission stand-
ard of 348 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(C02e) per mile travelled by 2016 (Government 
of Canada 2010). In combination with this is a 
federal renewable fuel standard requiring 5 per 
cent ethanol in gasoline, our estimates are that 
these two regulations could deliver 34 Mt of re-
ductions in 2020. 
 • Federal performance regulations on new or 
modified coal fired thermal power plants. Early 
indications are that the Government of Canada’s 
greenhouse gas regulatory process will not seek 
to align stringency with the 2020 targets. The 
proposed coal-fired regulations will only bind 
when new or modified capital stock is deployed 
while existing stock is left unaffected (Govern-
ment of Canada 2011). This means the major-
ity of the emissions from existing stock will 
remain unaffected by policy. The proposed coal-
fired regulations, for example, will likely deliver 
about 5 Mt of reductions in 2020 on the sector’s 
forecast emissions of 91 Mt. The average cost 
of these emissions reductions is in the order of 
CAD$25 per tonne, or about CAD$260 million 
annually.
Figure 1 provides an overview of these current ac-
tions.
Provincial and Federal Mitigation  
Actions Likely to be Implemented
The State of California and the governments of 
British Columbia, Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec, 
representing about 50 per cent of Canada’s 2020 
emissions, are currently developing the policy to 
implement a regional cap and trade system. Cov-
erage of the system starts initially with industrial 
emitters in 2013 and could then include liquid fuels 
in transport and buildings sometime thereafter. It 
is not clear how the overall cap will be allocated be-
tween participating jurisdictions and emitters, or to 
what extent flexibility mechanisms such as offsets 
will be permitted. Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
modelling suggests an allowance price of CAD$30 
per tonne in 2020 as a good benchmark for estimat-
ing stringency. Applying this allowance price across 
liquid fuels and large emitters in Ontario and Que-
bec (we assume the B.C. carbon tax now covering in-
dustrials instead becomes covered under cap-and-
trade) suggests emissions reductions of about 18 
Mt in 2020 from Quebec and Ontario. 
Also under development are a series of federal 
performance regulations aimed at new or modified 
energy users and producers in the industrial sec-
tor. Notably, the federal government has signalled 
it will regulate emitters in the oil and gas, chemi-
cals, smelting, cement, iron and steel and mining 
sectors. While the proposed regulations are not 
available to assess at this time, applying a per-
formance standard similar to the coal regulations 
(above) to new and modified industrial sources 
likely to be deployed before 2020 indicates emis-
sions reductions of about another 15 Mt in 2020. 
Again, we use an integrated modelling framework, 
so the impact of this action is lower, given reduc-
tions already occurring under other programs 
such as British Columbia’s carbon tax. 
Putting the provincial and federal policies togeth-
er indicates that Canada has in place or is ready-
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ing policies to reduce emissions by about 103 Mt 
in 2020, leaving a gap of 120 Mt (or 54 per cent) 
of the 2005 target. Figure 2 provides an overview 
of the existing measures, those planned and like-
ly to be implemented and the remaining gap to 
2020. 
While actions aligned to achieve 46 per cent of the 
2020 target seems like a large “quantity” gap, from 
a “price” perspective many Canadian emitters are 
facing costs aligned with or significantly above in-
ternational competitors. Notably, the carbon costs 
facing large portions of Canada’s industrial emit-
ters are in line with allowance prices under the Eu-
ropean Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) 
currently at about CAD$17 per tonne.8 Seventy 
percent of emissions in British Columbia currently 
face carbon prices of CAD$25 per tonne which will 
certainty increase by 2020, while industrial en-
ergy users and producers in Alberta face a price 
of CAD$15 per tonne. Currently federal coal fired 
power regulations will impose a carbon cost on 
8  EU ETS allowance price as of July 21st was €12 77, which is equivalent to 
CAD$17 33  
emitters closer to CAD$259 per tonne between now 
and 2020. Of course, some initiatives, such as the 
ethanol in gasoline content requirement, vehicle 
efficiency standards and renewable energy incen-
tives are imposing very high costs on some emit-
ters. By comparison, the EU ETS has, according to 
the European Commission, lowered emissions by 
8% below 2005 levels by 2010, which is equivalent 
to 47% of Canada’s target (-8% below 2005 relative 
to a 2005 target of -17%) (European Union 2011). 
As mentioned above, Canada is on track to lower 
emissions by 30% by below 2005 levels in 2015. 
While internationally Canada is seen by some as a 
GHG mitigation laggard due to a history of federal 
inaction, there is in fact more mitigation that is 
aligned with European carbon costs than Canada’s 
reputation would imply. On quantities reduced, 
Canada is lagging the EU, but still reductions are 
underway. 
Opportunities to Complement Current 
Mitigation Actions 
Canada’s willingness to close “the mitigation gap” 
to Canada’s announced 2020 target has much to 
do with competitiveness. Without action in the 
United States and carbon costs on U.S. industry, 
Canadian governments will continue to be hesitant 
to risk the flow of cross-border trade. But still the 
gap is there, and Canada has made international 
commitments to reduce emissions. The question 
then arises how to design policy to close Canada’s 
mitigation gap in a cost-effective manner while 
minimizing impacts on Canadian competitiveness. 
Indeed, without a cost-effective path forward, fur-
ther action by federal and provincial governments 
will likely be slow to materialize. But even with ef-
ficient mitigation policy, unless the United States 
move to reduce GHGs, Canada will continue to 
lag. In short, there is a much greater political con-
9  While the average cost is CAD$25 per tonne, an equivalent marginal cost, 
assuming a linear abatement cost curve, would be closer to CAD$50 per 
tonne removed  
Figure 1: Reductions from Existing Federal and 
Provincial Policies in 2020
30% Attainment of 2020 Target
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Figure 2: Current and Planned Actions to Re-
duce GHG Emissions in Canada
Composition of Canada’s Target of -17% below 
2005 in 2020
cern over the Canada-US competiveness impacts 
of “Canada alone” GHG mitigation than the risks 
posed by a changing climate. 
Looking forward, there are at least three options 
to cost-effectively close the gap. First, the federal 
government can move to regulate existing sources 
and not just new and modified; second, develop a 
domestic offset system to deliver real emissions 
reductions would contain costs; and third, look in-
ternationally for offset opportunities:
 • Move to regulate existing industrial sources. The 
focus on new and modified emitters means that 
the majority of industrial emissions (87 per cent) 
are omitted from coverage by regulations that 
target new and modified sources only (Figure 
3). Moving to apply the performance standards 
more broadly is a next logical move. But the reg-
ulatory process for new and modified facilities 
will take some time, and could take upwards of 
five years to unfold, and therefore significant ad-
ditional reductions are likely not possible from 
existing industrial sources much in advance of 
2020. That is, the government is focused on 
new and modified sources first, preferring to 
not burden existing sources given concerns over 
competitiveness. Still significant opportuni-
ties exist, even with provincial policies covering 
many large emitters. If regulations for existing 
sources can be promulgated prior to 2020, exist-
ing large industrial energy and producers could 
deliver in the order of 15 Mt of GHG reductions 
at an average carbon cost of CAD$25 per tonne.
 • Establish a domestic offsets system. With the cur-
rent federal regulatory approach and provincial 
actions delivering at best half of the aspirational 
targets of the federal government, offsets will 
Figure 3: Total Emissions in 2020 from Indus-
trial Emitters
Existing Sources in 2010 and New Additions by 
2020
While a regulatory approach works for 
now, a forward-looking climate policy is 
needed to design regulations that can ulti-
mately be transformed to increase compli-
ance flexibility and allow emitters to equal-
ize abatement costs.
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likely form an important compliance option. 
This is especially the case if the United States is 
slow to implement carbon policy seeking broad 
emission coverage. Developing offset rules and 
offset projects takes time, and therefore the 
federal government will need to signal early 
that offsets have a role in future compliance. 
This will set the necessary expectations for off-
sets project to be developed. This offset system 
could take the form of a flexibility mechanism 
for emitters to reduce compliance costs, or a 
standalone government fund that purchases re-
ductions for retirement towards Canada’s GHG 
targets. With offsets coverage in the agriculture, 
waste, buildings and transport sectors, our as-
sessment indicates about 26 Mt of reductions 
could be delivered annually in 2020 at a price of 
CAD$25 per tonne.
 • Look to International Offsets. While it is not clear 
what the post-2012 Kyoto world will look like, 
early indications are that project-based Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) could be com-
plemented by reductions from Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+) and from Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) in the developing 
world. While it is not clear where in the post-
2012 architecture NAMAs and REDD+ will fit, 
or CDM for that matter, the current momentum 
Figure 3: Current, Planned and Possible Actions to Reduce GHG Emissions in Canada
Composition of Canada’s Target of -17% below 2005 in 2020
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points to their use in future developing world 
compliance. Moving forward to support both 
REDD+ and NAMAs would prepare Canada to 
access low cost reductions internationally in the 
years to come. The current federal government 
has in the past indicated a tolerance for interna-
tional offsets, but certainly not in an unlimited 
way. Assuming a 10 per cent international off-
sets limit at an offset price of price of CAD15$ 
per tonne would imply reductions of about 22.5 
Mt at a cost of CAD$340 million in 2020. To put 
this into context, Canada’s current Fast Start fi-
nancing totals just over CAD$400 million annu-
ally.10 
Adding these potential opportunities, totalling 
about 63 Mt of reductions in 2020, would reduce 
the gap to Canada’s 2020 target to 26 per cent. Fig-
ure 3 below shows the breakdown of current and 
planned actions as well as future direction that are 
possible at carbon costs in the order of CAD$25 
per tonne. 
10  This financing reflects Canada’s commitment under COP 15 in Copenha-
gen  See WRI 2011  
Future Policy Directions 
The question for Canada is how to continue to 
reduce emissions that move towards Canada’s 
longer-term GHG reduction aspirations. For now, 
it is not politically feasible to implement national 
carbon pricing. But with precedents at the provin-
cial level for carbon pricing, Canada’s movement 
to carbon pricing may be inevitable. Indeed, a look 
at current and planned climate policies targeted 
at industrial emitters shows that carbon pricing 
is dominant over regulations, with current and 
planned initiatives contributing about 59 per cent 
to 2020 reductions (Figure 4). These overlapping 
of federal and provincial carbon policy on the 
same emitter group will need to be sorted out, 
especially given the different instrument choices 
that the federal and provincial governments have 
taken. 
The policy-relevant question now that Canada has 
a jumble of federal regulations and provincial car-
bon pricing is how to unify these to deliver cost-ef-
fective reductions aligned with deeper aspirational 
targets in the longer-term. While the federal gov-
ernment has shown a preference for regulations, in 
the longer-term this approach can’t deliver cost-ef-
fective reductions at a level aligned to deeper GHG 
targets. Our modelling suggests that the thermal 
power coal regulations mentioned above deliver 5 
Mt of reductions at a price of CAD$25 per tonne 
but could be delivered with economy-wide carbon 
pricing of CAD$5 per tonne. This ratio would like-
ly be exacerbated with increased stringency given 
that most marginal abatement cost are exponen-
tial, meaning compliance costs rise rapidly with 
deeper reductions sought. 
There is also the question of how well performance 
regulations can be designed for heterogeneous 
sectors such as those in the oil and gas sector and 
petroleum refining. Information asymmetry for 
Figure 4: Industrial Emission Reductions in 2020 
by Management Instrument
Regulations, Carbon Pricing and Incentives
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the regulator is likely a real problem when design-
ing performance standards for emitters with very 
different operations. 
While a regulatory approach works for now, a for-
ward-looking climate policy is needed to design 
regulations that can ultimately be transformed 
to increase compliance flexibility and allow emit-
ters to equalize abatement costs. To design this 
forward-looking policy that builds on the current 
federal preference for performance based stand-
ards, five guiding principles are worthy of consid-
eration:
1. Establish certainty through a published regula-
tory schedule that makes expected effort clear. 
Significant uncertainty has emerged in the reg-
ulated community and with provinces about 
both the schedule and stringency of federal 
regulations. Two sources of uncertainty are sig-
nificant for industry. First, there is confusion 
over who will be regulated and in what order, 
and whether new and/or existing facilities are 
targeted. Second, the level of effort expected 
is unknown, with industry trying to equate 
the announced targets with early indications 
of how regulations will unfold. For provinces, 
the uncertainty is impacting policy develop-
ment, with uncertainty about how equivalence 
in stringency between provincial and federal 
policies will be treated by the federal govern-
ment.  To address this uncertainty, and en-
able forward-looking planning, there is a need 
to publish a regulatory schedule outlining how 
regulations will unfold, who will be targeted 
and when, and to what level of stringency. 
2. Regulations need to enable flexibility while 
achieving emissions reductions. Compliance flex-
ibility can be achieved with performance regu-
lations through aligning the regulatory require-
ment with capital stock turn over. By not asking 
existing capital to be retired or retrofitted prior 
to end of life, costs are minimized. The trade-
off for keeping costs low is obviously a reduced 
impact on emissions, given the stock turn over 
in any year is a fraction of the total emissions. 
But in time as the regulations bind and more 
reductions are sought, additional flexibility 
mechanisms such as domestic and international 
offsets will need to be added to the policy mix. 
3. The regulations should not impose dispropor-
tionate costs. Getting out of step on compliance 
costs between sectors or trading partners in Can-
ada will drive adverse competiveness impacts. 
As such, forward-looking regulations need to 
be designed to keep compliance costs roughly 
equal across emitters. This will require a price 
target to be set by the federal government that 
can be used to guide regulatory development. 
4. Regulations should seek reductions throughout 
the entire emission inventory. A narrow focus 
will lead to high cost reduction missing some low 
cost opportunities. While a focus on the large 
emitters is a good start, there are a whole range 
of cost-effective options in waste, agriculture 
and buildings. To the extent these are omitted 
from a offsets system, then targeted regulations 
and inclusion in carbon pricing will be required. 
5. Regulations should be designed to transition to 
carbon pricing. Ultimately with deeper emis-
sions reductions constraints, more flexibility 
will need to be added. This means that regu-
lations should be designed with a longer term 
view to transition to carbon pricing as regulato-
ry costs climb. As such, performance standards 
should be designed to ultimately make then 
tradable, as cap and trade regime that allocates 
allowances on an industry emission intensity 
benchmark, or to allow them to be used to ap-
ply a carbon tax. 
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As the limitation of national performance regula-
tions are likely to be revealed in time, in terms 
of both low reduction potential and high costs, 
additional flexibility mechanisms will be needed. 
Most likely the future will require a movement to 
carbon pricing, with additional compliance flex-
ibility such as access to domestic and internation-
al offsets. 
Conclusion
Canada’s move to regulate carbon under pro-
posed federal regulations for new and modified 
coal fired power facilities will deliver greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions at a reasonable cost. 
While the emerging package of regulations won’t 
achieve the deep targets the government has as-
pired to, it does signal that Canada’s federal gov-
ernment is finally establishing the policy archi-
tecture to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.   
Since the federal government initiated the Na-
tional Climate Change Process in the late 1990s, 
successive governments have modelled Canada-
alone carbon pricing scenarios with limited com-
pliance flexibility and deep GHG reduction tar-
gets. These scenarios, which assume the United 
States does not act in parallel and view all inter-
national offsets with skepticism (i.e. “Russian hot 
air”), produce big compliance costs to the order 
of CAD$200 per tonne, while wreaking havoc on 
indicators of competitiveness. Any mitigation ac-
tions aligned with deep GHG reduction targets 
were off the table regardless of the instrument 
proposed— whether carbon taxes and cap and 
trade or regulations. As the debate on carbon 
pricing became deeply politicized in the last two 
federal elections, momentum to reduce carbon 
emissions stalled further despite the focus on a 
cost-effective instrument to deliver reductions. 
It is no wonder that the federal government has 
been locked in inaction for so long. 
Now the introduction of performance-based reg-
ulations gives the federal government room to 
move. 
Newly released draft regulations for coal fired 
electricity plants will deliver about 5 Mt of GHG 
reductions in 2020, climbing higher thereafter. 
Costs to emitters are likely manageable at about 
CAD$25 per tonne, which is in line with the cur-
rent carbon costs under the European Union GHG 
trading program and with the coal electricity regu-
lations under development in the United States. 
Canada’s proposed electricity sector regulations 
complement light duty vehicle fuel efficiency regu-
lations enacted in late 2011 and existing ethanol 
content standards in gasoline, which together de-
liver another 34 Mt of GHG reductions by 2020. 
The government has also signalled its intent to 
regulate other large emitters, such as oil and gas 
producers and petroleum refining, buildings and 
commercial vehicles. 
The federal government is not acting alone in Can-
ada. The emerging federal carbon policy builds on 
what is already happening at a provincial level. 
The federal regulations, coupled with provincial 
actions, put Canada on track to deliver about 70 
Mt of emissions reductions in 2020; about 30 per 
cent of Canada’s reduction target. All of the prov-
inces have policies for GHG reductions, including 
The challenge of a forward-looking 
climate policy is to anticipate how the 
current patchwork of climate policies 
can be transitioned to deliver cost-
effective reductions, while keeping 
compliance costs aligned with major 
trading partners.
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British Columbia’s carbon tax, Alberta’s specified 
gas emitter regulations, Quebec’s carbon levy, and 
Ontario’s phase-out of coal for thermal electricity. 
There are other policy mechanisms in the works 
that will further cut emissions, including the West-
ern Climate Initiative’s cap-and-trade program 
likely to be implemented by Manitoba, Ontario, 
Quebec, B.C and California. Taken together, Can-
ada currently has implemented or has plans to re-
duce emissions equivalent to about 46 per cent of 
its 2020 target of -17 per cent below 2005 levels. 
The longer-term objective of Canadian climate pol-
icy is to unify the very different federal and pro-
vincial actions to deliver cost-effective reductions 
across Canada’s entire emission inventory. This 
becomes more important as policies start to bind 
and compliance costs rise as more GHG reductions 
are sought. The challenge of a forward-looking 
climate policy is to anticipate how the current 
patchwork of climate policies can be transitioned 
to deliver cost-effective reductions, while keeping 
compliance costs aligned with major trading part-
ners. Recognizing equivalency across provincial 
and federal policies is a start, as is designing the 
new federal regulations to accommodate carbon 
pricing in the longer term. While there is still much 
work to do, Canada is moving in the right direction 
on GHG policy. 
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Abstract
This paper attempts to examine the role of the UN 
and multilateral politics in integrating an increas-
ingly fragmented global carbon market in the face 
of the outcomes and implications of the Cancun 
Agreements on mitigation, mitigation ambi-
tion and carbon financing  It also examines the 
context of the on-going negotiations, emerging 
uncertainty and the role of the carbon market in 
contributing to the achievement of a 2 degree or 
lower temperature increase above pre-industrial 
levels  Specifically, it examines how a pledge-
and-review system and a Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMA) regime can operate in 
a future global carbon market under various sce-
narios related to the ongoing international climate 
negotiations 
Introduction
The emergence of carbon as a virtual commodity 
on the international market has proved to be a 
potent mechanism for both regulating emissions-
based growth and as a source for financing clean, 
low-carbon growth. This has largely resulted from 
the legally binding emission reduction commit-
ments of developed countries who are Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol and the concomitant adoption 
of the flexible mechanisms to assist in meeting 
these commitments. However, with the expiration 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
at the end of 2012 and the growing uncertainty 
over whether the Parties to the Protocol will agree 
to a second commitment period, including the 
quantum of renewed emission reduction commit-
Role of the UN and Multilateral  
Politics in Integrating an 
Increasingly Fragmented 
Global Carbon Market 
Kishan Kumarsingh
Head, Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements Unit,tMinistry of  
Housing and the Environment
Trinidad and Tobago
1  The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone, based on his 
background knowledge of the Convention process and negotiations and 
the COP decisions, and therefore do not represent those of his employers, 
his country, any country or groups of countries under the UNFCCC 
74 
ments, significant uncertainty has arisen on the 
fate of the global carbon market in both the short 
to medium and long terms. Notwithstanding this 
political uncertainty at the international level, the 
players in the carbon market continue to show 
confidence in the future of the market through 
the establishment of trading schemes at the na-
tional level and multilateral and bilateral levels. 
This is invariably leading to an increasingly frag-
mented global market without overarching regu-
latory guidance at the multilateral political level. 
This emerging scenario raises several issues and 
questions, for example: 
 • Does the carbon market require a global regula-
tory framework for it to be viable?
 • What would be the efficacy of a fragmented 
global carbon market, bearing in mind the gen-
esis of the market and the purpose it was envi-
sioned to fulfil?
 • What could be the implications of the on-going 
negotiations on the market?
 • What is the role of UN and multilateral politics 
in the future of the market in view of the in-
creasing fragmentation?
 
While this paper attempts to address the issues 
surrounding these questions, it does not attempt 
to provide the answers. Rather, it seeks to ex-
amine the realities of the on-going international 
negotiations and the signals and implications of 
these negotiations, including under various out-
come scenarios, as well as provide some sugges-
tions as to what might constitute a UN and mul-
tilateral political approach to dealing with the 
market. 
The Cancun Agreements
At the Cancun Climate Change Conference held 
in December 2010, countries agreed to limit the 
global average temperature increase to 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels, with an oppor-
tunity to review this commitment with the possibil-
ity of moving to 1.5 degrees Celsius on the basis 
of scientific evidence on impacts (UNFCCC 2011). 
This political outcome signalled a renewed com-
mitment to address climate change following the 
disappointing climax of the Copenhagen confer-
ence one year earlier. 
The Cancun Agreements related to mitigation pro-
vide for:
1. Economy-wide emission-reduction targets by in-
dustrialised countries. Under this aspect, indus-
trialized countries agreed to develop low-carbon 
development strategies or plans and expected 
to report on progress in emissions reductions 
every two years. On this basis, countries pledged 
emissions reductions.
2. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NA-
MAs) by developing countries. Following the Co-
penhagen Accord, many developing countries 
submitted plans to limit the growth of their 
emissions. Such plans, known as NAMAs, are to 
be supported by technology, finance and assis-
tance in capacity-building from industrialised 
countries. Cancun provided for the formal rec-
ognition and recording of these NAMAs in the 
form of a registry, and developing countries are 
also expected to report on progress made on 
achieving their mitigation objectives. Some de-
veloping countries, including the major emerg-
ing economies, provided voluntary targets for 
emissions reductions.
The players in the carbon market con-
tinue to show confidence in the future of 
the market through the establishment of 
trading schemes at the national level and 
multilateral and bilateral levels.
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3. Decisions related to the Kyoto Protocol. Although 
further emission-reduction targets under a sec-
ond commitment period for the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol are still under negotiation, the 
Cancun decisions related to the Kyoto Protocol 
provide that the emissions trading and project-
based mechanisms under the Protocol are to be 
available to industrialised countries in a second 
commitment period. Additionally, Cancun pro-
vides for increased access to under-represented 
regions under the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), as well as for standardised base-
lines and monitoring methodologies, and refer-
enced levels for forest management.
Significantly, in addition to the above, govern-
ments agreed on the ‘consideration of the estab-
lishment of one or more market based mecha-
nisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and 
to promote, mitigation actions.’ This perhaps 
sends the clearest signal of an intention to de-
velop and use the carbon market in addressing 
mitigation. 
An analysis of the mitigation pledges made so far 
by some observers (UNEP 2010; IEA 2010) indi-
cates that they fall short of what is required. For 
example, the United Nations environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report estimates 
that pledges from both developed and developing 
countries are 60 percent of what will be needed by 
Developed 
country 
pledges  
– bottom-up
Australia Canada EU US
Scheme Carbon-pricing with 
transition to emis-
sions trading by 
2015
Federal level: per-
formance standards
Provincial level: 
carbon tax (British 
Columbia), cap-and-
trade (WCI), hybrid 
of carbon tax and 
cap-and-trade (Al-
berta) 
Cap-and-trade EU-
ETS phase III
Primarily cap-and-
trade schemes 
through various 
state and regional 
initiatives (e g  WCI, 
RGGI)
Targets 5% from 2000 levels 
by 2020
17% by 2025 from 
2005 on an econo-
my-wide basis
21% in 2020 relative 
to 2005
1990 levels by 
2020 (California); 
15% below 2005 
by 2020 (WCI); 10% 
in power sector by 
2018 (RGGI)
Measures Legislation; manda-
tory emissions cuts 
for major polluters
Sector by sector 
regulatory approach 
Policy Directives Proposed legislation
Table 1: Summary of scheme, targets and measures by some developed countries.
Importantly and critically, the sources of 
funding have not been identified or at least 
are not yet clear.
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2020 to place the world on a trajectory that will 
keep global temperature rises to less than 2˚C in 
comparison to preindustrial levels. 
Developed-country Pledges 
The Cancun decision on actions by industrialised 
countries, in the face of the impending conclu-
sion of the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, with no clear indication of whether a 
second commitment period may be agreed, essen-
tially provides for a bottom-up approach to limit-
ing greenhouse gas emissions based on national 
circumstances with a view to reviewing these 
pledges in the future. It would therefore form the 
basis of domestic climate change policy which 
may manifest itself as country-driven, bilateral, 
regional or multilateral, as we have already begun 
to witness.1 The following, though not exhaustive, 
briefly describes the respective initiatives without 
going into detail in order to give a sense of the 
general approach. These approaches are summa-
rised in Table 1.
Australia
The Australian government has proposed a car-
bon-pricing package (Hepburn and Jotzo 2011) 
1  For example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the 
Australian carbon price mechanism, and initiatives in Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Russian Federation and the United States 
| which promises to be a cost-effective way for 
Australia to meet its national target for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (five per cent 
lower than in 1990, once emissions from land-
use change are taken into account). The scheme 
is scheduled to be introduced in mid-2012 as a 
fixed-price permit scheme, and expected to make 
the transition to an emissions trading scheme in 
mid-2015. Additionally, other initiatives include 
the development of a domestic offsets scheme the 
Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) (Garnaut 2011), 
which aims to provide new economic opportuni-
ties to farmers, forest growers and landholders 
and to help the environment by reducing carbon 
pollution. 
Canada
Canada plans to reduce total greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, 
which is in alignment with the pledge made by 
the United States. Canada also has initiatives at 
the provincial level that involves cap-and-trade 
schemes (e.g. Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and 
Trade) Act 2008 in British Columbia (Legislative 
Assembly of British Colombia 2008) and Ontario 
(Ontario Regulation 452/09 n.d.); Act to amend 
the Environment Quality Act and other legislative 
provisions in relation to climate change in Quebec 
(National Assembly of Quebec 2009), which all al-
Developing country Brazil China India
Scheme Emissions reduction 
market
Carbon trading Market-based mecha-
nisms
Voluntary targets 36 1 -36 9 of projected 
emissions by 2020
Energy intensity reduc-
tion by 16% by 2015
Carbon intensity reduc-
tion of 20% to 25% be-
tween 2020 and 2030
Measures Legislation Voluntary carbon market Sectoral goals identified 
as ‘missions’
Table 2: Summary of scheme, voluntary targets and measures of Brazil, China and India. 
77 
low linking to other emissions trading schemes in 
other jurisdictions.
European Union
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) is the world’s most important market 
mechanism for reducing GHG emissions. The EU 
ETS operates in 30 countries (the 27 EU Member 
States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) 
and is expected to reduce total emissions by 21 
percent in 2020 compared to 2005 levels (Carbon 
Finance at the World Bank 2011). The revised EU 
ETS Directive (DECC 2011) provides for, inter alia, 
a centralized EU-wide cap on emissions allowances 
from 2013; it also provides that access to project 
offsets under the Kyoto Protocol from outside the 
EU will be limited to no more than 50 percent of 
the reductions required in the EU ETS. In general 
this is to increase efforts within the EU through 
essentially market initiatives.
United States 
Emissions reductions efforts in the United States 
primarily rely on cap-and-trade schemes through 
various state and regional initiatives (e.g. the Glob-
al Warming Solutions Act of 2006 Assembly Bill 
32 (AB 32) in California which requires California 
to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020; the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which 
aims to reduce regional GHG emissions to 15 per-
cent below 2005 levels by 2020 (WCI 2011); the Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is a 
mandatory cap-and-trade CO2-only-reduction pro-
gram covering ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic 
states which aims to reduce CO2 emissions from 
the power sector by 10 percent by 2018 (RGGI 
2011).
Developing-country actions and NAMAs
The now accepted view that developing countries 
need to play a part in global mitigation efforts, 
particularly the emerging economies, has resulted 
in the Cancun decision on NAMAs, which provide 
for a recording of these actions in a registry that 
will match support of finance and technology for 
those countries that request support. A separate 
part of the registry will record those NAMAs that 
do not request support. It is therefore clear that 
the extent to which NAMAs would be success-
ful, regardless of the quantum pledged, whether 
expressed as energy intensity, absolute amounts 
or programmes of activities, would be dependent 
on the support that they receive consistent with 
the provisions of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).2 This 
implies that significant sources of finance would 
need to be identified to fund mitigation activities 
in developing countries. Cancun also recognised 
this and formalized the commitment made by 
developed countries in Copenhagen to mobilize 
$100 billion a year by 2020 to address the miti-
gation and adaptation needs of developing coun-
tries, and decided to establish a ‘Green Climate 
Fund.’ Importantly and critically, the sources of 
funding have not been identified or at least are 
not yet clear. The Final Report of the UN High-
Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financ-
ing (UN 2010) assumes that contributions to the 
pledged $100 billion a year are expected to be 
made by the private sector, and may be mobilised 
through the carbon market. 
The following, though not exhaustive, briefly de-
scribes the respective initiatives and approaches 
of some developing country Parties without going 
into detail in order to provide a sense of the gen-
eral approach. These approaches are summarised 
in Table 2. 
Brazil
Brazil’s National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 
has been made law and establishes a voluntary na-
2  Article 4, UNFCCC 
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tional greenhouse gas reduction target of between 
36.1 and 38.9 percent of projected emissions by 
2020. In its NCCP law, Brazil proposes the creation 
of a Brazilian Emission Reductions Market (BERM) 
in order to achieve the voluntary emission-reduc-
tion target. 
China
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan of National Economic 
and Social Development sets a carbon-intensity re-
duction target (CO2 emissions per unit GDP) of 17 
percent and aims to cut energy intensity by 16 per-
cent by 2015. China has announced a 40 to 45 per-
cent reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 (The 
Climate Group 2011), levels that were first indicat-
ed at the Copenhagen Conference and reaffirmed 
at Cancun. In its 12th Five-Year Plan, China also 
proposes an increase in forest cover of 12.5 mil-
lion hectares by 2015, improved GHG emissions 
and energy monitoring systems, promotion of en-
ergy efficiency in industrial plants and buildings, 
support for the expansion of public rail transport 
infrastructure, and the continued development of 
non-fossil fuel energy sources (Seligsohn 2011). 
China recently transacted its first voluntary car-
bon credits under its domestic Panda standard 
(Peters-Stanley 2011; The Panda Standard 2010), a 
quality standard for Chinese voluntary emission-
reduction projects within agriculture and forestry, 
and developed by the China Beijing Environmental 
Exchange (CBEEX).
India
In 2008, India launched the National Action Plan 
on Climate Change (Govt. of India 2008), which 
involves the establishment of eight missions or 
programs on solar technology, energy efficiency, 
sustainable habitat, water, the Himalayan ecosys-
tem, green India, agriculture and strategic knowl-
edge. The mission on energy efficiency includes a 
market-based mechanism as a cost-effective way 
of meeting targets.
From the foregoing, it is evident that market 
mechanisms do and will form an integral part of 
domestic mitigation efforts, whether by developed 
or developing countries. Notwithstanding commit-
ments by developed country parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol and the uncertainty surrounding the con-
tinuation of a legally binding framework for emis-
sions reductions, global efforts to reduce emis-
sions are clearly following a trend of domestic-led 
policies, with the emergence of a fragmented car-
bon market. Domestic mitigation efforts must be 
seen in the context of what they are intended to 
address, namely global climate change. In the sce-
nario of ongoing uncertainty in defining a global 
regulatory framework, the efficacy and efficiency 
of a fragmented market will come into focus. 
Market signals from the negotiations
Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC 2011a) (UNFCCC 2011)
has given a clear indication of the political inten-
tions of world governments in utilising the carbon 
markets to this end. Paragraph 80 is particularly 
instructive in this respect, since it: 
Decides to consider the establishment, at the 
seventeenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties, of one or more market-based mecha-
nisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, 
and to promote, mitigation actions, taking 
into account … ensuring voluntary participa-
tion of Parties, supported by the promotion 
of fair and equitable access for all Parties; … 
complementing other means of support for 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions by 
Global efforts to reduce emissions are 
clearly following a trend of domestic-led 
policies, with the emergence of a frag-
mented carbon market.
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developing country Parties; … assisting de-
veloped country Parties to meet part of their 
mitigation targets, while ensuring that the use 
of such a mechanism or mechanisms is sup-
plemental to domestic mitigation efforts; …
What has also been made clear in this decision is 
that the carbon market is only intended to assist 
countries in meeting their pledges and NAMAs, 
and that domestic policy and action lie at the core 
of meaningful emissions reductions. Most if not 
all of the intentions to use the carbon market in-
volve emissions trading (cap-and-trade) and pro-
visions for these domestic schemes to be linked 
with other jurisdictions (e.g. U.S., Canada, as stat-
ed above). According to an analysis conducted by 
the World Bank (Carbon Finance at the World Bank 
2011), different forms of linking are available, in-
cluding direct linking and indirect linking. Direct 
linking involves the mutual recognition of each 
emissions trading scheme and their allowances, 
and the linking of these allowances through trad-
ing allowances between the schemes (import and 
export). Indirect linking involves linking through 
a mutually recognized standard unit. Most trad-
ing schemes indirectly link though Certified Emis-
sions Reduction Units (CERs). With the monitor-
ing, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirement 
of NAMAs, this means that in light of the spirit of 
Decision 1/CP.16, any possible linkages between 
emissions trading between developed and devel-
oping countries need to take into account issues 
such as compatibility in the level of effort or am-
bition; use of offsets; MRV standards; and price 
caps. It would therefore be necessary for agreed 
MRV standards to be adopted in order that effec-
tive linking between schemes can be meaningful. 
Such compatibility criteria have been defined in 
some proposed domestic policies and legislation, 
for example, the proposed U.S. Waxman-Markey 
Bill (Library of Congress 2011) (H.R. 2454: Sec 
728). 
The provisions that developing country NAMAs 
are to be supported by finance, technology and 
capacity-building by developed countries also 
factors in another dimension to the issues under 
consideration. Developed countries would need to 
raise the necessary finance to support such devel-
oping country actions, part of which is expected to 
be supplied by the private sector and the carbon 
market. If one considers that the pledged $100 
billion per year until 2020 to assist in mitigation 
and adaptation actions in developing countries is 
to be partially capitalised by the carbon market, 
then consideration would have to be given to some 
of the implications as a result. Given that 2020 
is only eight years away, any contribution by the 
carbon market would mean that the market would 
have to be scaled up significantly, not only for 
raising the finance, but also for facilitating signifi-
cant emissions reductions, particularly in develop-
ing countries. 
Outcome Scenarios of the current  
UNFCCC Negotiations
Recent analysis (Climate Action Tracker 2011) 
indicates that, in order to keep on track to limit-
ing the global temperature increase to at least 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, glob-
al emissions need to be capped at 40-44 billion 
tonnes CO2 equivalent (CO2-e) per year by 2020, 
and to decline steeply afterwards. The analysis 
also revealed that, when the individual pledges 
and targets of all countries were added up, glob-
al emissions in 2020 would be 54 billion tonnes 
The only way in which the market can be 
scaled up, regardless of whether any new 
mechanism relates to crediting or trading, 
is by creating increased demand – and to 
do this, the level of mitigation ambition 
has to be raised.
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CO2-e/year in 2020, leaving a gap of 10-14 billion 
tonnes to reach the reduction level required. What 
this means is that, if the emerging trend of a frag-
mented market structure were to be factored in as 
a mechanism for achieving individual pledges and 
targets, then more stringent action at the domes-
tic level would be required to achieve the desired 
temperature stabilisation, as the market alone can-
not achieve this. Even when one analyses the state 
of the voluntary markets in 2010 (Peters-Stanley, et 
al. 2011), the total volume traded amounts to 131.2 
MtCO2-e. It can be reasoned that stronger policy at 
the domestic level may incentivise and catalyse the 
voluntary carbon market and so provide the frame-
work for this aspect of the carbon market to con-
tribute to mitigation efforts.
The major challenge for the potential role that the 
market can play will be posed by the structure (or 
lack of structure) of a global regulatory regime to 
incentivise the market. It can be argued that the 
market needs to be scaled up in order to meet miti-
gation expectations, at least in this context. How-
ever, much will depend on how the international 
negotiations evolve in both the short and long 
terms. It would therefore be instructive to examine 
the possible scenarios that can emerge from the in-
ternational negotiations, at least in the short term, 
which would send a signal to the market. These can 
perhaps be categorised as follows:
1. Agreement at the international level and continu-
ation of the existing multilateral framework with the 
legally binding emissions reductions, with the quan-
tum being that required for stabilising temperature 
increase to 2 degrees Celsius or below.
Achieving this scenario would require tremendous 
political will. Given political realities in those coun-
tries that need to play critical roles in such a sce-
nario (e.g. US, Japan, Australia etc.), such a conclu-
sion appears to be remote in the short term. Most 
countries are continuing to grapple with the eco-
nomic fallout of the global economic crisis, while 
countries such as the United States (cap-and-trade 
legislation), Australia (Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme) and Japan (Basic Action Global Warming) 
are faced with internal political challenges in their 
efforts to address climate change at the domestic 
policy level. The United States has made is categori-
cally clear that it will not sign on to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and Japan, along with Canada and Russia, 
have indicated that they do not want to be part of 
a second commitment period. Continuation of the 
Kyoto Protocol in its present form therefore faces 
serious political challenges. Nonetheless, there 
is general agreement to allow access to the Kyoto 
mechanisms for industrialised countries to assist in 
meeting their reduction targets.
2. A non-binding agreement (voluntary pledges)
The current state of negotiations, with the most re-
cent round being concluded in June 2012 in Bonn, 
Germany, appear to be signalling a move towards 
a voluntary approach, with the submission of NA-
MAs from developing countries and the pledges 
of developed countries being consolidated from 
Copenhagen in Cancun. It also appears that such 
a non-binding agreement will contain guidelines on 
MRV, International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) 
and International Assessment and Review (IAR) that 
are currently under negotiation. Additionally, the 
pledges made by some countries are contingent on 
the actions of other countries and the conclusion of 
an agreement, so there also appear to be conditions 
attached to these pledges that go beyond domestic 
policy and have multilateral dimensions. This can 
pose the multilateral negotiations with an iterative 
dilemma that now essentially says that domestic 
policy will depend on a multilateral agreement that 
in turn will depend on domestic policy! 
3. No agreement in the short term 
This scenario is more or less the status quo, with 
voluntary pledges being placed on the table by 
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developed countries and developing countries 
(NAMAs), and mitigation actions premised on 
national circumstances and capability. This sce-
nario is also distinguished from the scenario at 
2. above on the basis that the pledges are not for-
malised into any type of instrument with the as-
sociated MRV, ICA and IAR guidelines currently 
under negotiation. However, both developed and 
developing countries have indicated their respec-
tive intentions to utilise the market in assisting 
them in meeting their emission-reduction objec-
tives (see above).
From the above analysis it can be argued that, at 
least in the short term (post-2012), a fragmented 
market approach would be the most likely sce-
nario to emerge. Accordingly, the challenge for the 
international negotiations would be how to harmo-
nise these fragments in a holistic whole that would 
keep in focus the need for a multilateral regime 
to account for the transactions of these markets, 
as well as to account for the reductions accruing 
from these transactions and its role in meeting 
the global objective of keeping global temperature 
increases to at least 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels.
Role of scaled-up market
It is reasonable to suggest that the only way in 
which the market can be scaled up, regardless of 
whether any new mechanism relates to crediting or 
trading, is by creating increased demand – and to 
do this, the level of mitigation ambition has to be 
raised. Increased demand can be realised through 
increased ambition and as a result can generate 
the volume of credits needed to reduce transac-
tion costs and increase the revenue potential from 
these markets. More importantly, the balance be-
tween supply and demand has to be managed to 
ensure that the price of carbon can be maintained 
at a level that would raise the necessary finance, 
while at the same time incentivising countries to 
participate through the setting of ambitious reduc-
tion targets and objectives. 
The following issues would have to be taken into 
account in the consideration and implementation 
of scaled-up market mechanisms:
1. Timing and Capacity 
Even if scaled-up market mechanisms can be 
agreed in the near or short term at the multi-
lateral/UN level, the time it would take for their 
implementation would need to be taken into con-
sideration, given the capacity constraints in de-
veloping countries, as well as the data and infor-
mation that may be required for participating in 
such mechanisms. These can include information 
required for baseline setting and domestic policy 
development. In order for developing countries to 
participate in any scaled-up market mechanism, 
the necessary domestic infrastructure would have 
to be put in place to ensure a state of readiness 
for participation, such as monitoring and verifica-
tion processes. 
2. Level of Offsetting
The consideration of any scaled-up market mech-
anisms must keep one issue in mind, and that is 
the need to reduce global emissions to a level that 
will keep the world on track for a stabilisation 
temperature of 2 degrees Celsius or less. Accord-
ingly, the degree to which such mechanisms will 
focus on offsetting emissions would need to be 
given serious consideration in order not to deter 
Such fragmentation, although still deriv-
ing the benefits of the emissions reduced 
and finance raised, would not provide the 
framework for monitoring and tracking its 
collective efficacy in reducing emissions 
towards a stabilised, post-industrial tem-
perature.
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countries from taking a more active part in glob-
al mitigation. 
In order to realise effective and meaningful emis-
sions reductions, the ongoing negotiations and 
multilateral politics would need to ensure that 
the requirements for a scaled-up market are met 
in a manner that allows for simultaneous entry 
by all parties wishing to participate. Issues that 
need to be addressed in this regard relate to MRV 
standards and establishment of the NAMA reg-
istry. Additionally, outside the main UN/multi-
lateral negotiations process, linkages between 
existing and proposed cap-and-trade emissions 
trading schemes need to be harmonised across 
political jurisdictions in respect of their compat-
ibilities, transparency criteria, domestic legisla-
tive and policy framework, and the fungibility of 
credits and allowances. It can be argued that only 
with such harmonisation and complementarity in 
a short-term international policy framework and 
regime can the carbon market perform the role 
envisaged for it in mitigating emissions. Though 
parallel, it ought not to be mutually exclusive. 
However, in addition to this harmonisation and 
complementarity, an agreed multilateral frame-
work to assess the performance of the market, 
the associated emissions reductions and its con-
tribution to global efforts may need to be formu-
lated. Even if bilateral and regional ETS can be 
linked, there will still be a need for a multilateral 
arrangement for accountability for transactions 
and emissions reductions in order to ensure en-
vironmental integrity and provide some measure 
of robustness to underpin the operations of the 
market. Such a framework may also be useful in 
reviewing commitments and pledges, bearing in 
mind that the ultimate objective still remains the 
stabilisation of global temperatures at manage-
able levels, consistent with the UNFCCC process 
and procedures. 
While a multilateral framework may also be useful 
in reviewing commitments and pledges, it must 
also be stressed that such a framework ought not 
to be a substitute for the international climate re-
gime for addressing climate change or the means 
for achieving the desired stabilisation levels. 
The way forward
The outcomes of the UNFCCC talks to date, par-
ticularly the decisions taken at Cancun, do appear 
to be sending some signal to the carbon market, 
particularly the decisions on strengthening and 
improving the CDM and the intention to arrive at 
a decision on new market mechanisms at COP 17. 
Governments need to consolidate these approach-
es in the short term even in the absence of a strong 
international climate change regime which may 
not be agreeable in the short term, and this can be 
used as a stepping stone towards such a regime. 
In any event, rules and regulations are already in 
place in the form of the Marrakech Accords and do 
not necessarily need to be reinvented. The political 
will required at the multilateral level has to be as-
sessed in the context of the political realities that 
challenge such political will. Protracted negotia-
tions and political inertia, which inevitably result 
in delaying progress and action on climate change, 
are untenable. Governments must arrive at some 
agreement at the UN/multilateral level to signal to 
the world that climate change is being seriously 
addressed. If this means that there is a role for the 
carbon market in raising the finance necessary for 
initiating action by developing countries in partic-
ular3 and to assist developed countries in meeting 
and raising their mitigation ambitions, then the 
political will to ensure that this aspect of an in-
ternational climate regime be concluded as soon 
as possible would need to be demonstrated. There 
3  It would defeat the purpose if developing countries were to propose ambi-
tious emissions reduction cuts through their NAMAs and these reductions 
were limited by, or were not realised, because of the lack of capacity sup-
port, technology support or financing 
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is therefore a responsibility on all governments to 
ensure that this will is not only demonstrated, but 
demonstrated at the multilateral level. 
Conclusions
It is beyond dispute that the carbon market has 
a critical role to play in the realisation of carbon 
emissions reductions and the raising of finance 
for mitigation, adaptation (for example, through 
the proceeds from the CDM or any other such ar-
rangements from a harmonised carbon market) 
and technology transfer. The extent to which this 
role may be of significance, however, may be lim-
ited by fragmentation in the absence of a cohesive 
international regulatory framework, or at least in 
the delay in arriving at such a structure. Such frag-
mentation, although still deriving the benefits of 
the emissions reduced and finance raised, would 
not provide the framework for monitoring and 
tracking its collective efficacy in reducing emis-
sions towards a stabilised, post-industrial tem-
perature – the very purpose for which the market 
was designed and which gave birth to it. However, 
multilateral politics can play a crucial role in the 
short to medium term by harmonising rules and 
approaches that can at least provide policy guid-
ance and send the appropriate signals to the mar-
ket. 
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Making CDM work for poor  
and rich Africa beyond 2012:  
a series of dos and don’ts
Abstract
Making CDM and other carbon-resilient mecha-
nisms work for Africa is not impossible  Looking 
at the situation through a keyhole will reduce our 
visibility tremendously and hence our capacity to 
obtain a full picture of the situation  Let us open 
the door wide to have a better appreciation and 
bring suitable solutions to the table to make car-
bon resilience a reality on the Dark Continent  
Climate change is a serious threat to humanity. 
Among actions undertaken to fight climate change 
and its disastrous impact on the planet, offset-
ting/mitigation mechanisms like the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) are playing an impor-
tant role in voluntarily but effectively involving 
developing countries in the global struggle. CDM, 
established by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the 
Marrakech Accords in 2001, formally entered into 
force in 2005. Up to now around 3500 projects 
have been registered worldwide as CDM projects, 
with fewer than 2% hosted by Africa. 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
is rapidly coming to an end, in 2012. International 
negotiations are continuing to find a successor or 
rather successors to the Kyoto Protocol. The Con-
Durando Ndongsok
Managing Director, S² Services 
Sarl (S2)
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ference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Cancun 
(COP16) gave the CDM Executive Board the task of 
designing new offset mechanisms, Japan is trying 
out its own bilateral offsetting mechanism, and 
emerging countries like China, India and Brazil 
are being pushed to stop hosting CDM projects 
and become active in the struggle against climate 
change. China, for instance, is already setting up 
a local market for the trading of emissions reduc-
tions. Whilst other parts of the world are looking 
beyond 2012, Sub-Saharan African countries have 
not really hosted many CDM projects, despite their 
existing potential. Future mechanisms, if they are 
to include Sub-Saharan Africa, must be carefully 
designed in order to learn lessons from CDM.
The world has not been quiet about the ‘non-suc-
cess’1 of CDM in Africa. There are countless pres-
entations and speeches about making CDM work 
on the continent. Articles and books have been 
published preaching the best solutions to make 
CDM a reality in Africa, and reforms to CDM have 
seen a shift from bundling to the programmatic 
and the simplification of the concept of addition-
ality for certain types of projects. Many capacity-
building initiatives by international organizations 
like the World Bank have been organized to train 
(and retrain) various stakeholders and install 
DNAs, the CASCADe program moved from theory 
1  We are ignoring here the latest CD4CDM Working Paper Series No 10 by 
Dr  Lütken of the UNEP Risoe Center, entitled ‘Indexing CDM Distribution: 
Leveling the Playing Field’ (Lütken 2011)  In this paper, relative figures 
are used to show that CDM is actually not working so bad in Africa as 
compared to other parts of the world  
to give practical support to the carbon asset de-
velopment of selected projects in French-speaking 
African countries, and the ACAD Facility financial-
ly supports the development of selected projects 
in the whole of Africa. The countless actions taken 
to support CDM in Africa are varied and diversi-
fied. ‘And yet it doesn’t move’ (we are paraphras-
ing the UNEP Finance Initiative paper ‘And yet it 
moves’ (UNEP Finance Initiative 2010), concluding 
from the very few CDM success stories from Africa 
that CDM is at least working on the continent. 
CDM and other offsetting mechanisms to be de-
veloped will coexist beyond 2012. For Sub-Saharan 
Africa finally to host a goodly share of projects, it 
is important to analyze the development of CDM 
in the region, learning lessons from the past to im-
prove the situation in the future.
For instance, why does Nigeria have five CDM pro-
jects registered compared to none for Ghana and 
Botswana, even though the latter two countries 
have better investment climates? Why are there 
more CDM projects in English-speaking Africa? 
What would happen if a carbon credit were traded 
at 30 Euros?
This paper provides a series of questions with ten-
tative answers, an explanation of intriguing situ-
ations based on our experience and discussions 
with some stakeholders, and a subjective analysis 
of the development of CDM in Africa. The hope 
is that making CDM or any other offsetting pro-
ject-based mechanism work in Africa will be ap-
proached more innovatively. 
Africa and CDM: is there any potential?
Before going any further in the analysis, it is im-
portant to consider Africa’s CDM potential. With-
out going into details, as this publication is not 
dedicated to analyzing this potential, here I none-
theless give some pointers to this potential. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa finally to host a 
goodly share of projects, it is important 
to analyze the development of CDM in the 
region, learning lessons from the past to 
improve the situation in the future.
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The World Bank (WB) (World Bank 2008) has pub-
lished a book presenting thousands of potential 
CDM projects in energy sectors. Critics will say 
that in reality the potential cannot be that high 
since issues like the baseline, additionality and 
monitoring, which are crucial for CDM, are not ad-
dressed in it at all. But the book gives a sense of 
the reality of the huge existing CDM potential in all 
energy sectors in Africa. 
Landfill gas 
It is possible to use landfill gas to produce electric-
ity in Africa, although the technology is still new on 
the continent. However, the technology is very ex-
pensive and, as showed in the WB book, producing 
5MW of electricity from a landfill will cost around $5 
million for an internal rate of return (IRR) of around 
5% without carbon credits. Selling carbon credits at 
a conservatively estimated price of $5 will increase 
the IRR to 14% and make the investment viable. 
Any city with around a million inhabitants can 
have such a project, and almost every African 
country has a least one such city, many even three, 
four or five or more. 
And landfill gas is not the only potential use of 
waste. Composting is cheaper and also suitable for 
small cities and can equally claim carbon credits. 
Besides carbon resilience, projects aimed at alter-
native uses of waste have a positive social impact 
in many African countries. Waste is usually col-
lected from dumpsites with people living nearby 
in chaotic conditions, enduring the smell, flies and 
mosquitoes from the dumpsite. In some cases the 
waste can even pollute the water table.
Improved cooking stoves 
Over 70% of the African population still relies on 
wood for cooking (and lighting). Many still use the 
traditional three-stone stoves for cooking, which 
have many negative impacts, such as the smoke 
and particles damaging the eyes and lungs, collect-
ing wood for cooking being intensively time- and 
energy-consuming, and the very low efficiency of 
three-stone stoves (around 10%), leading to heavy 
destruction of the forest and contributing to cli-
mate change. 
It is possible to move from this traditional way of 
cooking to improved cooking stoves and to claim 
carbon credits. Nigeria and Zambia have two such 
projects registered already as CDMs, and many 
other such projects on the continent are registered 
under different voluntary standards. 
Improved charcoal production
Some of the 70% of the African population that 
relies on wood for cooking uses that wood in the 
form of charcoal. Charcoal is a huge source of de-
forestation and forest degradation, and its produc-
tion emits a lot of methane into the atmosphere. 
Improving the production of charcoal will there-
fore have a positive impact on the environment. 
The WB book estimates a potential of over 2000 
such projects on the African continent.
Replacing kerosene lamps with clean lanterns
In many African countries, more than 80% of the 
population uses kerosene lamps for lighting. Ker-
osene lamps are expensive, cause damage to the 
environment and humans, as they produce carbon 
dioxide and harmful smoke, and are unreliable 
and inappropriate for lighting. 
Instead of using kerosene lamps, solar lanterns or 
mechanically charged lanterns like the Nuru Light2 
can be used. These alternative ways of lighting will 
2  The Nuru Light technology consists of a LED light (Nuru Light) with an 
incorporated battery and a human power pedal (PowerCycle) used to 
recharge the light  A Nuru Light is fixed on the PowerCycle (pedal charging 
lights)  By pedaling the PowerCycle for 20 minutes, 5 lights can be fully 
charged simultaneously and each will produce 40 hours of light (10 days 
lighting in rural area)  More information on the concept can be found at 
www nurulight com  The concept was developed in rural Rwanda and is 
now spreading all over Africa 
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reduce greenhouse gases and can therefore qualify 
as CDM projects. The potential in Africa is huge.
Wood processing residue and other
In many African countries, huge volumes of waste 
are produced after wood processing, which are 
usually burned or left to decay in nature. Instead 
this waste can be used to produce briquettes for 
energy production.
Proliferating plants like typha3 are also found in 
Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. This plant is devas-
tating for water and people. Some projects collect 
the typha, dry it and use it for electricity produc-
tion. One very innovative project in Mali mixes 
the typha with rice husks (left to decay in nature 
after rice production) to produce briquettes and 
sticks to replace charcoal and wood in Niono, a 
region of Mali where desertification is speeding 
up and people must travel for days to find wood 
for cooking.
Flared gas recovery for energy production
Gas flaring from oil fields4 is still a common prac-
tice in many oil-exploiting countries in Africa. In-
stead of flaring, the gas can be used for energy 
purposes. Examples of CDM projects from flared 
gas recovery come from Nigeria, where two such 
projects are registered. 
3  More information about Typha can be found at http://www probos net/
biomassa-upstream/pdf/reportBUSB1 pdf
4  Important oil-producing African countries in descending order of produc-
tion are Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of 
Congo, Chad, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, South Africa, and Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo 
The WB book focused only on CDM in the energy 
sector. Although this is the sector with the most 
CDM projects worldwide (more than 60% of CDM 
projects registered are from energy sectors), in Af-
rica the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
sector (the so-called LULUCF) is important.
Forestry and CDM in Africa
Forestry has not picked up at all in terms of CDM 
worldwide, and only a very few CDM projects are 
in the forestry sector. The reason is because the 
Kyoto Protocol did not put any emphasis on for-
estry and allowed only 1% of emissions reduction 
from it. Moreover, the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the main buyer of car-
bon credits from CDM, has not admitted forestry 
credits into the scheme.
In Africa, however, forestry needs to be an impor-
tant part of CDM because it represents 75% of the 
continent’s total emissions. To date, five forestry 
projects have been registered in Africa,5 represent-
ing 17% of 29 forestry projects registered world-
wide. This shows that the forestry sector is devel-
oping faster than other CDM sectors in Africa, but 
the potential is still largely untapped. 
International negotiations around the climate 
change issue are placing great importance on us-
ing forestry to fight climate change, because for-
estry contributes around 20% of greenhouse gases 
emitted yearly into the atmosphere. Africa should 
play an important role in any future mechanism 
that uses forestry to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions into the atmosphere. 
What does it take to get carbon credits 
issued?
Many people in Africa do not really know what a 
CDM project is. We have come across people pre-
senting us with a very well-structured and well-
5  Two in Uganda and one each in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Ethiopia 
Africa should play an important role in 
any future mechanism that uses forestry 
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions into 
the atmosphere.
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written PDD or Project Design Document and ask-
ing if we can find a buyer without any plans for 
project implementation. This can be explained 
with reference to the failings of earlier capacity 
building by the World Bank dedicated to training 
people to develop PDDs without insisting that a 
PDD should be the result of real physical studies 
for a project that will be implemented and will fol-
low certain monitoring procedures. A project can 
look good and reduce greenhouse gases, but still 
not qualify for CDM purposes. 
To be a CDM project, a project must:
 • be considered early: i.e. before any decision to 
implement the project is taken, a CDM has to be 
considered. The project developer has to notify 
the Executive Board of the CDM (EB) and the des-
ignated national authority or DNA. This rule can 
be compared to a woman finding a kindergarten 
for her child before even planning to become 
pregnant. 
 • respect the sustainable development criteria of 
the host country. This is ensured by the DNA of 
the host country issuing its approval through the 
well-known Host Country’s Approval document 
(Letter of Approval). It must also be additional, 
i.e. reduce greenhouse gases below the level that 
would have been emitted in the absence of the 
project’s activities. The rules seem extremely 
simple, but using different approved CDM tools 
to demonstrate the so-called additionality can 
be tedious, and the project can still fail at valida-
tion when the Designated operational Entity is 
not ‘convinced’.
 • have a PDD developed against an approved CDM 
methodology. If there is no methodology suit-
able for the project, the project owner must de-
velop a new methodology and bring it to the EB 
for approval.
 • have a stakeholder consultation organized by 
the project owner with the results compiled in 
the PDD.
 • be validated by a Designated Operational Entity 
accredited by the EB. 
 • be verified by a different DOE to check if the pro-
ject has been monitored as indicated in the PDD. 
These requirements show that developing a CDM 
project needs more than just the will to do so, but 
rather a clear long-term commitment for many 
years. A CDM project can easily take two years to 
be registered, and that is not the end, as carbon 
credits are issued ex-post, and therefore monitor-
ing needs to be done yearly, before the project is 
verified and carbon credits – if any – issued. And 
then issuance is yearly for ten years once or three 
times seven years. It is therefore impossible to un-
dertake spot capacity-building initiatives and ex-
pect miracles to happen. 
CDM and sustainable development  
in Africa
One tonne less of HFCs brings millions of dollars 
to already rich people, feeding the fat cat, as they 
say. A tonne less of carbon dioxide in Africa can be 
life-changing. 
We talked about the Nuru Light concept earlier, 
which is replacing kerosene lamps with environ-
mentally friendly mechanically charged lights. Ac-
cording to the CDM methodology, one such light 
can only claim 0.08 tonnes of CO2 reduced per 
year, and thus 0.08 carbon credits. Around thir-
teen such lights need to be distributed to claim 
one carbon credit. Many rural families can afford 
only a single kerosene lamp, but thirteen lights 
will provide thirteen families with a clean, afford-
able, reliable and appropriate lighting system. 
it is difficult to talk about CDM in Africa 
as a continent and to try and find the 
panacea to problems caused by the lack 
of CDM projects in Africa.
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This new system will remove the risk of children 
being burned by kerosene lamps and the smoke 
that destroys users’ health. Also, our research in 
Cameroon shows that a family can reduce its light-
ing costs by around $50 per year by moving from 
kerosene lamps to Nuru Lights. Searching for that 
ton of CO2 will change the lives of many families!
Cooking-stove CDM projects also have huge so-
cial and economic impacts on populations mov-
ing from three-stone stoves to improved cooking 
stoves. Families will cook their meals faster, spend 
less time finding wood for cooking, and reduce 
their health bill by drastically reducing the fumes 
inhaled by the traditional cooking method. Again 
the tonne of CO2 reduced will not bring a lot of 
money, but will be life-changing for a family.
However, these projects are very complex to im-
plement, from sampling to determining the base-
line and monitoring of the project before verifica-
tion to obtain carbon credits. The delivery risk of 
expected carbon credits is therefore very high. But 
buyers of carbon credits are banks or compliance 
buyers, and their analysis when purchasing carbon 
credits is purely cost/revenue oriented.6 They do 
not add any social dimension to their analysis, as 
they are purely profit-making businesses. And few 
of the buyers that do add the social dimension to 
their analysis and take the risk of purchasing cred-
its from boutique African projects do it just to di-
versify their portfolios and to claim that they have 
African projects in the pipeline. A perfect commer-
cial strategy is to have 1% of carbon credits in the 
pipeline to sell billions of unsustainable HFC cred-
its from China. 
6  In fact, the costs of CDM development from baseline studies and PDD 
development to monitoring and issuance of carbon credits are roughly 
the same, independently of the volume of carbon credits to be issued  
And small and scattered projects like cooking stoves projects that are very 
good and possible in any African countries have very high issuance risks, 
due to a complex monitoring  Buyers then look at CDM development costs 
and compare the volume of credits to be secured and go then for large 
projects that are definitely not in Africa 
Looking at this, one can think that a higher price 
for Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) from Af-
rica will boost CDM on the continent. This topic 
will be tackled later in this publication.
What is Africa?
Africa is a continent of 53 countries (not count-
ing the newly independent South Sudan). Many 
books and articles claim that CDM is not working 
in Africa. Does this include South Sudan? Is it pos-
sible to put 53 countries in just one category la-
beled Africa? Many indicators show the contrary. It 
could well happen that African countries need to 
be categorized or taken country by country when 
finding solutions to bringing carbon finance in the 
continent. For instance:
 • Out of 66 projects registered in Africa, 19 are 
hosted by South Africa, representing 30%. When 
it is said CDM is not working in Africa, does this 
include South Africa?
 • Egypt and Morocco together host 14 projects, 
representing 20% of the African pipeline of pro-
jects registered. Maybe it can be assumed that 
CDM is working in these two countries?
 • Nigeria has 5 CDM projects registered. The ex-
pected volume of carbon credits to be gener-
ated per year is over 1% of worldwide expected 
carbon credits to be generated, making Nigeria 
the 10th country in the world of CDM in terms 
of yearly credits to be generated. Is this reason 
enough to say that CDM is working perfectly in 
Nigeria?
 • Rwanda has 3 CDM projects registered as against 
none for Botswana. Does this mean that Rwanda 
is the preferred destination for CDM in Africa?
 • 16 projects are registered in the 33 Least De-
veloped Countries (LDCs) in Africa.7 This rep-
resents 24% of projects registered on the conti-
7  Out of these projects, 2 are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1 in 
Ethiopia, 1 in Liberia, 1 in Madagascar, 1 in Mali, 3 in Rwanda, 1 in Sen-
egal, 1 in Tanzania, 4 in Uganda and 1 in Zambia 
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nent. But 33 countries out of 53 is 63%. Can we 
then conclude that CDM is not working in LDC 
Africa? Or, from a different angle, can one say 
that the potential in those countries is quite low 
and hence 24% of the projects are rather very 
good? And when we realize that almost all the 
16 projects have been registered only in 2011, 
can we say that CDM is at last starting to work in 
LDCs in Africa?
 • The CD4CDM Working Paper Series No. 10 by Dr 
Lütken of the UNEP Risoe Center (Lütken 2011) 
gives relative figures like comparing countries’ 
emissions to carbon credits to be emitted and 
concluding that Africa is not ‘the lost continent 
in CDM’, as people keep saying. Although critics 
will say that it is not always wise to put the whole 
of Africa into one basket, can we nonetheless 
conclude that the most debated issue regarding 
CDM not working in Africa is rather flawed as a 
result? Or will we join the UNEP Finance Initia-
tive paper, ‘And yet it moves’, written in 2010, 
and conclude from the very few CDMs registered 
from selected African countries that CDM is at 
least working on the continent?
These situations show that it is difficult to talk 
about CDM in Africa as a continent and to try and 
find the panacea to problems caused by the lack 
of CDM projects in Africa. Although people talk 
about how CDM is working in China and India, no-
body suggests that it is working in the whole of 
Asia. 
Listing these situations is not intended to suggest 
that nothing should be done to make CDM work in 
Africa, but rather to show that the approaches to 
make CDM work on the continent should be more 
innovative and more deeply thought out.
What has been done to make CDM work 
in Africa
‘There is no doubt: we want to help.
The well-documented horrors of extreme poverty 
around the world have created a moral imperative 
that people have responded to in their millions.
Yet poverty persists …’
Anyone who has read the bestseller ‘Dead aid: why 
aid is not working and how there is another way 
for Africa’ (Moyo 2009) knows this quote by heart. 
If the same person is following discussions about 
making CDM work for Africa, many similarities 
will come to his mind. The many problems affect-
ing developing countries – especially in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa – from extreme poverty to the AIDS pan-
demic to malaria and others have never left any 
conscious human being indifferent. Yet problems 
persist and might stubbornly continue to do so for 
centuries to come. And hurdles related to the suc-
cess of CDM in Africa are so far not proving an 
exception to this rule. 
It is impossible nowadays to name all the pro-
grams dedicated to making CDM work in Africa. 
The World Bank started capacity-building on the 
continent in 2003. People invited to attend were 
mostly from the public sector (ministries), with 
an interest rather in collecting per diem. And this 
capacity-building was short and totally theoretical. 
We have come across PDDs developed for virtual 
projects and people looking for buyers of carbon 
credits. What carbon credits???
The capacity-building was always carried out by 
international consultants who cost a lot but did 
There is a strong need to develop pilot 
projects (based on a bottom-up analysis) 
with people who are working in the field 
and have a better understanding of the 
business culture in the countries in which 
they are based.
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not have the expected results. Maybe international 
consultants were more interested in getting their 
mandates through and cashing them in than in 
seeing CDM flourish in Africa. It may have been 
better to train trainers locally and use them to 
promote and develop CDM projects. By developing 
projects, they would have had other interests like 
the provision of success fees8 on CERs and would 
then have pushed the project further. CDM is ex-
tremely complex, the process is extremely long 
and it is important to have local support instead of 
trying to develop it from distance.
What has worked, and what needs to be 
taken forward
Very few programs have been entirely beneficial 
to Africa, and there is a strong need to encourage 
similar programs from the continent.
The CASCADe/UNEP program selected seven 
French-speaking African countries to develop a 
program that has brought many carbon-resilient 
projects to light. To quote their website: ‘The 
program provides a hands-on, learning by doing 
approach in which local developers are given the 
opportunity to develop and prepare Project Idea 
Notes (PINs), Carbon Finance Documents (CFDs) 
and/or Project Design Documents (PDDs) through 
direct technical assistance and capacity building 
to pilot projects’. Such programs should be en-
couraged because they work on real projects and 
support project owners in learning by doing. Also 
they focus on French-speaking Africa, which has 
been particularly ‘neglected’ in the CDM platform. 
The CDMs are designed entirely in English, even 
though many African countries speak exclusively 
French. Only 10 registered CDM projects out of 66 
are from French-speaking African countries. 
8  A success fee is usually a fixed percentage of CERs payable to the project 
developer by the buyer when CERs are delivered and transferred to the 
buyer’s account  
The ACAD Facility, amongst others, provides 
grants for early-stage projects to support the costs 
of feasibility studies, business plan development 
and CDM development. African projects are al-
ways great ideas, but many fail to materialize be-
cause they lack a sound business plan to attract 
investors. The ACAD Facility bridges the gap to 
help project developers present high-quality docu-
ments to investors. Also, the Facility takes some 
projects throughout the CDM development pro-
cess: the further the project is in the CDM devel-
opment process, the lower the risk perception of 
investors and carbon credit buyers. 
The Belgium Technical Facility is focusing only on 
Uganda, with a two-million Euros grant program 
to support CDM development from conception 
to registration, organize financing for the project 
and above all developing the capacity of local con-
sultants to manage the whole process. This is very 
practical and needs to be taken forward, to move 
from talking to practical work.
These three programs are in just a few countries 
and select very few projects compared to the con-
tinent’s potential, but their impact is enormous, 
and real projects are brought to registration and 
implementation. 
Making CDM work in Africa
A lot has been said, written, discussed and pro-
posed during the last five years to make CDM 
work in Africa. The result is clear today: as already 
noted, 2% of the CDM project pipeline come from 
Africa. And discussions are continuing in the same 
direction. 
Initially the main problem seemed to be the lack of 
CDM institutional support. While a lot of work has 
been done to install Designated National Authori-
ties (DNA, national authorities representing the 
UNFCCC and making sure the sustainable devel-
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opment criteria of the country are met in any sin-
gle CDM project developed) in almost all African 
countries, which is a good initiative, there has not 
been any noticeable change in terms of the num-
ber of CDM projects from the region. 
Many people thought and are still thinking that, in 
order to stimulate the development of CDM pro-
jects, capacity-building is urgently needed in Af-
rica. The result in some cases has been a perfectly 
developed Project Design Document (PDD) to put 
forward a project that only exists in the said PDD, 
totally ignoring the fact that the CDM is merely an 
add-on to an underlying project. 
Feed-in-tariffs are under development in many 
African countries, to follow the example of South 
Africa. Although this is another very good initia-
tive, there is no certainty that it will be the magical 
potion that makes renewable-energy CDM projects 
work for Africa. 
On the UNFCCC side, efforts are being undertaken 
to make CDM a reality in Africa. For example, to 
solve the problem of the small and therefore un-
attractive size of projects of Africa, the so-called 
programmatic approach has been developed. In 
theory this will help spread small-scale projects 
in time and space into one program. Although the 
idea behind the concept is a work of genius, this 
might end up being even more complex than ‘nor-
mal’ CDM projects. 
William Easterly (Easterly 2006) defines ‘Planners’ 
as advocates of the top-down decision-making ap-
proach and ‘Searchers’ as the agents for alterna-
tive approaches, that is, bottom-up ones. Let us 
illustrate this with Easterly’s own example: ‘The 
short answer on why dying poor children don’t get 
twelve-cent medicines, while healthy rich children 
do get Harry Potter, is that twelve-cent medicines 
are supplied by Planners while Harry Potter is sup-
plied by Searchers […] Planners determine what to 
supply; Searchers find out what is in demand’. 
The difficult question of how to make CDM work 
in Africa always seems to have landed on the 
desks of Planners. Despite their good intentions 
and thorough motivations in supporting Africa, 
nothing noticeable has so far been changed in 
reality. It may be time to think differently, try to 
understand clearly and find real solutions to this 
stubborn disease. 
Conventional project finance: still the 
main hurdle for carbon finance in Africa
The debate about making carbon finance work for 
Africa will certainly go beyond 2012 if and when 
new mechanisms are added to existing ones. Af-
rica suffers no shortage of potentially great low-
carbon projects that will definitely qualify for ex-
isting and forthcoming mechanisms. But for CDM, 
for instance, carbon finance accounts on average 
for only 20% of the overall investment need of 
the project, and carbon credits are by definition 
converted into cash only after delivery, i.e. when 
the project has been physically implemented and 
monitored and verified against CDM rules imposed 
by a specific methodology. 
The huge investment, usually in millions of Euros, 
to create at least 20,000 carbon credits per year 
(a minimum threshold of carbon credits for many 
buyers to be interested in the project) for a CDM 
project needs to be available to implement the 
project before carbon credits can be issued. Add-
ing to this the fact investment purely for CDM de-
velopment is rather insignificant compared to the 
revenue from carbon credits, we can insist that 
conventional finance is what is needed first in Af-
rica. Many carbon-credit buyers prove the correct-
ness of this, as they are always willing to cover all 
CDM-related costs when there is a project that can 
reach financial closure. 
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We strongly recommend the focus to be more on 
finding solutions for making conventional project 
finance work for Africa. The CDM is the icing on 
the cake. No matter how much icing there may be, 
however, it cannot be enjoyed if there is no cake 
to support it.
The bottom-up approach 
External analysts are sometimes prone to think in 
pan-African terms. Africa, however, is no more ho-
mogenous than Latin America or Asia. This simple 
truth has obvious implications for any analysis of 
the barriers to CDM development. Africa is a con-
glomeration of 53 countries, all very different and 
diverse. Well-designed capacity-building might be 
of interest to Botswana or Ghana, whilst there is 
a rather basic need for an institutional framework 
in Mauritania and Chad. Maybe CDM is thoroughly 
understood in Senegal and Nigeria and there is a 
lack of seed money and venture capital to jump 
start selected projects and create a bandwagon 
effect that will see many projects in the pipeline 
within no time. Is English, the official and only lan-
guage of CDM, a huge and the main barrier to the 
Central African Republic? The feed-in-tariff may 
really boost the development of renewable energy 
in Cameroon, but can that be of some advantage 
to CDM if the baseline of energy production in 
Cameroon is hydro? And is grid electricity a useful 
baseline when more than 70% of Africa’s popula-
tion reportedly still relies on fuel wood as primary 
energy source for cooking and lighting? Questions 
like these could span pages without clear answers 
today. 
It is obvious, then, that the situation is extremely 
complex and that no simple solution can be envis-
aged. 
There is a strong need to develop pilot projects 
(based on a bottom-up analysis) with people who 
are working in the field and have a better under-
standing of the business culture in the countries in 
which they are based. 
The CASCADe program and ACAD facilities we 
mentioned have probably not spent a tenth of 
what has been spent for many years to build ca-
pacity in Africa. But their impact is far greater be-
cause they focus on real projects and work in the 
field to support the project through the complex-
ity of CDM development. 
One recent striking example of a bottom-up ap-
proach that can be recommended to any donor 
country or agency trying to make carbon finance 
work for Africa is the two-million Euros grant pro-
gram from Belgium Technical Cooperation to pro-
mote CDM in Uganda, mentioned earlier. In brief, 
the grant will take real CDM projects through the 
CDM cycle, hire and develop the capacity of local 
consultants to take the lead on projects, develop 
the capacity of local project owners and support, 
develop innovative financing solutions for the 
selected project, and develop the website of the 
DNA to allow for transparent communication. The 
Belgian government would have spent ten or a 
hundred times this amount to run in a few Afri-
can countries and organize workshops about CDM 
without any impact on CDM development.
Success stories 
Belgium Technical Cooperation is going to develop 
success stories as CASCADe did. Success stories 
can easily have a bandwagon effect on the devel-
opment of any initiative. The CDM concept is so 
complex and even looks abstract: many in West Af-
rica will see this, begin to believe and then imitate. 
We know of many cooking-stove projects under de-
velopment in Africa that follow the CDM standard. 
And many developers mention the cooking-stove 
projects registered under CDM in Zambia and Ni-
geria as success stories, proving that the rather 
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complex cooking-stove project can be developed 
under CDM. Any capacity-building initiative would 
have said so forever without any impact, but the 
climate-neutral group atmosfair took the ‘risk’ of 
being the leader and can be followed.
 
Building the capacity of the private sector
CDM is too complex to be developed remotely. Lo-
cal consultants are unavoidable if costs and time 
are to be saved (and success guaranteed) in the 
CDM development process. Many European buyers 
today are trying to have local representatives or 
partners in Africa, as they have seen that there is 
no success in coming to conferences in Africa and 
expecting to come across great projects. 
In December 2010, we opened the company S² Ser-
vices Sarl (www.s2-gmbh.com) in Cameroon to de-
velop CDM in the region. To date, many companies 
that have been struggling to find projects in Africa 
for many years are approaching us to exploit our 
experience in win-win cooperation. 
Local African-based banks will play a major role in 
making CDM or any other mechanism work on the 
continent. If they are taught how to benefit from 
CDM, they will definitely have a positive impact on 
it. 
Capacity building – if any – should target local con-
sultants and banks so that, once they understand 
what they can gain in becoming involved in CDM, 
they will support it on the ground, where projects 
are actually developed. 
Creating an African standard to have a 
premium on prices? 
A simple cost/revenue analysis for pure invest-
ment in CDM development shows that no carbon 
credit buyer will readily come to Africa. In fact Af-
rican projects are usually very small, their CDMs 
are constructed in such a way that the costs of de-
velopment for two projects yielding, for instance, 
20,000 CERs and 200,000 CERs per year respec-
tively, are almost the same. Of course, expected 
revenues per project will be a simple product of 
CERs by the unit price of CER, and the decision of 
the buyer not to come to Africa will then be easily 
made. It is clear that, if there is no extra incen-
tive for buyers to come to Africa, even with new 
mechanisms, buyers will still follow the cost/rev-
enue analysis and come to Africa only when there 
is saturation – if ever – in other markets. 
CDM is a market-based mechanism, with players 
seeking to increase their profits while reducing 
costs. The discussions on how to make CDM work 
in Africa should be more focused on increasing 
the profitability of CDM projects. 
The first CDM projects to be initiated in Africa (ex-
cluding South Africa and the North African coun-
tries) speak volumes about what CDM investors 
are looking for. Only four projects were initiated 
in Africa in 2005, and surprisingly two of those 
in Nigeria looked at using flared gas to produce 
energy. Nigeria is not the preferred destination for 
investors interested in Africa. Nigeria did not even 
have a DNA installed at that time, and a special 
presidential committee was put in place to give 
HCA to projects. This even caused great prob-
lems later, when the ‘real’ DNA was installed in 
the Ministry of Environment. For a long period of 
time there seemed to be two DNAs in Nigeria, leav-
ing the project developers very confused, as the 
Special Presidential Committee on CDM did not 
But maybe it is time to think of more 
innovative solutions to speed up the 
process of approval, especially if CDM 
is increasingly going to come to the 
continent together with new carbon-
resilient programs.
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want to cede ground to the other Special Climate 
Change Unit where the DNA is now installed. 
Nigeria is blessed with oil and gas, and CDM pro-
jects aiming to use the associated flared gas for 
other purposes produce carbon credits in the or-
der of hundreds of thousands Euros making the 
cost/revenue ratio very attractive for carbon cred-
its buyers. And this was enough incentive for in-
vestors to look at those projects in Nigeria despite 
the bad investment climate, instead of trying to 
develop cooking stove projects in Ghana or Bot-
swana, preferred destinations for foreign inves-
tors in Africa.
This example of Nigeria shows that if cost/revenue 
is attractive for investors, some projects might 
have an opportunity to be developed in Africa. It 
is hard to say that a separate standard should be 
designed for Africa, but if a carbon credit from Af-
rica costs 50 Euros, many CDM buyers will recon-
sider their strategy for the continent. This is no 
different from giving coefficients to carbon credits 
that some innovators are thinking about. It is not 
impossible to implement a different standard for 
Africa, as the Gold Standard CDM (GS CDM), for 
instance, is already ensuring that certain types of 
project receive a price premium in the market and 
are still in the same pipeline as the other projects. 
The Africa Standard CDM (AS CDM) can be concep-
tualized in the same way as the GS CDM. 
If carbon credits improve the Internal Rate of Re-
turn (IRR) of projects by ten points, carbon cred-
its buyers will easily be willing to organize the 
financing of projects and obtain a double return 
later on (on CERs sales and a share of the project’s 
revenues). 
For example, let us imagine a 5MW biomass-to-en-
ergy project in Nigeria that needs more than 5 mil-
lion Euros to be implemented and that will have 
an IRR of 12%, very low to attract investors. With 
the actual price of carbon credits at around €10, 
the IRR will increase to around 15%. If the carbon 
credit is given a premium because the project is in 
Africa and moves to €40, the IRR will increase to 
25%, and any investor or carbon credit buyer will 
fight to get the project financed. 
Privatizing CDM decisions  
in host countries
CDM projects are mostly owned by the private sec-
tor. Yet one stringent regulation is to get the host 
country’s approval (HCA) that the project is fol-
lowing sustainable development criteria designed 
by the government. Acquiring the HCA is in many 
African countries extremely time-consuming and 
can be a big obstacle in having the project regis-
tered. 
Many DNAs are organized like the DNA of Cam-
eroon, where it is an inter-ministerial committee 
of 17 members. PINs and PDDs are submitted in 
17 printed copies that are then distributed to the 
committee members. Then they read the docu-
ments – if at all – and a meeting is organized to 
approve them and to mandate the DNA’s repre-
sentative (the climate change focal point) to issue 
the HCA. We assume that they have read carefully 
through the documents. But they are all govern-
ment officials, and for meetings to happen they 
expect a per diem to be paid to them. The cost of 
the meeting becomes high, and as the DNA does 
not really have a running budget, it can be very 
difficult to organize meetings. As a consequence, 
projects can be halted for a year before being is-
sued with the HCA. 
It is understandable that any UN-backed program 
will always work with the government in any coun-
try for sovereignty reasons. But maybe it is time to 
think of more innovative solutions to speed up the 
process of approval, especially if CDM is increas-
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ingly going to come to the continent together with 
new carbon-resilient programs. 
The Gold Standard VER, for instance, does not re-
quire HCA approval prior to the certification of 
projects. But the sustainable development integri-
ty of the projects registered cannot be questioned. 
CDM can learn from the Gold Standard to avoid 
the involvement of the government, while ensur-
ing that the projects respect social and environ-
mental criteria. Or the government through, for 
instance, the ministry in charge of environmental 
affairs could give the final (symbolic) approval af-
ter a nongovernmental UN-accredited committee 
like DOEs has approved the project. 
Making CDM and other carbon-resilient mecha-
nisms work for Africa is challenging. Innovative 
solutions from all perspectives need to be adopt-
ed. There is no miracle solution to suit all situa-
tions and all African countries. Simple capacity-
building could be enough in Nigeria, whilst Uganda 
needs pilot projects to learn from. More incentives 
need to be created for players in the African car-
bon market. The future for offsetting mechanisms 
is surely going to be in programs like PoA, LULUCF 
and REDD, NAMAs and maybe many other new bi-
lateral and multilateral mechanisms. Africa might 
continue to be lost on the playing field if innova-
tive bottom-up solutions are not adopted. 
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Voluntary Market  
– Future Perspective
Abstract
In less than a decade from inception, compliance 
and voluntary sectors have steadily expanded and 
enlarged, outmanoeuvring any other commodity 
growth  Given the current uncertainty surround-
ing compliance markets, the voluntary market is 
seen as a lynchpin on which the mere existence 
of the global carbon market depends  For devel-
oping economies, voluntary carbon trading may 
provide a solid experience in designing the future 
compliance framework, be it an Emissions Trading 
Scheme or NAMAs  This article discusses the po-
tential of the voluntary carbon market in shaping 
the future carbon trading regime, discuss existing 
and emerging standards, and on how to expand 
the stakeholders and service providers needed to 
support this sector   
Given the uncertainty surrounding the legality, 
longevity and purpose of the compliance carbon 
markets, it seems reasonable to look towards the 
voluntary sector as a possible saviour of the vision 
of a global carbon market.
By virtue of the fact that the voluntary carbon mar-
ket preceded and guided the establishment of the 
compliance carbon market, and given the host of 
voluntary standard knowledge now utilised by the 
compliance market, it is likely that the future of 
the compliance carbon market will also be guided 
by the voluntary sector. 
In contrast, the institutional mechanisms and in-
frastructure needed to achieve greater liquidity 
and integrity in the compliance markets are in-
creasingly branching out from the compliance to 
the voluntary markets. As transparency and ac-
countability continue to drive activity in this sec-
Nithyanandam Yuvaraj  
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CEO, The Carbon Rating Agency 
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tor, it is hoped that efforts to establish greater li-
quidity should lead to true price discovery. 
The financial crisis halted the momentum of com-
pliance carbon markets, which was then com-
pounded by the setbacks of Copenhagen. With the 
Cancun conference also failing to outline a path 
towards a global market, there has been a unique 
development: the growth of regional semi-com-
pliance markets in the US, and other voluntary 
transactions in the rest of the World, during 2010 
(Peters-Stanley, et al. 2011). 
Yet, globally, the growth in the voluntary market 
for the past decade seems inconsequential due to 
the negative influence of global economic reces-
sions; high transaction costs; buyers’ predilec-
tions for geography, project type, recent vintage; 
oversupply, including flooding of VERs (Verified 
Emission Reductions); and declining prices. The 
collapse and ultimate closure of the Chicago Cli-
mate Exchange (CCX) has done little to add to the 
market’s confidence. 
On the bright side, new and improved standards, 
enhanced market service providers (such as regis-
tries and exchanges in Europe and China) and new 
sectors (such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Develop-
ing Countries) and O3 Depleting Substance) have 
dominated the voluntary market’s developments 
in recent years. Moreover, the confidence of stake-
holders in the WCI (Western Climate Initiative) and 
RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative), and the 
growing interest in demonstrating corporate social 
responsibility through carbon-neutral initiatives, 
have given a fillip to the voluntary market in the 
developed economies.
Rapidly developing economies, viz., India, China, 
Peru and Brazil, have also displayed notable ma-
turity by implementing new and innovative meas-
ures to support the growth of the voluntary carbon 
market. In China, for example, voluntary market 
exchanges have been set up, and the Panda stand-
ard has been created.  
The voluntary market is packed with new stand-
ards, infrastructure service providers and projects, 
and has constantly increasing participation from 
corporates in developed and developing econo-
mies. Minds are now focussed on raising standards, 
benchmarking and best practices, as service provid-
ers and stakeholders gear efforts towards opening 
up a new paradigm in the voluntary market. The 
best use of these positive developments is expected 
to be made by the developing economies and the 
regional voluntary trading schemes in the west.
As the roadmap towards a post-2012 compliance 
market remains absent, the voluntary market is 
seen as an obvious lynchpin on which the mere ex-
istence of the global carbon market depends. Most 
importantly, and in the absence of a firm and for-
mal global post-2012 agreement, a voluntary carbon 
market should be embraced by most of the devel-
oped and developing economies in the near to long 
term. For developing economies, voluntary carbon 
trading may provide a solid experience in designing 
the future compliance framework, be it an Emis-
sions Trading Scheme, Nationally Appropriate Miti-
gating Actions (NAMAs) or something entirely new. 
Market in action
Since its beginning the carbon market has faced 
many challenges, hampering the speedy growth 
many had envisaged. However, in less than a dec-
ade from its inception, both the compliance and 
voluntary carbon sectors have steadily expanded, 
becoming one of the fastest growing new com-
modity markets. 
While the first voluntary credit was transacted in 
1989 between a Guatemala pine and eucalyptus 
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plantation and a project funded by US-based AES 
Power (Ecosystem Marketplace 2009), very few 
people in the market would recall that the World 
Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund launched its first 
ever institutional-level carbon procurement based 
on VERs, later to be converted into CERs (Certified 
Emission Reductions) upon the Kyoto Protocol’s 
entry into force and establishment of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).
Voluntary carbon credits of CDM pre-registered 
vintage were the most preferred by buyers due to 
their regulatory assurance for compliance. Such 
credits mostly qualified under the VCS (Verified 
Carbon Standard) with transaction costs related to 
validation, verification and VCS registry hosting. 
At the same time, credits from projects that were 
rejected or withdrawn from the CDM found their 
way on to the unregulated voluntary market. The 
inclusion of credits from 1999 flooded the mar-
ket with old vintage credits from India, China and 
other countries for trading on the self-regulated 
CCX, serving the voluntary carbon market in North 
America. 
Pricing criteria by buyers covered vintage, coun-
try, project type, standard and registry. The pric-
ing of credits thus veered in different directions, 
with those generating special social and environ-
mental benefits priced differently but lacking a 
definite standard of their own. The Gold Standard 
was launched in 2003, and the market recognized 
the additional value of credits that qualified under 
its robust and rigorous framework, such that Gold 
Standard VERs are always priced at a premium. 
The voluntary carbon market reached a staggering 
annual growth rate of more than 100% between 
2003 and 2008, though not comparable in volume 
with the compliance market. The market declined 
post-2009, due to the global economic meltdown, 
before recovering in 2010 by climbing back up to 
2008 levels (Ecosystem Marketplace & Business for 
Social Responsibility 2008).
As would be expected, US and European buyers 
dominate the demand for voluntary carbon. The 
retail markets in the US and EU are increasingly 
offsetting emissions for products, travelling and 
other activities. A few leading corporates and fi-
nancial institutions, such as Google and HSBC 
(Ecosystem Marketplace & Business for Social Re-
sponsibility 2008), have launched voluntary car-
bon credits procurement programmes, with a few 
of them directly funding voluntary projects. Re-
cently, projects with clear social benefits that orig-
inate in Africa and other least developing coun-
tries are being increasingly demanded by buyers, 
most notably in the EU. In North America, offsets 
from agriculture and methane projects dominate 
the supply.
Registry services offered from 2009, primar-
ily by VCS, provided buyers with the much 
needed integrity and addressed the double 
counting and retiring measures. Besides CCX, ex-
changes such as Climex and the Asia Carbon Ex-
change auctioned VERs from various standards, 
while a dedicated trading platform was recently 
launched by the Carbon Trade Exchange (CTX). 
The voluntary market is deepening institutional 
understanding, increasing integrity and, most 
importantly, offering flexibility in the design and 
implementation of projects in different circum-
stances. Despite this development, investors in 
voluntary carbon projects are limited. Hence, 
some innovations are needed to shift from the 
procurement vested market to a scenario where in-
vestments are secured for implementing projects 
to reap voluntary carbon credits. Such voluntary 
carbon project-financing initiatives will create a 
new facet in scaling socially oriented small-scale 
GHG mitigation projects. 
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The next phase of the voluntary carbon 
market
Developing countries and emerging economies 
are beginning to shape the voluntary market by 
increasing demand, modifying supply, construct-
ing technical infrastructure and building unique 
standards. These actions are demonstrative of the 
significant commitments made subsequent to the 
signing of the Copenhagen Accord and effective 
use of market-based mechanisms for protecting 
environmental assets.  
China launched key initiatives subsequent to the 
energy intensity reduction commitment, such 
as launching a voluntary standard (CBEX Group 
2010), a provincial pilot cap-and-trade scheme 
and provincial environmental and emission ex-
changes. Brazil established a state-level sub-na-
tional environmental registry for multiple energy 
and environmental assets. Kenya’s forestry pro-
ject became the first one to generate and issue 
the VCS-based REDD credits (VCS 2011). (See Box 
1 on Developing Countries’ initiatives).
India has launched its flagship Perform, Achieve 
and Trade (PAT) scheme (Climate Connect 2011), 
where participants trade energy-efficiency certifi-
cates. India is also launching a Renewable Energy 
Certificates (RECs) trading scheme. Taking it fur-
ther, there is ongoing consultation by the gov-
ernment on a scheme that trades environmental 
pollutants at the state level. All India’s schemes 
further the objectives of the National Action Plan 
on Climate Change (NAPCC) (Govt. of India 2008) 
whilst simultaneously building confidence and 
knowledge of emissions trading within the public 
and private sectors. 
Global stakeholders welcome such initiatives but 
expect that any emission reductions from do-
mestic schemes should have a robust accounting 
framework designed and implemented with high 
regulatory standards, ensuring that emission re-
ductions are real and additional. The World Re-
sources Institute (WRI 2010) rightly points out 
that “parties should agree to rigorous and con-
sistent estimation and accounting methodolo-
gies.”
Future perspective
Developing countries’ efforts in establishing 
large-scale voluntary carbon markets are a clear 
indication of the determination to design robust 
frameworks for ensuring the integrity of carbon 
credits. This, coupled with registries and trad-
ing infrastructure, will increase the confidence of 
buyers.
Standards
Recent initiatives point towards the consolida-
tion of organizations and standards involved in 
establishing, supporting and administering volun-
tary standards. The International Emissions Trad-
ing Association (IETA) and International Carbon 
Reduction and Offset Alliance (ICROA) have an-
nounced (IETA 2011) the integration of their mar-
ket-facing associations, which is expected to bring 
players from both associations together to provide 
an even stronger base for the already expanding 
voluntary carbon market. This also reflects the 
need to facilitate the expansion of national regula-
tors, using voluntary carbon mechanisms as blue-
prints for compliance market designs, as empha-
sised by Peters-Stanley, et al. 2011.
The integration of all the voluntary carbon stand-
ards seems far off, but it is not impossible. There 
are two major distinguishing factors to standards: 
the unit of measurement and the additionality. 
With regard to additionality, market players view 
the Gold Standard as more stringent, while the 
ISO Standard stipulates the use of an established 
methodology for estimating GHG emissions from 
existing schemes like the CDM. 
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IDEAcarbon’s Carbon Rating Agency has estab-
lished a methodology to provide an independent 
and credible assessment and opinion of the qual-
ity of the credits developed under all of the off-
setting systems in the global market. The ‘quality’ 
of any carbon credit is determined by its compari-
Box 1. Developing Countries’ voluntary carbon market initiatives
A Brief Overview of China Carbon Market
China Beijing Environment 
Exchange (Peters-Stanley, 
et al. 2011)
China Beijing Environment 
Exchange (CBEEX) was 
founded in August 2008   It 
was established by China 
Beijing Equity Exchange 
(CBEX), CNOOC New Energy 
Investment Co  Ltd, China 
Guodian Corp and China 
Everbright Investment 
Management Corp  The 
strategic partners of CBEEX 
include the Financial and 
Energy Exchange (FEX), 
the Centre of Environ-
mental Protection Foreign 
Cooperation of Ministry of 
Environmental Protection 
(MEP), BlueNext Environ-
ment Exchange; and The 
Energy Research Insti-
tute (ERI) of the National 
Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)  
CBEEX offers a range of 
services in addition to OTC 
transactions, including 
facilitation of technology 
transfer, raising finance, 
carbon asset management, 
carbon footprint assess-
ment, carbon offsets and a 
CDM-related consultation 
and advisory service  It has 
facilitated the very first 
domestic VER transaction in 
China  It also participated 
in the development of the 
Panda Standard  
Shanghai Environment 
Energy Exchange (Peters-
Stanley, et al. 2011)
Shanghai Environment 
Energy Exchange was 
founded in August 2008, as 
a trading platform for asset 
rights, creditor rights and 
stock rights, with a focus 
on environmental and en-
ergy sectors  The exchange 
is backed by the Shanghai 
United Assets and Equity 
Exchange  The Shanghai En-
vironment Energy Exchange 
offers a package of services 
for business, ranging from 
consultation on energy-
saving and pollutants 
discharge reduction, pro-
ject-designing, project ap-
praisal, business planning, 
marketing, fund operation, 
financing and technology 
supporting   Adopting the 
membership system, SEEE 
is exploring a new market 
mechanism to build a 
complete transaction chain 
linking technologies, capital 
and equity in accordance 
with the requirements of 
the Clean Development 
Mechanism  According to 
its website, it facilitated 
the transaction for 13 CDM 
projects, 47 VER projects 
and other projects  (China 
Environment & Energy Net-
work 2011)
Tianjin Climate Exchange 
(Peters-Stanley, et al. 2011)
Tianjin Climate Exchange 
was founded in September 
2008 as a joint venture 
of China National Petro-
leum Corporation Assets 
Management Co  Ltd 
(CNPCAM), Tianjin Property 
Rights Exchange (TPRE) and 
Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX)  In addition to its 
trading service, it also of-
fers consultation on CDM 
project development and 
related issues   In June 
2010, the Tianjin Climate 
Exchange launched its 
online VER trading platform 
with 375,900 VER listed 
with unique electronic ref-
erences for each unit  
Pilot Trading Scheme
By 2020, China has com-
mitted itself to reducing its 
carbon dioxide emissions 
per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 
percent from 2005 levels 
and using non-fossil fuels 
for about 15 percent of its 
energy  The Chinese 12th 
Five Year Plan announced 
that the pilot carbon trad-
ing schemes will be in the 
cities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Chongqing, and 
the provinces of Guang-
dong and Hubei before 
2013  It is aiming to set 
up a nationwide trading 
platform by 2015  (www 
nrdc org/international/co-
penhagenaccords/)
Panda Standard (Peters-
Stanley, et al. 2011) 
The Panda Standard is 
the first voluntary carbon 
standard designed specifi-
cally for China  In addition 
to emission reductions, 
poverty alleviation is one of 
its primary objectives  The 
founders and co-founders 
of the Panda Standard 
include the China Beijing 
Environment Exchange 
(CBEEX), Bluenext China 
Forestry Exchange (CFEX) 
and Winrock International  
The Panda Standard version 
1 0 was launched at COP 15 
in Copenhagen in Decem-
ber 2009  Later, the Panda 
Standard pilot project, the 
AFD bamboo reforestation 
project, was announced in 
Cancun in October 2010   It 
has developed the AFOLU 
Sectoral Specifications, 
which was open for public 
comment until the end of 
January 2011 and subse-
quently published in late 
2011  The first transaction 
of its pilot voluntary carbon 
credits took place at the 
end of March 2011  (Peters-
Stanley, et al  2011) 
Markit Signs First Sub-Na-
tional Environmental Asset 
Registry- Brazil (Peters-
Stanley, et al  2011)
First VCS REDD credit (Pe-
ters-Stanley, et al. 2011)
On 7 February (2011), a 
project in Kenya became 
the world’s first Reduced 
Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) project to issue 
verified carbon credits 
under the VCS Program  
The Kasigau corridor REDD 
project – Phase I, developed 
by Wildlife Works in the 
Rukinga Sanctuary in South-
east Kenya, issued 1 16 
million credits for the initial 
six-year monitoring period 
of its 30-year project life, 
representing 80 percent 
of the total 1 45 million 
metric tonnes of GHG 
emissions avoided during 
the period  The project 
deposited 290,066 ‘buffer 
credits’ – or 20 percent of 
the net GHG benefit – to the 
VCS pooled buffer account, 
where they will be held to 
insure against the potential 
loss of credits across all 
projects in the VCS AFOLU 
portfolio  Prior to this is-
suance, Wildlife Works had 
successfully developed its 
own REDD methodology 
and had it approved by the 
VCS Program on 13 January 
2011  The Kasigau corridor 
REDD project lies in semi-
arid tropical forest, but the 
methodology can be used 
more broadly in projects 
throughout the tropics 
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son with a high quality standard, specifically: Real - 
Measurable - Additional - Permanent - Leakage proof 
- Verified - Unique/Traceable – Transparent - Clear 
ownership rights - Positive sustainable aspects.
This approach provides a platform to allow any 
two carbon credits to be compared, providing car-
bon market participants with an essential guide to 
the pricing of carbon. Using a similar approach, 
the standards can be consolidated and integrated 
with a classification based on well-defined criteria.
A remaining potential challenge, however, is the 
difference in the unit of measurement amongst 
standards – emissions, biodiversity, etc. There is 
no immediate necessity to consolidate or equate 
units of measurement; indeed, there is no reason 
why projects cannot utilise multiple units of meas-
urement whilst there is simultaneous consolida-
tion of the overall standards.
Infrastructure
Developing countries should consider the adop-
tion of current voluntary and compliance stand-
ards for domestic carbon projects, instead of 
developing new standards entirely. Leading asso-
ciations like IETA could facilitate such a review, 
establishing a centralized registry for voluntary 
programmes. Domestic registries established in 
developing countries and the US could potentially 
link to a new centralised registry, ensuring global 
access and fair trading.
The centralized registry will need to put in place 
measures that avoid double counting and fraudu-
lent behaviour related to the reuse and recycling 
of credits traded without retirement. While use of 
consolidated standards, registries and exchanges 
within developing countries can grow the domes-
tic voluntary carbon market, the establishment of 
a centralised registry will ensure there is global 
linkage. 
The domestic voluntary market should be able to 
provide institutional experience to the participat-
ing emissions-intensive industries in developing 
countries, allowing them to prepare for the en-
suing compliance markets. Building the capacity 
of industrial participants and securing their in-
volvement are critical to ensuring a smooth tran-
sition.
Sectors, Methodologies and Regions
Industrial energy efficiency and renewables, land-
fill gas, agriculture and forestry are expected to 
grow in their contributions to the generation of 
credits in the voluntary markets. 
Domestic demand for credits from specific sec-
tors within developing countries has yet to be 
clarified, and China will probably be the first to 
record trends in the coming years. But most of 
the emerging voluntary markets are expected to 
export credits, with forestry a frontrunner in scal-
ing the supply. Indeed forestry credits are very 
much the rising star in the voluntary market, with 
all observers anticipating huge growth in forestry 
projects worldwide. In 2010 REDD and Avoided 
Conversion accounted for 29% of all transactions, 
whilst the first REDD credits (as discussed in Box 
1) were issued by a major standard – the VCS – for 
the Kenya Kasigau Corridor project in early 2011. 
Moreover, of the VCS’s forestry-based credits, 90% 
were REDD.
As is common with voluntary projects, some are 
designed such that they will eventually be regis-
In the absence of a firm and formal global 
post-2012 agreement, a voluntary carbon 
market should be embraced by most of the 
developed and developing economies in the 
near to long term.
107 
tered for compliance markets (a.k.a. pre-compli-
ance), whilst some will be designed solely for the 
voluntary markets. Given the political will behind 
REDD and the expectations that a REDD compli-
ance regime will emerge from the COP negotia-
tions, some developers are looking at setting up 
REDD projects so they can enter a compliance 
market as and when it materialises.
According to the Forest Trends annual report 
(Peters-Stanley, et al. 2011), one quarter of the 
pipeline credits from forestry activities will be de-
signed for compliance buyers in 2011, with some 
being REDD projects. Forestry activities have the 
largest share of credits designed for – and still 
awaiting the materialisation of – a compliance 
market, but the majority of REDD programs will 
still be sold in to the voluntary market. 
It seems that some – although clearly not all – pro-
ject participants are optimistic about the emer-
gence of a REDD compliance market, and we may 
therefore expect the number of REDD projects tar-
geted at a future compliance scheme to increase 
in line with anticipation of the existence of a fu-
ture compliance scheme. However, this should 
be tempered with the reality that the EU ETS (EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme) explicitly disallows 
the inclusion of REDD credits, and appears unwill-
ing to do so on a large scale until 2020. No other 
large-scale compliance market yet exists, nor do 
emerging markets show any sign of allowing large 
volumes of offsetting via REDD.
This does not mean that there won’t be growth in 
pre-compliance projects – as there undoubtedly 
will – it simply means that the majority of REDD 
projects will continue to be voluntary and market-
based, and given the relatively higher opportunity 
costs of land use in voluntary market REDD pro-
jects, this will undoubtedly result in a lower up-
take of REDD projects as landowners make alter-
native uses of land in areas that otherwise would 
have been profitable projects under a compliance 
market.
Adding another twist to the story, however, is the 
USA. It seems that the failure of the federal cap-
and-trade in the US diminished interest in pre-
compliance buying. Sellers are looking towards 
the California cap-and-trade scheme as a market 
for pre-compliance REDD credits, with eyes still 
remaining on the WCI as a whole, albeit a little 
more hesitantly due to the uncertainty over dif-
ferent levels of participation by different states. 
California’s Climate Action Reserve (CAR) doesn’t 
have a REDD standard at the moment, but there 
are agreements in place to develop sectoral REDD 
crediting in Mexico and Brazil, meaning that REDD 
pre-compliance projects could feel a push from 
these two countries alone.
Indeed, this dynamic could shift the regional fo-
cus of credit origins over the coming years. As of 
2010, the USA dominated the location of credit 
origins,  but as more and more large-scale REDD 
projects begin issuing, the voluntary market will 
have a greater focus on the global South, for the 
obvious reason that most of the world’s tropical 
forests are located in these regions.
Then there’s California’s effect on the methodolo-
gies. Pre-compliance buyers focussed heavily on 
landfill methane in 2010, transacting 16% of the 
market share – the second highest. While landfill 
While use of consolidated standards, 
registries and exchanges within devel-
oping countries can grow the domestic 
voluntary carbon market, the establish-
ment of a centralised registry will  
ensure there is global linkage.
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methane will no doubt remain high for the precise 
reason that it is pre-compliance, the CAR’s approv-
al of four methodologies will mean that the volun-
tary market is likely to see a rise in CAR-approved 
methodologies, notably O3 depleting substances 
and livestock methane.
With regard to standards and scale, the growth 
in REDD is already having – and will continue to 
have – an impact on the market share of particular 
standards and on the scale of projects. As soon as 
VCS developed a REDD methodology, the market 
share of VCS credits increased drastically, whilst 
the average size of projects jumped upwards due 
to the sudden presence of a relatively small num-
ber of projects storing huge volumes of carbon. 
This trend is likely to continue to bolster the posi-
tion of VCS as a market leader and also to help 
in the effort to scale up the size of the voluntary 
market.
Volume
Turning now to the total volume in the global 
market, an estimate of voluntary credits that do 
not achieve successful validation and registration 
in the CDM pipeline can give a ball park figure of 
supply: with an estimate of the drop-out rate from 
the CDM pipeline of 10% for all projects expected 
in the pipeline until 2020, 1.13 billion tonnes of 
CO2e would be generated by 2020 for entry into 
voluntary schemes, assuming CDM continues and 
all such projects are implemented and can be vali-
dated for a voluntary standard.
Table 1. Description of figures for a ball park 
figure of voluntary credits from CDM pipeline 
(UNEP Risoe 2011)
Description Quantity  
(billion tCO2e)
a   Annual volume of po-
tential CERs from CDM 
Pipeline under validation 
(as of September 2011)
0 40
b   Estimated addition of 
average annual volume 
of potential CERs from 
CDM Pipeline under 
validation (until 2020) – 
based on past trends
0 16
c   Estimated total volume 
of carbon credits in the 
CDM pipeline (by 2020)
11 31
d   Assumed CDM drop-out 
rate
10%
e   Estimated share of 
voluntary carbon credits 
(by 2020)
1 13
The Ecosystem Marketplace annual report pre-
dicts (Peters-Stanley, et al. 2011) that the voluntary 
market will grow to 1.6 billion tCO2e in 2020. This 
would require a significant step-change in the vol-
untary markets’ share of the global carbon markets. 
Voluntary markets transacted 2% of the volume 
in compliance markets in 2010 (Peters-Stanley, 
et al. 2011). We assume that 2% is also the vol-
untary market’s share of the global REDD market 
and that this figure does not grow by 2020, and 
we use a mid-range, mid-term estimate of globally 
available supply of REDD-based reductions of 5.5 
billion tCO2e in 2020 (Madeira, Coren and Streck 
2010), then a quick back of the envelope calcu-
lation shows that 2% of this 5.5 billion tCO2e is 
0.11 billion tCO2e (c in Table 2). This 0.11 billion 
tCO2e, equates to 6.9% (d in Table 2) of 1.6 billion 
tCO2e, the projected size of the voluntary market 
in 2020.
The majority of REDD projects will  
continue to be voluntary and market-
based, and given the relatively higher 
opportunity costs of land use in voluntary 
market REDD projects, this will undoubt-
edly result in a lower uptake of REDD 
projects.
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Table 2. Description of figures for a back of the 
envelope calculation of total volume in the vol-
untary market
Description Quantity  
(billion tCO2e)
a   Size of global voluntary 
market in 2020
1 6
b   Size of global REDD 
market in 2020
5 5
c   Voluntary market’s 
share of REDD market 
in 2020
0 11 (2%)
d   REDD’s share of volun-
tary market in 2020
6 9%  
If only 6.9% of the 2020 supply for the voluntary 
sector will come from REDD, the sector projected 
to grow the most, it begs the question of where the 
rest of the supply will come from. One option, and 
perhaps the most apparent, is to shift the share 
of global carbon markets dramatically in favour of 
the voluntary sector, thus growing the voluntary 
market’s share not just in absolute but also in rela-
tive terms. 
Conclusion
REDD will no doubt dominate the market in years 
to come due to the large scale of emissions reduc-
tions achievable by REDD projects. Activity in the 
pre-compliance market should also increase, but 
excitement here should be tempered by the real-
ity that a compliance market in REDD is still un-
certain, no methodologies have yet been approved, 
nor have any limits been placed on REDD offsetting 
so as to avoid flooding of the compliance market.
Nonetheless, action directed by developers in Cali-
fornia will be the area to watch, and whilst other 
sectors approved by CAR will begin to rise in the 
pre-compliance market – such as O3 depleting 
and livestock methane – the potential inclusion of 
REDD in this scheme and its anticipated growth 
as a solely voluntary project, irrespective of pre-
compliance projects, is likely to begin to shift the 
standards and methodologies used, and the domi-
nance of the USA as the country of credit origin, 
towards REDD.
It seems that the future of the carbon markets will 
continue to be shaped by the voluntary markets 
through their influence on standards, method-
ologies and technical infrastructure. As this con-
tinues, developing countries may adopt existing 
voluntary standards for domestic compliance re-
gimes, whilst existing stakeholders at varying lev-
els may consider consolidating existing standards 
with a view to centralising not only standards, 
but also their technical infrastructure, such as the 
Excitement here should be tempered by 
the reality that a compliance market in 
REDD is still uncertain, no methodologies 
have yet been approved, nor have any 
limits been placed on REDD offsetting so 
as to avoid flooding of the compliance 
market.
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registries. Indeed centralisation of infrastructure 
becomes increasingly important in order to avoid 
double counting. 
Furthermore, as activity in the voluntary market 
sector continues to grow in the coming years, it will 
not only need to increase in absolute levels but also 
to shift its contribution to the global carbon mar-
kets in favour of the voluntary sector, particularly 
if it hopes to contribute to emerging market mecha-
nisms. 
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Sectoral Approaches as a Way  
Forward for the Carbon Market?
Abstract
For almost ten years now, there has been a 
discussion on how to scale up the project-based 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or comple-
ment it with new carbon market mechanisms  
This article aims to analyse to what extent the 
proposed new mechanisms do actually hold out 
the promise of improving and going beyond the 
current CDM  The article first considers how the 
new mechanisms would be defined and would op-
erate based on the current status of discussions  
Secondly, it analyses the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of the new mechanisms  Key ques-
tions in this respect are how robustly emission 
reductions could be quantified under the new 
mechanisms, what incentives the new mecha-
nisms would provide for reducing emissions, and 
which sectors and countries would in practice be 
capable of and appropriate for employing the new 
mechanisms 
Introduction
For almost ten years now, there has been a discus-
sion on how to scale up the project-based Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) or complement it 
with new carbon market mechanisms. The Euro-
pean Union even has the stated aim of completely 
phasing out the CDM in more advanced developing 
countries and instead move to sectoral approach-
es. This discussion is driven by the perceived 
weaknesses of the CDM regarding additionality, 
sectoral and geographical coverage and scale. 
While this discussion was at first mainly academic, 
in 2005 it entered the political negotiations and 
ultimately led to the decision of the Conference 
of the Parties serving as a Meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in Montréal in 2005 
to allow Programmes of Activities (PoAs) in the 
CDM. PoAs offer the opportunity to aggregate high 
numbers of small-scale decentralised activities 
into larger projects. At the same time, though, the 
conference also decided not to allow policies and 
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Table 1: Types of Mechanisms 
What Objective Who
Programmatic CDM Aggregation of many/
all possible activities in 
a sector or sub-sector, 
initiated by political or 
similar actor
Assisting Annex I countries in 
achieving targets cost-efficient-
ly, contributing to sustainable 
development of host country
Private entities, 
governments
Standardised Base-
lines, ‘Sectoral CDM’
Setting a baseline for 
all installations or 
activities in a sector or 
sub-sector in a country 
Assisting Annex I countries in 
achieving targets cost-efficient-
ly, contributing to sustainable 
development of host country
Private entities, 
governments
Sectoral Crediting Decoupled from specif-
ic activities, credits are 
awarded if emissions 
from a sector are kept 
below a pre-defined 
level
Achieving large-scale net emis-
sion reductions in developing 
countries in the context of 
sustainable development, and 
assisting Annex I countries in 
achieving targets cost-efficiently
Governments, 
private entities?
Sectoral Trading Decoupled from specif-
ic activities or policies, 
allowances are issued 
ex ante based on a 
sectoral target, with 
penalty for missing 
target
Achieving large-scale net emis-
sion reductions in developing 
countries in the context of 
sustainable development, and 
assisting Annex I countries in 
achieving targets cost-efficiently
Governments, 
(private enti-
ties?)
NAMA Crediting Crediting of specific 
NAMAs or based on 
sectoral thresholds
Achieving large-scale net emis-
sion reductions in developing 
countries in the context of 
sustainable development, and 
assisting Annex I countries in 
achieving targets cost-efficiently
Governments, 
(private enti-
ties?)
standards under the CDM, which had been one of 
the focus areas of the discussion thus far.
The topic was taken up again in the negotiations 
for a future climate agreement that was also start-
ed in Montréal. In particular industrialised coun-
tries are pushing for the creation of new carbon 
market mechanisms, and three main proposals 
have been put on the table: sectoral crediting (of-
ten also referred to as sectoral no-lose targets), 
sectoral cap-and-trade trading, and crediting of 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 
taken by developing countries. In addition to this 
top-down negotiation process under the UNFCCC, 
analysts are also considering the potential of PoAs 
and standardised baselines under the CDM to 
serve as a stepping stone to sectoral approaches.
This article aims to analyse to what extent the 
proposed new mechanisms actually hold out the 
promise of improving and going beyond the cur-
rent CDM. The article first considers how the new 
mechanisms would be defined and would operate 
based on the current status of the discussions. Sec-
ondly, it analyses the possible advantages and dis-
advantages of the new mechanisms. Key questions 
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in this respect are how robustly emission reduc-
tions could be quantified under the new mecha-
nisms, what incentives the new mechanisms would 
provide for reducing emissions, and which sectors 
and countries would in practice be capable of and 
appropriate for employing the new mechanisms. 
Defining Sectoral Approaches
Sectoral approaches have been discussed for al-
most ten years now in the hope that they will be 
able to deal with some of the shortcomings of the 
current CDM and allow for larger-scale emission 
reductions. However, a wide variety of concepts 
and definitions have emerged, with some concepts 
being the same as others but using a different la-
bel, and others using the same labels but refer-
ring to different concepts (for the early discussion 
where most of the key concepts were coined, see 
e.g. Samaniago and Figueres 2002; Bodansky et 
al. 2004; Cosbey et al. 2005; Bosi and Ellis 2005; 
Schmidt et al. 2006; Sterk and Wittneben 2006). 
Based on the ongoing discussions in the literature 
and the negotiations (see e.g. UNFCCC 2011), five 
basic types of mechanisms or proposed mecha-
nisms to address the sectoral level can be distin-
guished, as illustrated in Table 1.
As noted in the introduction, PoAs were in fact an 
interim outcome of the discussion on sectoral ap-
proaches. Under a PoA, an unlimited number of 
projects – CDM programme activities (CPAs) – can 
be implemented and added to the PoA at any time 
over the lifetime of the programme. The individual 
CPAs are not subject to the same lengthy CDM pro-
cesses as individual CDM projects. These stream-
lined processes are intended to reduce transaction 
costs and promote dispersed small-scale activities 
such as end-use renewable energy and energy ef-
ficiency projects.
In addition, PoAs may consist of concrete actions 
to implement policy goals, making it possible to 
fill the gap between the project and policy levels. 
Governments themselves may be PoA coordina-
tors and directly coordinate activities under their 
policy framework. The potential is illustrated by 
a government-led PoA in India which aims at the 
large-scale distribution of compact fluorescent 
lamps. The PoA is coordinated by the Indian Bu-
reau of Energy Efficiency, which has the task of ac-
celerating market transformation towards energy-
efficient appliances (Castro et al. 2011).
A recent study by Puhl et al. (2011) delves further 
into the possibility of scaling up PoAs. The study 
analyses four specific PoAs and shows how they 
might be scaled up to NAMAs. The authors stress 
that the streamlined PoA procedures lower trans-
action costs, shorten the time to market for carbon 
credits, allow for scalability and reduce the risks 
of non-registration. This in turn facilitates carbon 
finance and increases bankability. In addition, by 
designing a NAMA through scaling up an existing 
PoA, one can use existing technical expertise in 
design, implementation and measuring, reporting 
and verification (MRV), as well as government pro-
cedures. The study finds that PoA elements can 
indeed be useful as building blocks for NAMAs, 
in particular for defining eligible activities, base-
lines and MRV provisions, and that scalability is 
especially good if a PoA is based on standardised 
parameters and closely integrated with domestic 
policies. However, the study also notes that real-
life experience with PoAs is still very limited.
Another approach that is based on the existing 
CDM is to establish standardised baselines, this 
If a standardised baseline has low 
stringency, non-additional projects are able 
to claim credits, while with high stringency 
no projects may be feasible.
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sometimes being referred to as ‘sectoral CDM’. 
For example, Amatayakul and Fenhann (2009) 
propose a scheme based on a national CO2 emis-
sion intensity standard (gCO2/kWh) for new pow-
er plants. The climate conference in Cancún au-
thorised the further development of standardised 
baselines. While standardisation has been present 
in CDM methodologies for some time already, for 
example in the form of grid and fuel emission fac-
tors, as in the case of PoAs it is still too early to 
see how far this approach can go. Butzengeiger-
Geyer et al. (2010) note that standardised base-
lines are most feasible in homogeneous sectors 
with similar technologies. Even in sectors which 
are often seen as relatively homogeneous, such 
as cement, various technologies are in use, and 
emissions are also influenced by factors such as 
the quality of raw materials. They also note the 
difficulty of hitting the ‘right’ baseline level. If a 
standardised baseline has low stringency, non-
additional projects are able to claim credits, while 
with high stringency no projects may be feasible. 
In addition to these initiatives to scale up the 
CDM, the UNFCCC negotiations have mainly re-
volved around three proposals for new mecha-
nisms: sectoral crediting, sectoral trading and 
NAMA crediting (see e.g. Parties’ submissions in 
UNFCCC 2011). 
Sectoral crediting would be based on an agreed 
emissions threshold or ‘no-lose target’ at the 
sectoral level. That is, countries would agree on 
a level of emissions for a sector. This threshold 
could either use absolute emissions or be intensi-
ty-based, for example, using emissions per unit of 
GDP, emissions per unit of electricity generated, 
etc. The developing country could then undertake 
actions to reduce its emissions to the agreed lev-
el, either unilaterally or with some international 
support. If emissions are reduced below the tar-
get, the developing country would receive credits. 
If the target is not achieved, there would be no 
penalties.
By contrast, sectoral trading would follow the cap-
and-trade approach. The sectoral target would be a 
mandatory cap, and the developing country would 
receive tradable units ex ante, essentially equiva-
lent to the assigned amount units (AAUs) industri-
alised countries receive under the Kyoto Protocol. 
If the country manages to reduce its emissions be-
low its target, it would thereby achieve a surplus 
of trading units which it could sell. If the country 
does not achieve its sectoral target, it would need 
to buy trading units to cover the shortfall. 
As for NAMAs, from the negotiations so far it ap-
pears that these will be defined very broadly to in-
clude any type of action that reduces emissions, 
from specific investments to national policies 
such as financial incentive schemes or regulations. 
The proposal to credit NAMAs therefore initially 
seemed to be related to earlier discussions about 
allowing the crediting of policies under the CDM. 
However, in most submissions of Parties the pro-
posal for crediting NAMAs is hardly different from 
the proposals for sectoral crediting and trading. A 
country might implement individual NAMAs such 
as financial incentives or regulations, but credit-
ing and trading would take place on the basis of 
a sectoral emissions threshold. One exception is 
South Korea, which in its recent submission does 
mention crediting individual NAMAs. South Korea 
distinguishes NAMAs where emission reductions 
can be measured more or less easily, and proposes 
to use ‘success indicators’ as a basis for crediting 
in the latter case. For example, credits might be 
issued on the basis of the percentage of energy-ef-
ficient appliances or the average carbon intensity 
of the vehicle fleet.
Among all these existing and proposed mecha-
nisms to scale up the carbon market to the sectoral 
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level, a basic distinction can be made between ap-
proaches which retain the activity-based character 
of the CDM but use sectoral instruments, namely 
programmatic CDM and standardised baselines, 
and approaches that aim at the performance of a 
sector as a whole, namely sectoral crediting, secto-
ral trading and NAMA crediting. These approaches 
will only become possible under the UNFCCC if 
Parties manage to achieve a consensus in the cur-
rent negotiations.
Given the limitations of space, and since all activity-
based approaches are possible and indeed already 
being implemented under the current CDM, the fol-
lowing discussion will focus on the proposals for 
creating entirely new sector-wide mechanisms.
Potential Advantages and Disadvantag-
es of Sectoral Mechanisms
In the discussion about new mechanisms, four 
main advantages are mentioned:
 • Scaled-up mechanisms are supposed to mobilise 
carbon finance on a much larger scale than so far.
 • It is hoped that at an aggregate level the new 
mechanisms will be better able to reach sectors 
the CDM has so far hardly tapped, especially 
transport and buildings.
 • The new mechanisms are supposed to give in-
centives to developing countries to implement 
climate-friendly policies.
 • Finally, it is hoped that at an aggregate level the 
mechanisms will be more environmentally robust 
than the project-by-project approach of the CDM.
The first three points essentially relate to the in-
centive structure that the new mechanisms would 
provide. The second point also relates to the ap-
proach to quantifying emission reductions, as MRV 
has been one important reason why implementing 
the CDM has so far been difficult in the transport 
and building sectors. The following will therefore 
discuss the incentive structures and MRV aspects 
of the proposed new mechanisms. A third factor 
that is important for points 1 and 2 is which sec-
tors and countries would actually be able to make 
use of new mechanisms.
Incentives for Sector-Wide Emission 
Reductions
If implemented successfully, the proposed new 
mechanisms at sectoral level would by definition 
set incentives for sector-wide transformations in 
developing countries. Years ago authors were al-
ready arguing that sectoral approaches might spe-
cifically give a major boost to decentralised small-
scale renewable energy and energy-efficiency 
activities or make it possible to implement fuel ef-
ficiency standards or comprehensive traffic man-
agement (Browne et al. 2005; Figueres 2005). This 
argument has been taken up again in recent years, 
for example, by Schneider and Cames (2009). 
Sectoral approaches would operate at the govern-
ment level, at least in the first instance, as private 
entities can hardly take responsibility for entire 
sectors. This would introduce an intermediary 
(the developing country governments) between the 
carbon market and those who actually undertake 
the investments. It would therefore be necessary 
for developing country governments to implement 
appropriate policies to pass the incentive on to 
investors or those affected by the policies. As an 
alternative to governments implementing policies, 
sectoral mechanisms may also be devolved to the 
installation level. These two cases of operation, 
government level and installation level, will there-
fore be discussed in turn.
In principle, operation at the government level need 
not be a barrier to achieving substantial emission 
reductions. Governments have a broad arsenal of 
policy tools at their disposal which they could use 
to reduce sectoral emissions below the baselines, 
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such as taxes, financial incentives, standards or 
infrastructure investments. Dransfeld et al. (2011) 
discuss nine possible configurations of how to use 
government policies and measures to pass the car-
bon price incentive on to private entities. 
Nevertheless, the International Emissions Trad-
ing Association (IETA) is highly sceptical of gov-
ernment-level mechanisms. IETA (2010) highlights 
three key risks:
 • Implementation risk: the risk that the develop-
ing country fails adequately to implement or en-
force emission reduction policies and measures 
due to insufficient capacity, negligence, or insti-
tutional inertia; 
 • Default risk: the risk that, after issuance, the 
developing country fails to honour emission re-
duction purchase agreements into which it has 
entered; and  
 • Performance risk: the risk that the policies and 
measures used, despite being fully implemented 
and well enforced, fail to deliver the expected 
reductions.
IETA also cautions that the risks of government-op-
erated mechanisms may be too high for buyers to 
be willing to provide upfront financing. IETA con-
cedes that this option may nevertheless be the most 
attractive for developing country governments that 
prefer centralised control of their economy and 
have sufficient capital available domestically.
In addition, it may be questioned whether emis-
sion trading mechanisms would in fact constitute 
a strong incentive for governments to implement 
ambitious emission reduction policies and meas-
ures. The reliability of funding under crediting 
mechanisms is characterised by significant struc-
tural limitations related to the high levels of risk 
and uncertainty at various stages, relatively high 
transaction costs and complexity, and the timing 
of credit generation. Especially in developing coun-
tries, the financing need is most acute before the 
start of implementation. Emission credits, however, 
are only generated when emission reductions have 
already been achieved. In addition, the carbon rev-
enue is subject to high risks. Ex ante, participants 
cannot be sure whether their project will be regis-
tered, whether it will actually achieve the expected 
amount of emission reductions and what price they 
will receive for the credits. Some critics claim that 
for these reasons the CDM is in fact hardly ever a 
make-or-break factor when deciding to proceed 
with a project and that this has been confirmed by 
project developers themselves (Haya 2009).
The sectoral trading proposal has been put for-
ward as a solution to the upfront financing prob-
lem: if governments received trading units ex ante, 
they would be able to sell some of them and use 
the resulting revenues to finance their policies. 
However, governments may only wish to do this 
if they can be very sure that the planned policies 
will in fact be able to deliver the expected reduc-
tions, as otherwise they would ultimately need to 
buy back the trading units they had sold initially.
Due to these factors, Ward et al. (2008, p.71) ques-
tion whether sectoral mechanisms would in fact 
provide a strong incentive for developing countries 
to implement climate-friendly policies: ‘As govern-
ments are not investing in policies and measures 
to speculate in carbon markets, the volatility of 
carbon credits may be a serious problem for gov-
ernments.’ This limitation could probably only be 
overcome if Annex I countries were willing to pro-
vide significant amounts of upfront financing. 
The proposed new mechanisms at 
sectoral level would by definition set  
incentives for sector-wide trans-
formations in developing countries.
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If a sectoral mechanism is broken down to the in-
stallation level, installation owners have a direct 
incentive to reduce emissions as long as their 
abatement costs are lower than the price of car-
bon. While not explicitly envisaged in the negotia-
tion texts, not only sectoral trading but also sec-
toral crediting mechanisms could be broken down 
to the installation level (Marcu 2009). The process 
would be similar to an allocation in a cap-and-
trade system, but instead of allowances, each in-
stallation would be given a crediting baseline. The 
regulatory risk would be much lower than under 
the CDM as there would be no issue of eligibility. 
Due to the low regulatory risks, top-down credit-
ing at the installation level might even be able to 
actually drive financing decisions.
However, crediting individual installations on the 
basis of a sectoral target raises the question of 
how to handle a situation where individual installa-
tions reduce their emissions below their baselines, 
but the sector as a whole does not. If installations 
that reduce emissions ran the risk of not being re-
warded because of the failures of others, the sys-
tem would hardly provide an incentive to reduce 
emissions. The crediting of individual installations 
would therefore need to be decoupled from the 
performance of the sector as a whole. One option 
would be for the government to buy trading units 
to make up for any shortfall that may exist. Other 
options, which would probably be politically more 
acceptable to developing countries, would be to 
hold back a share of the credits issued to form a 
reserve, or to make the installation-level baselines 
mandatory, with penalties attached (Baron, Buch-
ner and Ellis 2009; Helme et al. 2010; Marcu 2009).
Sectoral trading in the form of cap-and-trade at in-
stallation level would further simplify issues. As 
units are issued ex ante, they could be traded un-
der standardised contracts. This would probably 
result in exchange-based trading, which would fur-
ther facilitate the operation of the mechanism. En-
tities could manage their allowances as assets and 
sell them whenever they liked, rather than having 
to wait for the ex-post assessment of their perfor-
mance. However, for most developing countries 
the adoption of binding sectoral caps is probably 
still far away (Marcu 2009).
A final question related to the strength of the in-
centive is the price credits would fetch, which 
depends on the balance between supply and de-
mand. Given the uncertainty about the future cli-
mate regime, any estimates are rather speculative. 
Nevertheless, given that industrialised countries’ 
emission reduction pledges are currently rather 
weak, any demand for credits could conceivably by 
met by the project-based CDM.
Environmental Integrity
The proposed new mechanisms imply establish-
ing the baselines or targets at an aggregate level 
instead of for specific activities. They would thus 
have the advantage of removing the necessity to 
determine the additionality of individual invest-
ment decisions. However, sectoral approaches also 
pose new challenges for baseline-setting. 
The quantification of emission reductions at ag-
gregate levels would have to rely on modelling and 
projections, which always possess a degree of un-
certainty. Baseline projections need to be based on 
assumptions about the future impact of current 
policies, the development and penetration of tech-
nologies and the development of economic activity. 
Crediting individual installations on 
the basis of a sectoral target raises the 
question of how to handle a situation 
where individual installations reduce their 
emissions below their baselines, but the 
sector as a whole does not.
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Uncertainties are likely to be especially great for 
countries that are growing rapidly and where the 
GHG-intensity of production can vary significantly 
over the period of the baseline projection, either 
through technology choice or technology develop-
ments. Also, many developing country economies 
rely heavily on manufacturing and commodities, 
which are more sensitive to economic fluctuations 
than service sectors. Growth rates are therefore 
more variable and difficult to predict in developing 
than in industrialised countries (Helme et al. 2010). 
Ellis and Moarif (2009) highlight an example from 
China, where in 2000 the IEA projected electric-
ity generation of 1.5 trillion kWh in 2005, whereas 
actual generation in 2005 ended up at 2.5 trillion 
kWh. 
Schneider and Cames (2009) discuss in detail the 
practical challenges associated with establishing 
reliable baselines. As it is not possible to verify 
assumptions on key emission drivers such as fu-
ture economic growth and fuel prices, it may not 
be possible to assess proposed baselines purely on 
technical grounds and in an objective manner. One 
key political risk is that countries have an incen-
tive to inflate their baselines in order to weaken 
the level of effort they have to make.
These problems can be avoided to a certain extent 
by using intensity targets, for example, in the form 
of emissions per unit of GDP, per unit of electric-
ity produced etc. Changes in these key drivers of 
emissions would then be factored into the base-
line. Intensity targets would probably also be more 
palatable to developing countries, as there would 
be no danger that the targets might become a ‘cap 
on growth’. The disadvantage is that absolute tar-
gets provide certainty regarding environmental 
outcomes, whereas intensity targets do not.
Overall, it is not yet clear whether baselines at ag-
gregate levels would be more reliable than project-
by-project additionality testing. The experience of 
the EU ETS, the first large-scale real-case sectoral 
approach, also gives cause for caution. In its first 
trading phase from 2005 to 2007, the EU ETS was 
substantially oversupplied, in part due to faulty 
baseline data. The second trading phase is also 
set to be substantially oversupplied due to the im-
pacts of the financial crisis. 
Further complexities would arise if the scope of 
crediting NAMAs did include the crediting of indi-
vidual actions. Specific actions can in principle be 
of two types, either specific investments or poli-
cies. Specific investments can be credited through 
the CDM, so in principle no new mechanism seems 
necessary to allow crediting of this type of NAMA. 
The possibility to measure, report and verify the 
implementation and impact of policies varies 
from case to case. In the case of a policy involv-
ing a renewable electricity feed-in tariff, one can 
straightforwardly count each kWh that benefits 
from the tariff and multiply the total by the re-
spective grid’s average emission factor. By con-
trast, while it is possible to determine whether a 
vehicle efficiency standard has been introduced 
and to measure whether transport emissions are 
declining, it is difficult to determine to what ex-
tent the decline of emissions is attributable to the 
policy rather than to other impacts, such as chang-
ing fuel prices. Further complexities would arise 
if governments implemented several overlapping 
policy-based NAMAs, for example, NAMAs tackling 
electricity supply and demand.
If policies are supposed to be incentivised through 
the carbon market, in many cases it may therefore 
be more straightforward to use a sector-wide ap-
proach, rather than try to pinpoint the reductions 
achieved specifically by a certain individual policy. 
This points back to the proposals which essential-
ly envisage NAMA crediting as sectoral crediting 
or sectoral trading.
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The Viability of Sectoral Mechanisms for 
Specific Countries and Sectors
The complexity of the proposed new mechanisms 
gives rise to the question of which countries would 
actually be able to make use of them. On the one 
hand, poorer countries might find it easier and 
cheaper to implement policies and measures than 
to try and attract individual investment projects. 
On the other hand, given the amounts of techni-
cal capacity and data required, it can be expected 
that only the most advanced developing countries 
would be able to make sectoral mechanisms work. 
In addition, sectoral mechanisms may not be ap-
propriate for every sector. Helme et al. (2010) ex-
amine the electricity, iron and steel, and cement 
sectors in Brazil, China and Mexico. They find 
significant limitations in data availability and, in 
some cases, host country administrative capaci-
ties, a wide range of efficiency performance across 
firms in the same sector in some countries – from 
world class installations to highly outdated ones 
– substantial administrative and policy barriers 
to the implementation of even low-cost mitiga-
tion opportunities in some cases, and weaknesses 
in the financial infrastructure needed to finance 
investments. Serious data gaps and uncertainties 
about projections became apparent, in particular 
in China, the world’s largest emitter. 
In a similar exercise, Butzengeiger-Geyer et al. 
(2010) examine six economic sectors in nine non-
Annex I countries. Importantly, they find that most 
sectors in most countries are actually too small to 
warrant a sectoral approach. In most cases there 
are only a handful of installations, so a sectoral 
approach would have no advantage compared to 
the project-based CDM. Among the nine countries, 
generally only China and India have industrial sec-
tors that are large enough to warrant sectoral ap-
proaches. However, here the problem is that the 
sectors usually consist of very efficient large in-
stallations on the one hand and large numbers of 
very inefficient small installations on the other. 
Effectively addressing emissions would mean in-
cluding these small installations in a sectoral ap-
proach. However, this would cause high costs for 
the monitoring and verification of emissions. 
Current Sectoral Market Initiatives in 
Developing Countries
While the UNFCCC negotiations to create new 
mechanisms are progressing very slowly, if at all, 
some non-Annex I countries are exploring options 
for domestic systems outside the UNFCCC frame-
work (Sterk and Mersmann 2011). South Korea is 
most advanced, having already started two small 
voluntary pilot trading systems, and it is current-
ly developing a ‘Greenhouse Gas & Energy Target 
Management System’ to ensure that the interna-
tionally pledged emissions reduction target of 30% 
below business as usual by 2020 will be met. The 
national target will be broken down to company 
level, and individual targets for the country’s 470 
largest emitters will be imposed. While this system 
will probably include only very little trading possi-
bilities, it is supposed to form the basis for a full-
fledged cap-and-trade emission trading system to 
start in 2015 (Reklev 2011a). 
China is currently envisaging developing several 
pilot systems at the city and provincial levels which 
are to form the basis for a national system that is 
to start in 2015. Pilot schemes are to be developed 
before 2013 and will be based on provincial energy 
consumption targets that are derived from the na-
tional energy consumption target of approximate-
ly four billion tonnes of standard coal in 2015. The 
designated provinces are currently envisaging very 
different design routes. For instance, Guangdong 
Sectoral mechanisms may not be 
appropriate for every sector.
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is likely to put in place a trading system based on 
absolute emission caps, while Tianjin and Beijing 
have indicated that their trading scheme might 
be based on energy saving credits (Reklev 2011b). 
China has also recently announced intentions to 
impose absolute caps on specific industries such 
as steel and cement and to establish carbon trad-
ing programmes on that basis (Reklev 2011c). 
Mexico’s National Strategy on Climate Change 
(ENAC) of 2007 inter alia envisaged the creation 
of a sectoral system for the oil and electricity sec-
tors with a view to the later integration of other 
sectors (Mexico 2007). However, the current Spe-
cial Climate Change Program 2009-2012 (PECC) 
does not mention cap-and-trade as an option to 
mitigate GHG emissions domestically (Mexico 
2008). Mexico’s Expression of Interest to the World 
Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness envisages 
the development of credited NAMAs on energy 
efficiency in housing, appliances and other end 
uses, methane destruction or use in solid waste 
disposal, improved cement blended production, 
and urban transport. Mexico envisages part of the 
financing for these NAMAs coming from crediting, 
but the ideas revolve around improving national 
regulation or establishing local projects rather 
than introducing an emission trading system (Mex-
ico 2011).
Looking at these initiatives, the question is if and 
how such domestic systems would interact with 
the UNFCCC system. As non-Annex I countries 
do not have legally binding caps, they also do not 
dispose of Kyoto-valid trading units which they 
could use to back up the trading units in their 
emission trading systems. To allow industrialised 
countries to purchase and use trading units from 
these systems, it would therefore be necessary to 
implement some form of certification of these sys-
tems under the UNFCCC. Interestingly, several of 
the recent UNFCCC submissions entertain the idea 
of such a decentralised system, as opposed to the 
centralised system of the CDM. The EU, Japan and 
Papa New Guinea envisage possibilities for both in 
their submissions, on the one hand a centralised 
model with a strong supervisory body, and on the 
other hand a more decentralised model, where the 
UNFCCC would define core rules, but host coun-
tries would have flexibility regarding the defini-
tion and functioning of the mechanism. Australia 
advocates a very flexible approach which would 
allow Parties to submit a broad range of market 
mechanisms under a ‘common framework’. Des 
Sepibus and Tuerk (2011) discuss various options 
for centralised and decentralised governance sys-
tems for new mechanisms.
Conclusions
Industrialised countries in particular have strong-
ly advocated introducing new emission trading 
mechanisms at the sectoral level. The expectation 
is that scaled-up mechanisms will be able to mo-
bilise carbon finance on a much larger scale than 
before, be better able to reach sectors the CDM has 
so far hardly tapped, give incentives to develop-
ing countries to implement climate-friendly poli-
cies, and be more environmentally robust than the 
project-by-project approach of the current CDM.
Sectoral approaches would by definition be bet-
ter suited than the CDM to achieving sector-wide 
transformations and might in particular give a 
boost to small-scale decentralised renewable ener-
gy, energy efficiency and transport projects. They 
would also remove the necessity for testing addi-
tionality on a project-by-project basis. 
Sectoral approaches would probably operate at the 
government level, at least in the first instance, as 
private entities can hardly take responsibility for 
a whole sector. Hence, these approaches would 
introduce an intermediary (the developing coun-
try governments) between the carbon market and 
those who actually undertake the investments. 
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As the carbon market has anyway had difficul-
ties so far in reaching some sectors such as the 
building or transport sector, sectoral approaches 
could potentially provide the necessary stimulus 
for developing country governments to introduce 
policies and measures such as building codes to 
redirect investments to these sectors. However, 
sectoral mechanisms would still retain the limita-
tions of the current CDM in terms of only receiving 
the revenue ex-post and not being able to predict 
accurately how much revenue will be received. De-
veloping countries would therefore need to pre-
finance sectoral schemes and run the risk of not 
being able to recoup their costs through emissions 
trading. These limitations could probably only be 
ameliorated if industrialised countries were will-
ing to finance a significant part of the costs up-
front.
For the energy and industry sectors, potentially 
sectoral schemes could immediately be devolved 
to the entity level through installation-level base-
lines or a domestic cap-and-trade emission trading 
system. Such installation-level schemes would give 
a direct incentive to companies to reduce emis-
sions. Since eligibility would not be an issue, reg-
ulatory uncertainty for investors would be much 
lower than under the current CDM.
However, the quantification of emissions and re-
ductions for sectoral approaches would have to 
rely on sectoral modelling and projections, which 
always possess a degree of uncertainty. Projec-
tions at an aggregate level may therefore be more 
reliable than project-by-project additionality test-
ing, but on the other hand they might be even 
more unreliable. The history of over-allocation 
in the EU ETS gives cause for caution in this re-
gard. It is therefore imperative to assess further 
the reliability of quantifying developing country 
reductions at the sectoral level before scaling up 
uncapped trading. 
The first studies to have examined the applicabil-
ity of sectoral mechanisms to specific countries 
and sectors have indeed found that data availabil-
ity and reliability is a serious constraint in many 
countries. They have also found that in many 
countries the relevant sectors comprise only a few 
installations so that there would not be a great 
advantage compared to the project-based CDM. 
At the other end of the spectrum China and India 
have large sectors, but these are very diverse, being 
composed of very modern large installations on 
the one hand and very small and inefficient ones 
on the other. Including these small installations in 
sectoral mechanisms would be recommendable in 
terms of achieving emission reductions but would 
substantially increase the effort necessary for data 
gathering and continuous monitoring.
One may therefore conclude that sectoral mecha-
nisms are interesting, but for most countries ac-
tual implementation will probably not be feasible 
before the middle of this decade, even in purely 
practical terms. Butzengeiger-Geyer et al. (2010) 
estimate that, once a mechanism has been agreed, 
developing detailed rules would take three to four 
years, while collecting data for baselines, agreeing 
on the baseline and establishing an MRV system 
would take at least another four years.
On the positive side, the Cancún Agreements and 
the ongoing process under the UNFCCC may pro-
vide the opportunity to address the data prob-
lems. Under the Agreements, developing countries 
have committed to submitting national communi-
cations including emission inventory reports every 
two years, while Annex I countries have pledged 
to provide 30 billion USD in fast-start financing 
until 2012 and to mobilise up to 100 billion USD 
Who is supposed to buy the hoped-for flood 
of credits from sectoral approaches? 
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per year jointly by 2020. Building the necessary 
capacity to measure, report and verify emissions 
reliably should be made one of the priority uses of 
this funding in the years to come. 
In addition, while for most developing countries 
sectoral mechanisms are probably a rather distant 
prospect, some countries such as China and South 
Korea are actively considering the introduction of 
domestic multi-sector emission trading systems. 
While it remains to be seen how quickly these 
schemes will actually develop and how robust they 
will be, Parties are already considering ways to ac-
commodate such bottom-up systems within the 
UNFCCC.
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future this will 
at best apply to a handful of developing coun-
tries. As an alternative to sectoral approaches, 
some analysts see substantial potential in scaling 
up the CDM through PoAs and standardised base-
lines. However, real-life experience with these in-
struments is still limited, so it remains to be seen 
whether they can indeed become stepping stones 
towards comprehensive sectoral approaches. Oth-
er analysts point out that even sectors such as ce-
ment are not as homogenous as has sometimes 
been thought, so the challenge to develop stand-
ardised baselines on a sectoral scale may be al-
most as formidable as developing new sector-wide 
mechanisms. To cover all developing countries 
and sectors with adequate support mechanisms, 
substantial efforts should therefore also need to 
be invested in supporting comprehensive trans-
formational NAMAs through fund-based financing 
instruments.
A final question is who is supposed to buy the 
hoped-for flood of credits from sectoral approach-
es. Based on the currently rather low level of ambi-
tion reflected in industrialised countries’ targets, 
any demand for credits might easily be met by the 
existing project-based CDM. Making large-scale 
sectoral approaches work would therefore require 
substantially strengthened industrialised country 
targets.
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The Durban Outcome
A post 2012 Framework 
Approach for Green House Gas 
Markets
Abstract
Among the cornerstones of the climate regime 
that is emerging post-2012 are the new market 
mechanisms that will help developed countries 
meet their commitments, as well as provide devel-
oping countries with the opportunity to innovate 
and find new actions to contribute to the chal-
lenge of climate change  They are expected to dif-
fer from what we have used during the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in a number 
of ways  First, they will depart from the top-down 
only definition and approval by the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), and allow for 
far more innovation by all Parties in the 
design stage  Secondly, they are also likely to 
depart from the project-by-project approach of 
the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and JI 
(Joint Implementation), and cover broader sectors 
of the economy  Finally, an offset-only system is 
not expected to survive post-2012, since the need 
to go beyond that and achieve the next round of 
emission reductions will be an important char-
acteristic of any new mechanisms that emerge  
To conclude, there are many challenges, but also 
many opportunities, in designing and operational-
izing this new market architecture 
Andrei Marcu
Managing Partner, Cybelle 
Partnership
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Introduction
This paper will analyze the challenges involved in 
producing new market mechanisms that will allow 
the level of ambition that is emerging post-2012 
to be met, which must be much higher than in the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
paper offers the vision that we are moving into a 
world where a greater variety of actions will be de-
veloped, which will be healthy, as it will allow a mar-
ket place of ideas to emerge from which Parties can 
choose those that meet their local realities, from a 
top-down approach only to an approach that is both 
top-down and bottom-up.
At the same time, the paper discusses the frame-
work, and its governance, that will allow the chal-
lenge of trying to glue all these new approaches into 
a coherent system to be met, one that will ensure 
environmental integrity, that ‘a ton is a ton’, that 
units are fungible across systems and that we have a 
deep and liquid global market place, well regulated, 
that will be efficient and deliver environmental ob-
jectives. 
Finally some of the challenges of meeting the funda-
mental conditions that will make such an approach 
viable are discussed, such as providing predictable 
and transparent approaches for market intervention 
to ensure a well-functioning market place, technol-
ogy neutrality, going beyond simple offsetting, and 
providing the right incentives for all actors, includ-
ing the private sector, to participate.
Background
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) provided a complex, 
but orderly framework for the implementation of 
the UNFCCC, which was negotiated as part of the 
1992 Rio Conference. It essentially provided for 
targets (according to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities), timetables and the 
instruments to reach those targets. Markets, and 
the market mechanisms that the KP provided, were 
not always an obvious outcome of the Kyoto nego-
tiations, and only came in after heavy lobbying by 
some Parties, especially the United States.
Whatever else can be said about the KP, it cannot 
be denied that it provides a clear top-down model, 
one that has coherence and cohesion provided by 
the Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that formed the 
backbone of the KP accounting system and allowed 
for the further development of a nascent green-
house gas (GHG) market. The world was clearly 
divided between high income, high emission coun-
tries, which could use international emissions trad-
ing under Article 17, and low income, low emissions 
countries able to use the offset mechanisms of CDM 
and JI. 
The offset mechanisms provide revenue for devel-
oping countries to develop and have the ability to 
take on targets as points in the future, while the off-
sets allowed developed countries to meet their obli-
gations at a lower compliance cost.
The logical result of the KP was a two-layered GHG 
market architecture that was tied together by the 
offset mechanisms. One layer was Article 17 on 
trading in AAUs between Parties that were in Annex 
1.
Underneath Article 17 trading a second layer devel-
oped, as the EU introduced a Domestic Emissions 
Trading Scheme (DETS) to meet its KP obligations, 
allowing installations to trade with each internal EU 
compliance unit. There was the full expectation that 
other Annex 1 countries would follow suit and then 
link their DETS with the EU one. AAUs shadowed 
the internal EU compliance units, the EUAs, which 
allowed for KP accounting reconciliation.
CDM and JI sat in the middle and were accepted 
both for sovereign compliance under Article 17 and 
EU compliance under EU ETS. 
129 
It was a great disappointment when it became evi-
dent that, with the notable and laudable exception 
of New Zealand, no other developed countries de-
veloped their own DETS. Some came close, but the 
systems never became operational.
Post-Copenhagen and post-Cancun, as we approach 
the 2012 end of the KP First Commitment Period, 
defining a future for the GHG market becomes 
more critical. Substantial resources and energy 
have been poured into creating the market reality 
that exists today, systems and infrastructure built, 
lessons learned. All this must not be lost, and the 
post-2012 architecture will need to take into ac-
count not only the political and economic realities 
of the end of the first decade of the 21st century, 
but also what we have on the ground, and what we 
have learned over the last six years from a function-
ing GHG market.
Current GHG Market Situation
The GHG market developed on two pillars – the EU 
ETS and the two KP offset mechanisms, CDM and JI. 
However, a number of important lessons need to be 
learned and considered when we start thinking of a 
post-2012 GHG market.
The EU ETS started by learning much about the im-
portance of good fundamentals, such as baselines, 
banking from one period to another and registry 
security. It can be said that the EU ETS has gone 
through growing pains but has resulted in a well-
functioning market, one that responds to economic 
signals. The types of issues that we faced did not 
shake confidence in the concept, but were some-
times painful and were clearly exploited by some. 
The importance of good infrastructure and an ex-
perienced regulator with good and tested market 
practices must be the lesson learned.
A second reality is that the result of an incomplete 
KP, with major Parties staying out of the Protocol, 
was that ad hoc measures had to be applied to the 
EU ETS to try and adjust for this situation, and 
also to provide assistance in arriving at price that 
would drive GHG reduction measures at EU instal-
lations. The implementation of what are perceived 
to be ad hoc regulatory measures in a pure regula-
tory market has created a state of uncertainty and 
some lack of trust on the part of market partici-
pants.
While most of the time the market was driven by 
real market drivers such as the price of other en-
ergy commodities, the weather, economic growth 
and hydroelectric conditions, regulatory decisions 
also played an important part, maybe too much so.
Towards the end of the second ETS compliance pe-
riod, new EU legislation brought some questioning 
of the stability of the instrument in the long term. 
While unrealistic, this was to some degree driven 
by the unease in a market that had already been 
hurt by the financial crisis and the lack of response 
from other developed countries in establishing a 
price for carbon comparable to the EU ETS.
The lessons learned are the importance of good 
regulation, and of insuring that the national and 
international frameworks have enough flexibility 
to adapt to national changing international and na-
tional political circumstances. 
CDM and JI are not an afterthought, as they im-
pacted in a major way on the influence that mar-
kets exerted during these years on the climate 
change agenda, the image of markets and the sup-
ply-demand balance. Both extremes of the politi-
cal spectrum amplified and used questions about 
CDM to attack the very heart of the GHG market 
concept, which they disliked for more fundamen-
tal reasons, such as the transparency that markets 
bring to environmental compliance or opposition 
to markets in general. To some degree this was the 
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result of the questioning of the KP structure itself 
and changing economic and competitive positions 
over the past fifteen years. 
What CDM and JI has taught us, and what needs 
to be incorporated into future designs, is the need 
for a balance between economic incentives and 
environmental perfection, the need to provide in-
centives and unleash the entrepreneurial spirit to 
drive in GHG mitigation, the fact that pure offset-
ting is no longer an acceptable approach except 
for the least developed and most needy countries, 
and the importance of public support driven by 
simplicity and environmental credibility.
The Post-Cancun Agenda
The Conference of Parties (COP- 16) to the UNF-
CCC in Cancun decided to consider, at its seven-
teenth session in Durban, the establishment of one 
or more market mechanisms to enhance the cost 
effectiveness of the Convention. These new ap-
proaches are an important part of the Bali Road 
Map and an important element in the architecture 
that is emerging from the Long-term Cooperative 
Action (LCA) negotiations. 
This was not an easy decision, as some Parties saw 
the discussion on markets as undermining the 
very principles of the UNFCCC and felt that it was 
premature to enter into these negotiations in light 
of the lack of any serious mitigation commitments 
by developed countries. Those that supported the 
new market initiatives did not have the opportu-
nity to articulate detailed views during Cancun, 
with some thinking emerging in the submissions 
provided during 2011 in response to the Cancun 
mandate. 
Questions were raised about the contribution 
to the environment of the existing mechanisms. 
One additional and very relevant question was 
that of need for new market approaches given the 
perceived current oversupply and the unknown 
source of new demand. Indeed, why create new 
machinery if the product is not needed?
Parties should continue to support and improve 
existing mechanisms, learn from the experience 
gained from them and promote the development 
of new mechanisms. The three Kyoto Protocol 
mechanisms were built for the level of ambition 
of the Protocol. Meanwhile, the science is indicat-
ing that we need to ramp up that level of ambi-
tion with a target of 350 ppm. The agreements in 
Cancun point to an objective of 2 degrees Celsius, 
which, many feel, the current mechanisms effec-
tively cannot cope with on the required scale of 
collective effort. 
In addition, the required effort will need signifi-
cant resources. As the demand on scarce public 
resources increases, the use of market approaches 
can encourage effectiveness and efficiency, as well 
as harness the entrepreneurial innovations of the 
private sector.
Copenhagen, and then Cancun, seem to be offering 
the glimpse of a world that will be different from 
the Cartesian world in which we have been living 
since 1997. The lack of a binding international 
agreement that would allow for the continuation 
of the coherent KP double-layered market architec-
ture and the emergence of NAMAs as a developing 
country contribution to mitigation actions point to 
the emergence of a bottom-up approach. 
The lessons learned are the importance  
of good regulation, and of insuring that 
the national and international frameworks 
have enough flexibility to adapt to 
changing international and national 
political circumstances. 
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The development of new approaches for GHG mar-
kets has not progressed much at the international 
multilateral, regional, national or subnational lev-
els. What we see are tentative steps for the devel-
opment of national initiatives, which, however, 
due to the lack of a clear international framework, 
are moving independently. 
A number of initiatives, such as the World Bank’s 
Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), have 
emerged, which while not specifically wanting 
a coordination role - may end up filling that de-
mand as the need increases. There is a clear need 
to ensure that ideas that emerge can be fitted 
into a framework. That framework can be created 
to bring together national market initiatives and 
give them coherence, a development that will start 
through bilateral and small multilateral agree-
ments. Such an approach will take time and will 
lead, during this transition period, to a market 
that is not as efficient and effective as it could or 
should be and that will detract from its contribu-
tion to sustainable development.
The alternative is to put in place a framework un-
der which a credible market place of ideas can 
emerge, one that is flexible and decentralized, 
without compromising its environmental credibil-
ity.
The future market architecture also needs to find 
a way to reconcile the need to allow a number of 
potentially contradictory forces. 
 • An important priority is the desire to maintain a 
tight control over the quality and environmental 
integrity of any units that are used to meet com-
mitments under any post-2012 regime. Simple 
bilateral agreements, without any international 
quality control, do not meet this criterion.
 • Developing countries wish to be able to choose 
the type of mitigation actions that they find ac-
ceptable for their national circumstances and 
to choose how they define sustainable develop-
ment. 
 • There is a strong interest in also ensuring na-
tional control over low-cost abatement and how 
it is used.
 • The modalities of financing the mitigation ac-
tions of developing countries is another issue.
 • Good market functioning, smart regulation and 
transparency are seen as essential.
 • Allowing national characteristics to play an im-
portant role and the creation of a market place 
of ideas are also important characteristics of an 
outcome.
Cancun Agreement
Agreement was reached in Cancun on a number of 
topics that are important to reiterate. Under ‘Na-
tionally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 
by developing country Parties’, Cancun: 
61.  Also decides that internationally supported 
mitigation actions will be measured, reported 
and verified domestically and will be subject 
to international measurement, reporting and 
verification in accordance with guidelines to be 
developed under the Convention; 
62.  Further decides that domestically supported 
mitigation actions will be measured, reported 
and verified domestically in accordance with 
general guidelines to be developed under the 
Convention; 
Under ‘Various approaches, including opportuni-
ties for using markets, to enhance the cost-effec-
tiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, 
bearing in mind different circumstances of devel-
oped and developing countries’: 
80. Decides to consider the establishment, at its 
seventeenth session, of one or more market-based 
132 
mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, 
and to promote, mitigation actions, taking into ac-
count the following 
It is therefore envisaged that the new needs for 
mitigation efforts will lead to a number of new 
approaches/mechanisms that will be appropriate 
for the national circumstances of each country’s 
NAMAS
 • Some NAMAs could be financed through the sale 
of resulting reduction from market-based NA-
MAs as credits in international carbon markets 
(carbon market-financed NAMAs)
 • Some of the credits resulting from market-based 
NAMAs could be allowed by Parties for use in 
international markets. 
 • Which market-based NAMAs are allowed by Host 
Parties for use in international carbon markets 
is a matter of Party choice. 
Framework for Post-2012 GHG Markets
The current situation and future trends described 
above point to the need for an international frame-
work under the UNFCCC, which will allow a top-
down approach to coexist with a new bottom-up 
reality. Under this approach, the UNFCCC could 
define the framework under which market NAMAs 
are defined, to be used in the international GHG 
market and for UNFCCC compliance while allow-
ing a level of decentralization that meets the aspi-
rations of individual Parties.
Such a framework will contain a number of critical 
elements:
 • Market approaches that will be defined both top-
down and bottom-up.
 • A regulatory Board that will ensure coordination 
between all emerging market mechanisms.
 • A body that will play the role of a carbon bank 
to ensure that any intervention in the market is 
done in a predictable and transparent manner.
 • Market-based NAMAs will be adopted and imple-
mented by Parties from a menu of top-down and 
bottom-up defined NAMAs, on a voluntary basis 
by Parties, according to: 
 • The desire of Parties to make use of mecha-
nisms.
 • Parties meeting certain criteria that would 
qualify them to apply that particular type of 
NAMA – similar to qualifying for ET and JI T1 
and T2 under the current KP mechanisms.
 • Using low-cost abatement NAMAS for domes-
tic purposes and high abatement cost NAMAs 
for international markets is a strategy that 
ought to be considered, but the choice should 
remain a Party-driven choice.
At this stage, one can say that a number of op-
tions are being profiled, a relatively ‘loose’ ap-
proach, one under which there is no central re-
view and approval process, and where Parties 
provide information on what approaches they 
will use. The consistency and strictness would 
emerge through the willingness of the Parties to 
ensure their good behaviour in a voluntary way 
and their strong desire to ensure that they meet 
standards that are in line with the expectations of 
the global community.
At the other end of the spectrum, the internation-
al community would provide for the recognition 
and definition of a limited number of approaches. 
These new approaches would be defined interna-
tionally to a large degree, but would also allow for 
Parties to adapt some of their elements to local 
conditions. This is to ensure that there is strong 
environmental integrity and consistency in the 
units that emerge, especially as buyers wish to 
see a guarantee of quality and to avoid political 
pressure to allow less than solid systems to be ap-
proved. Some of the flexibility and innovativeness 
is sacrificed to ensure quality control.
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Finally, an intermediate approach seems to be on 
offer, one which creates a framework or proposal 
that would allow any new approach to be consid-
ered and vetted in a systematic way. This would, 
or could, combine the desire for flexibility with the 
desire for environmental integrity. Some would ar-
gue that political reality will get in the way of such 
a design and that the political pressure to approve 
approaches that are less than strict may become 
hard to resist at some point. In addition, those Par-
ties that have developed approaches that create 
the demand may not welcome the need to take the 
politically difficult decisions that would lead to the 
banning of some units from their markets. The bit-
ter debate over Qualitative Restrictions for CERs 
from HFC projects is much too recent for many.
Top-down Market Mechanisms will be defined and 
approved by the COP and can take two forms:
 • A specific, well-defined mechanism that can 
be applied by each country on a voluntary ba-
sis. Such a mechanism will be well defined and 
applied as is by each Party that is willing to do 
so. An example of such an approach could be a 
CDM-like mechanism.
 • A more general COP definition whereby the COP 
provides the general outline and protocols to 
ensure consistency and environmental integrity, 
but that allows flexibility for each Party to adapt 
it to its national circumstances. A sectoral credit-
ing mechanism, whereby each party defines how 
it will incentivize the participation of the private 
sector in its country could be a good illustration.
 • Potential top-down mechanisms. Some top-down 
mechanisms, like those mentioned below, have 
been extensively mentioned without ever being 
seriously elaborated in detail or tested in the 
field. 
 • Crediting approach. Under such a mechanism, at 
the end of the period, emissions from a defined 
area of the economy (subsector defined region-
ally, one sector, multi-sector etc) are compared 
to an ex-ante defined baseline. The quantity of 
emissions under the baseline will be credited. 
This could be a no-lose target, in that there will 
be no consequences for emitting above the de-
fined baseline. There will have to be significant 
flexibility for national approaches regarding 
how such an approach is implemented, while 
ensuring both consistency and environmental 
integrity.
 • Trading approach. Under such a mechanism, a 
cap (national, sectoral, subsectoral etc.) is de-
fined ex-ante. The allowances issued can be 
sold in the global market for emissions rights. If 
emissions at the end of the period are above the 
defined cap, then that party must purchase the 
equivalent number of emissions in the market. 
Flexibility will have to be provided to Parties on 
how they implement such an approach, taking 
into account national circumstances.
Bottom-up approach will emerge at the country 
level. Each country may innovate, and find new 
ways, to implement international market NAMAS 
that can meet its national circumstances.
Units created through these NAMAs could follow 
different national Protocols, and as such the com-
parability of these units (‘a ton is a ton’), will not 
be addressed without any international coordina-
tion.
One of the key conditions for the effectiveness 
and credibility of these new NAMAs is to ensure 
The alternative is to put in place a 
framework under which a credible 
market place of ideas can emerge, 
one that is flexible and decentralized, 
without compromising its environmental 
credibility.
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the environmental integrity and credibility of the 
whole system if the created units are to be used to 
meet developed country commitments.
In order to ensure a common protocol for issues 
such as addressing double counting, monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV), baseline defini-
tion, additionality etc. depending on the type of 
mechanism envisaged, the COP will have to approve 
standards, protocols etc. that will ensure that ‘a ton 
is a ton’. These NAMAs will have to be validated and 
accepted under international rules approved by the 
COP.
For both top-down and bottom-up approaches, the 
COP and its international regulator will approve the 
‘mechanism/system’ and not individual projects 
or activities that result in reductions. The interna-
tional level of regulation will play the role of defin-
ing the minimum conditions for the recognition of 
a market mechanism, and approve the mechanism 
itself. This will result in significant amount of flex-
ibility and decentralization.
Market Standard-Setting Board (MSSB) will be cre-
ated as a body under the COP and will be the global 
regulator for market approaches under the UNFC-
CC. The MSSB will: 
 • Administer and apply the standards that the COP 
develops. 
 • Administer the mechanisms that are created top-
down by the COP.
 • Provide guidelines for their implementation at 
the national level according to national circum-
stances of top-down developed mechanisms.
 • Examine new mechanisms that are emerging as 
NAMA market mechanisms to ensure that they 
meet COP-defined criteria and approve them for 
use by Parties
 • Define and recommend to the COP conversion 
factors to allow conversion from different based 
units resulting from different mechanisms to 
tons of CO2 equivalent.
 • The MSSB would play the critical role of SMART 
global market regulator to ensure coherence at 
the global level that must work hand-in-hand 
with the flexibility that Parties must develop in 
implementing measures that are nationally ap-
propriate. 
 • Provides for transparency and ensure that ‘a ton 
is a ton’.
Stimulating mitigation action across 
broad segments of the economy
Experience with CDM-type mechanisms has dis-
covered that they have stimulated action globally 
and directed flows of funds to mitigation actions. 
At the same time, the level of ambition that can be 
achieved under such mechanisms is limited, given 
the project-by-project approach and the need for 
complexity in the system to process a large quan-
tity of projects and ensure their environmental in-
tegrity.
The required mitigation actions need scaling up 
and must have the ability to influence changes 
that are material in the efforts to reach the levels 
of mitigation required by science. 
It is envisaged that such new market-based mecha-
nisms would cover broad sectors of the economy, 
possibly being at the intersection of one sector, 
multi-sector, or subsector with national and sub-
national sectors, etc.
The current situation and future trends 
described above point to the need for 
an international framework under the 
UNFCCC, which will allow a top-down 
approach to coexist with a new bottom-up 
reality.
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To facilitate environmental integrity, all actions 
would need to be reported within the context of 
a National GHG Inventory Report, applying the 
most recent International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Guidelines. Finally, how to define the cov-
ered sector of the economy will be the prerogative 
of the Party implementing the market-based ap-
proach.
Compliance and Reduction Objectives
Project-based mechanisms such as CDM lead to 
contractual-based compliance to deliver emissions 
reductions between two or more Parties, whether 
business and/or public bodies. National compli-
ance comes through the obligations of the Desig-
nated National Authorities (DNAs), but Parties take 
on no obligations to deliver and or monitor the de-
livery of reductions.
The new market-based approaches will require 
state actors to play an important role and, under 
either the crediting or trading type of mechanism, 
will have to have responsibility for compliance 
with reduction objectives.
The reduction objectives selected can be absolute 
or relative, this being the choice of the Party imple-
menting the market-based approach.
Reduction objectives can be:  
 • Non-Loose, where non-attainment does not lead 
to any penalties or obligations, OR 
 • Mandatory (such as under trading described in 
18a above), where allowances may need to be 
purchased to meet an agreed objective).
 • Meeting reduction objectives will be the obliga-
tion of the Party implementing the market-based 
approach.
To ensure environmental integrity, such reduction 
objectives could be guaranteed by an international 
institution (GEF, WB) or through the Green Fund. 
For purposes of illustration:
 • A party could implement a market-based ap-
proach in the form of a trading scheme.
 • As part of this approach, it would distribute al-
lowances ex-ante to the companies or installa-
tions covered, in a manner consistent with its 
national priorities and circumstances (grandfa-
thering, auctioning etc.).
 • These enterprises would sell the units in the in-
ternational market and then out to be short at 
the end of the compliance period.
 • The Party would then be responsible for ensur-
ing that the reduction objective is met by pur-
chasing credits in the international market.
 • Should it not be able to do so, it would under-
mine the environmental integrity of the ap-
proach globally.
 • An international institution (GEF, WG, Green 
Fund) could guarantee that a Party implement-
ing such an approach would be able to meet its 
target/objective.
Reduction objectives can be expressed in differ-
ent units depending on the type of market-based 
mechanism employed. For purposes of illustra-
tion:
 • GHG emissions trading, cap & trade-type mecha-
nisms would be expressed in tons of CO2.
 • Energy efficiency trading schemes could be ex-
pressed in other units. 
 • It would be the responsibility of the MSSB to es-
tablish protocols leading to exchange factors re-
sulting in conversion of all units to tons of CO2.
One of the key conditions for the effective-
ness and credibility of these new NAMAs is 
to ensure the environmental integrity and 
credibility of the whole system if the cre-
ated units are to be used to meet developed 
country commitments.
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Incentives for Business to Participate
The role of market-based approaches is to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness and to capture the 
entrepreneurial innovation of the business sec-
tor and stimulate direct flows of finance to clean 
energy and other such areas, where it would not 
otherwise flow.
The engagement and participation of the business 
sector, within the framework that is nationally ap-
propriate and defined by each Party, is critical.
The new market-based approaches will have to be 
designated such that they incentivize the partici-
pation of the business sector at both the national 
and international levels. They will have to ensure 
that individual enterprises have direct incentives 
to contribute to meet the objectives set by the Par-
ties in the market-based NAMAs.
Technology Neutrality
Market-based approaches will have to be defined 
by national priorities and circumstances.
Each Party will have its own technology preferenc-
es and priorities defined by, among other things, 
its expertise, natural resources and historical cir-
cumstances. Sustainable development criteria will 
be defined by each Party.
The criteria for recognizing the credits produced 
by NAMAs for use in the international market 
will be technology-neutral, allowing for new ideas 
and approaches to be developed in areas such as 
mitigation, developing new or maintaining exist-
ing sustainable development pathways and CO2 
absorption through natural or technologically in-
novative means.
Ensuring a Net Decrease in Emissions
Market-based reductions must generate real emis-
sions reductions, beyond offsetting. For this pur-
pose the baseline must be ambitious and go be-
yond business as usual.
In the case of crediting, for example, two baselines 
will have to be defined. 
 • One baseline will be for business-as-usual 
thresholds (BAUT) that will recognize the addi-
tionality of the approach.
 • The second will be the crediting threshold (CT), 
which will be lower than the BAU.
This will allow for developing country Parties to 
claim as their own contributions those emissions 
reductions that are between the BAU and the CT. 
Internationally generated and used carbon finance 
units would be between the ACTUAL emissions 
line and the CT. 
Capacity-building
The CDM and JI experience has shown the impor-
tance of capacity-building in implementing market 
based approaches.
This was seen in developing DNA capacity, Desig-
nated Operational Entity (DOE) non-Annex 1 basis 
capacity and the capacity of the business commu-
nity in both developed and developing countries.
The capacity of the regulator to address the issues 
it has faced has been more complex than expected 
and full use was not made of lessons learned from 
existing national and international regulatory re-
gimes and institutions.
The new market-based approaches will 
have to be designated such that they 
incentivize the participation of the busi-
ness sector at both the national and 
international levels.
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Where there was need for data collection, the com-
plexity of accessing and using such confidential 
data became painfully clear.
All of the above will apply to the new market-based 
approaches proposed above, only in much greater 
complexity in many cases, especially in terms of: 
 • Data collection
 • Recognition of national approaches internation-
ally while ensuring environmental integrity
 • Capacity-building
 • Designing new approaches and tailoring existing 
ones to meet national circumstances
Capacity-building is a prerequisite for the devel-
opment, deployment and implementation of such 
market-based approaches.
International institutions will have to be designat-
ed to provide the finance and the expertise in this 
area, while avoiding duplication and reinventing or 
rediscovering existing knowledge and experiences.
Conclusions
New market mechanisms will form an important 
part of the package of any post-climate regime. 
We have learned valuable lessons from this first 
period, but the most valuable lesson is the real-
ity of a political and regulatory market, and the 
need to acknowledge and address that. Trying to 
pretend that this is a ‘normal’ commodity market 
will only result in outcomes and actions that will, 
in the end, damage environmental credibility and 
good functioning. 
The key will be in allowing as much flexibility as 
possible, while balancing that against the realities 
of capacity to develop new mechanisms and the 
need to find an acceptable level of intrusiveness. 
All this is possible, but will require a significant 
departure from deeply held beliefs by many Par-
ties. Are they ready to compromise in Durban?
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